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PRELIMINARIES 
 
Abstract 
 
This research study focuses on the extractive minerals sector as limited current research 
exists on the Nigeria‟s mining sector, compare to oil and gas which has been extensively 
researched. Nigeria has distinctive opportunities and challenges in relation to its extractive 
industries. Over the years, Nigeria has recorded significant fortunes in terms of revenue 
generated from oil and gas sector. However, failure to manage these resources effectively, 
diversify the economy and invest in infrastructure to create inclusive growth, has kept the 
country entangled in development challenges. Furthermore, the recent instability in global oil 
markets has resulted in considerable drop in Nigeria‟s revenue and thereby compounded the 
problem, hence, diversification is necessary. While Nigeria‟s mining sector is considered to 
be a potential alternative source of revenue, poor regulatory and policy frameworks, 
inadequate infrastructure and lack of investment create a serious setback to the sector. This 
study seeks to investigate the factors that can improve foreign direct investment and enable 
the use of innovative financial instruments for financing mining projects in Nigeria. Overall, 
the study explores key issues underpinning debates on mining and development. It finds that 
reviving the mining industry in Nigeria requires integrated reform to address issues of 
investment, industrial infrastructure and effective regulation. Adopting a three-pronged 
approach of analysis through legal, spatial and economic dimensions, this thesis interrogates 
how foreign direct investment and Islamic Finance instruments, particularly Sukuk could 
stimulate Nigeria‟s mining sector.  
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1. Chapter One: Background to Issues of Mining, Infrastructure and Investment 
Introduction 
This chapter provides the context behind the role of extractive industries in Nigeria, 
highlighting the need for an appropriate policy and legal framework for investment in mining 
and infrastructure development (power and transport). The chapter sets out the rationale for 
focusing on key elements of this study, namely mining, infrastructure development, 
investment (both conventional and Islamic) and their interlinkages. The aims and objectives 
of the research as well as its contribution to the discourse on investment and knowledge are 
discussed. This chapter pursues fundamental questions underpinning the study, and the 
methodology used to carry out its investigation. Adopting legal and policy analysis, the 
chapter interrogates how foreign direct investment (FDI) and Islamic Finance instruments, 
particularly sukuk (Islamic bonds) could stimulate Nigeria‟s mining sector.  
 
1.1. Mining, Development Legal Framework: the need for a different approach  
 
Extractive industries in Nigeria comprise of two sectors; namely the mining sector and the oil 
and gas sector. The focus of this study is on the mining; however, it will also be referring to 
the oil sector in order to draw lessons. 
 
1.1.1. Introducing the Mining Sector in Nigeria  
 
Mining was a strategic sector to Nigeria‟s development prior to independence. Hard minerals 
such as coal, iron ore and lead/zink together with agriculture were the backbone of the 
Nigerian economy, and particularly mining was part of drive for development and 
industrialisation in the early 20th century. Revenue from coal mining and coal energy were 
used to build and run railway infrastructure efficiently in addition to provision of electric 
power supply for both factories and household utilities. Iron ore gave birth to the first Steel 
Plant and Steel Rolling Mills in Nigeria. One of the factors that had led to those significant 
development was the effective regulation of the sector through the mining legislations of 
1900s. The hard-mineral sector continued to be crucial to Nigeria‟s economy until oil was 
discovered.1 With the discovery of oil in the 1950s and eventual commencement of crude 
lifting in the 1970s, solid minerals were neglected as the state shifted its focus to the oil and 
                                                          
1Umejesi I., „Coal Sector Revitalization, Community Memory and Land Question in Nigeria: A Paradox of 
Economic Diversification‟ (2011) African Studies Quarterly, Vol. 12 (3), pp. 1-21, at pg. 9  
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gas sector due to its greater economic advantage compared to solid minerals. Furthermore, 
the industry declined swiftly due to the eventual departure of foreign companies due to 
nationalisation policy of 1970s/80s, and the gradual withdrawal of the Nigerian Mining 
Corporation (NMC) from active mining as the government focused on oil, virtually leaving it 
to petty and artisanal miners.2 Since then, the sector was largely abandoned until 1995, when 
the need to reform the sector became a reality. Considering the growing uncertainty in oil 
markets on one side, and the increased potentials of mining in Africa on the other, the 
Nigerian government resolved to diversify its revenue source by reviving the long-abandoned 
mining sector. In addition to the instability of its market value, Nigeria‟s oil reserves were 
predicted to last for only forty more years. Mining is, thus, seen as one of the key sectors with 
the potential to replace oil and gas.  
 
From 1995 to present, there has been some indication from the government of willingness to 
reform the sector. New policy and regulatory frameworks have been introduced in order to 
create an attractive business environment; a ministry dedicated to mining has been 
established with a minister and six technical directorates as well as a couple of research 
agencies for effective management and regulation; and extensive geological work has been 
undertaken to bring into public display the potentials of Nigeria‟s natural resources. Data 
suggests that, the geological endowment of Nigeria in solid minerals is vast. Unlike oil which 
is found in only few areas, solid minerals occur in hundreds within each of the country‟s six 
geopolitical zones.3  
 
Nevertheless, despite all this potential, the lack of investors has been a major challenge for 
mining in Nigeria as the sector has long been dominated by artisanal miners. Major 
international companies are still hesitant to invest, and the reason has been noted by the 2017 
Investment Promotion Brochure of the Nigeria‟s Ministry of Mines as „There is an 
established market perception that Nigeria is not investor friendly‟. 4 Data has shown that, 
GDP contribution of mining in Nigeria over the period of 10 years (2007-2017) was the 
                                                          
2 Alfred, Oluropo Filani, „The prospects of solid minerals industry in Nigeria‟ (2014), journal of Education and 
Research, Vol. 2, No. 1, PP. 689-696 Mining started to decline in 1970s due partly to the civil war and largely 
owing to shift in policy in 1972, where state began to take part in mining, Nigeria Mining Corporations (NMC) 
established to activate and promote state involvement in mining, which also declined later on due to oil 
prospects.  
3 Nigeria Mining Investment Promotion Brochure 2017, available at: 
<https://www.slideshare.net/FMMSDNgr/nigerias-mining-and-steel-sector-investment-brochure>   (accessed 5th 
December, 2018) pg. 11 
4 Ibid, pg. 24 
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lowest of almost all mining countries in Africa. While South Africa, Democratic Republic of 
Congo and Botswana respectively have 18%, 25%, and 40% as mining contribution to GDP, 
Nigeria recorded only 0.55%.5  Hence the choice of mining industry in this study. The table 
below emphasises this point, showing the different types of minerals found in each of the six 
zones. 
 
Table 1:1 Different types of minerals found in each of the six geopolitical zones of Nigeria 
Zone Available Mineral Resources 
Northeast Feldspars, flourspar, marble, gypsum, magnesite, tantalite, rock crystal, laterites, 
topaz, sandstones, mercury, glass sand, zircon, spinel, emerald, graphite, beryil, 
tourmaline, mica, iron ore, clay minerals, diatomite, coal, garnet, aquamarine, 
gold dust, zoisite, cassaterite, agates, amethyst chalcopyrite, kaolin, limestone, 
chalcedony, onyx, barytes, zinc, tin, uranium, quartz, mica, wolframite, 
columbite, platinum, ruby, Kaolin, trona, gypsum, cassiterite, mica, clay, tantalite, 
galena, iron ore, gemstone, sphalerite, silica sand, barite, columbite, zinc, lead, 
muscovite, quartz, tin, glass sand, monazite, feldspar, graphite, wolfram, coal, 
agate, rutile, tungsten, copper, talc, limenite, zironSilica sand, natural salt, 
sapphire 
Northwest Clay, laterite, cassiterite, columbite, illmenite galena, phyrochlorite, kaoline, 
gemstone, silica, tin ore, monazite, wolframite, thorium, granite, hyalite, kaolin, 
beryl, amethyst, gold , manganese, lateritic, clay, feldspar, black tourmaline, 
amethyst, quartz, kaolin, mica, gypsum, silimanite, clay, granite, sand, uranium 
asbestos, tourmalin, chromites, illmenite, diamond, graphite, iron ore, potash, 
silica sand 
Northcentral Bell clay, kaolin, limestone, granite, glass sand, iron ore, red clay, feldspar, silica 
sand, quartz, asbestos, marble, talc, gemstone, gold, manganese and tantalite, 
Monazite, columbite, feldspar, clay, cassiterite, gemstone, kaolin, dolomite, mica, 
zicron, marble, limonite, barite, quartz, talc, galena 
South-south silica sand, glass sand, clay, Kaolin, lateritic clay, gravel, silica sand, natural gas, 
petroleum, ball clay, bauxite, granite, river sand, clay, spring water, limestone, 
glass sand, Salt limestone, coal, maganese, mica, limenite, gold, quartz, glass 
sand, tourmaline, petroleum, natural gas, kaolin, tin ore, sharp sand, spring water, 
salt deposit, talc , granite, galena, lead, zinc, tin ore, muscovite, uranium, barite, 
Clay, glass sand, salt, silica sand, granite, coal, petroleum, natural gas, kaolin, 
limestone, lignite 
Southeast Laterite clay, crude oil, kaolinitic clay, iron ore, glass sand, petroleum, gypsum, 
coal, silica sand ceramics, Glass sand, limestone, salt, shale, ball clay, granite, 
galena, marble laterite, bentonite, phosphate, kaolin, pyrite, feldspar, petroleum, 
lignite, gypsum, sphalerite, clay, Lead, zinc ore, salt, limestone, ball clay, 
refractory clay, gypsum, granite 
Southwest Silica sand, bitumen, sharp sand, gravel, petroleum, laterite, Kaolin, feldspar, 
silica sand, mica, granite, clay, phosphate, gypsum, limestone, quartz, tar sand, 
Marble, gold, gemstone, diorite, lignite Clay, granite, talc, dolomite, feldspar, 
quartz, limestone, mica, gold, Clay, feldspar, granite, limonite, iron ore, kaolin, 
quartz, talc, marble, dolomite, tourmaline, aquamarine, amethyst, gemstones 
 
 Source: distilled from the website of the ministry of mines, Nigeria 
 
                                                          
5 Nigeria Mining Investment Promotion Brochure 2017, PP. 4-6 
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1.1.2. Oil and Gas 
 
While the booming mining sector sustained Nigeria in the 19th century, the search for oil 
begun in earnest in the 20th century. By 1908, various companies had been looking for oil in 
Nigeria, but were not successful for almost fifty years until 1956, when Shell-BP made a 
discovery in Oloibiri, Bayelsa state. The first ever crude oil production begun in 1958, yet the 
volume was only 5100 Barrel Per Day (bpd) not big enough to shift away from mining. 
Nonetheless, mineral exploration had already started to decline owing to departure of several 
foreign companies due to civil war (1967-1970). With the emergence of Nigeria from the 
civil war in 1970, its reliance on hard minerals declined as it coincided with the boom in oil 
prices and discovery of new oil fields. The combined effect of the increase in global demand 
for oil and the volume of crude production in Nigeria was a rise in economic fortunes that led 
the country into neglecting other sectors including mining.6  
 
Over time, the fortunes of Nigeria‟s oil sector significantly improved, increasing its 
reputation in the global petroleum industry. In 1971 Nigeria joined the Organisation of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) to have a stake in driving policies for the 
international oil market. Further, to consolidate its state control over natural resources, 
Nigeria established its national oil company, the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation 
(NNPC) in 1977. Nigeria became the largest oil producer in Africa, with a capacity of 2 
million bpd which is currently maintained.7 However, the country has been marred by socio-
economic turmoil despite remarkable growth in state revenues due to its failure to achieve 
expected development of local content as oil extraction still depends on foreign technology. 
The relationship between investor and host communities has been characterized by 
entrenched hostilities due to conspicuous absence of regulated Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR). This imbalance was largely attributed to the poor quality of policy and 
regulatory frameworks. For example, there are 16 different statutes governing the oil and gas 
sector, but mostly outdated as they were enacted in the 1960s. Given this experience from the 
oil and gas sector and Nigeria‟s determination to revive mining industry, there is need to 
reflect on the former to avoid repeating same mistakes in the mining sector. 
                                                          
6 A.G. Hopkin, An Economic History of West Africa (New York, London: Routledge, 2014), PP. 121-200;  
7 Jedrzey George Frynas, Manuel Paul, „A New Scramble for African Oil? Historical, Political, and Business 
Perspectives‟ (2007) African Affairs, Vol. 106, Issue 423, PP. 229-251 also available at: 
<http://nnpcgroup.com/nnpcbusiness/businessinformation/oilgasinnigeria/industryhistory.aspx>  accessed 5th 
December, 2018 
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Although, oil and gas, and mining are two distinct sectors, regulated by different set of 
legislation, yet there are some similarities between the two. Both sectors depend largely on 
foreign capital and technology to function, therefore FDI is critical to each of them and 
consequently the need for enabling environment is one of the common factors that justify 
comparison between the two sectors. Furthermore, they are both termed as extractive 
industries which is a broad umbrella pointing to myriad of issues such as CSR and resource 
course associated with these sectors. Based on these reasons, lessons from the oil and gas 
sector might be relevant in the mining sector. However, mining operations have generated 
considerable controversy. Adverse effect of extractive industries on the society and 
environment coupled with the nature of minerals as exhaustible resources, raise questions 
regarding the sustainability of these sectors. Nevertheless, these natural resources generate 
monumental   revenues to states, which could be used to create economic development and 
prosperity for citizens, provided the sector is effectively regulated and the income is managed 
carefully. This is the assumption on the basis of which this research proceeds. 
 
1.2. Development outcomes in Nigeria 
 
1.2.1. Infrastructure Development 
 
For any diversification of Nigeria‟s economy to be productive, current deficits in 
infrastructure need to be addressed. Infrastructure is crucial for a functional and efficient 
mining sector but is also necessary for the provision of vital services for citizens.  Resilient 
infrastructure serves as a link for development generally, it drives socio-economic prosperity 
through job creation and enhancement of revenue generation.  Acknowledging the need to 
address this gap, infrastructure development has recently been consistently prioritized by the 
Nigeria‟s government increasing its budgetary allocations for capital projects progressively 
from 2016 through to 2018. However, owing to population growth and rapid urbanisation in 
Nigeria, the demand for infrastructure is also increasing, experts estimated the required 
expenditure to grow from $23billion from 2014 to $77 billion by 2025.8 In 2012,  Nigeria‟s 
central bank governor disclosed that, the country would require $10 billion to be spent on 
                                                          
8 National Integrated Infrastructure Master Plan (NIIMP), 2015; PwC Nigeria,  „Infrastructure Development in 
Nigeria: Better Late than Never‟ (2016), available at: 
<https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=7814c253-4d29-44ac-a59a-b2aa51e0276d>  accessed 15th 
September, 2019 
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infrastructure annually for one decade to overcome the challenge, and he noted that 
government alone cannot provide the funding.9 Even though, all types of infrastructure in 
Nigeria are vital and require attention, the deficit in utility infrastructure appears to be more 
challenging. 
 
Power infrastructure is the most concerning of all sectors because it is critical to the nation‟s 
economy, and because Nigeria‟s potential to generate its own electricity through coal, gas, 
hydro, thermal among others. Yet, the country has been unable to generate efficient and 
stable electricity for residential or industrial consumption. Despite significant improvements 
that took place in the period 2015-2018, and with a population of about 200 million, Nigeria 
generates only 5,026.48 MW,10 while Malaysia generates 20,944MW,11 which exceeds its 
total demand of 17000MW,12 with a population of only 30,270,962 people.13 The ability to 
ensure adequate power supply is one of the key reasons that mining has been more efficient 
and attractive in other African countries.14 South Africa, for instance, currently generates 
51,309MW with a population of just 56.72million.15 In transport sector the narrative is 
similar. Road network in Nigeria is 80% unpaved, only 20% of the country is linked,16 
consequently most mines are left out of this coverage as they are predominantly in rural areas 
and the road coverage largely favours urban areas. The cause of this infrastructure constraint 
has been attributed to lack of investment, weak institutions and a poor regulatory 
framework.17  
 
                                                          
9 S. L. Sanusi, „The Role of Development Finance Institutions in Infrastructure Development: What Nigeria can 
Learn from Bndes and the Indian Infrastructure Finance‟ (2012), PP. 1-12, available at: 
<http://www.proshareng.com/admin/upload/report/gpppstakeholderforum160712.pdf>   accessed 12 
September,2018  
10 International Atomic Energy Agency (AEA), Report  on Federal Republic of Nigeria (2018), available at: 
<https://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/cnpp2018/countryprofiles/Nigeria/Nigeria.htm>  accessed: 
15th  September, 2019 
11 MD Hasanuzzaman, Jeyraj Selvaraj, Siew Chein Teo, and Shing Chyi Chua, „Energy Policy and alternative 
energy in Malaysia: Issues and Challenges for Sustainable Growth-An Update‟ (2018), Renewable and 
Sustainable Energy Review, Vol. 81, PP. 3021-3031, at Pg. 3022 
12 Ibid 
13 Worldometers, Malaysian Population (2019), available at: <https://www.worldometers.info/world-
population/malaysia-population/> accessed 16th September, 2019. The figure given above is for 2015 to 
correspond to electricity demand and supply data given above, which stands for 2015. Current (2019) population 
of Malaysia is 31,949,777 
14 Johannes Fedderke and Rob Garlick, infrastructure Development and economic growth in South Africa: A 
review of the accumulated evidence (2008), Policy Paper Number 12, PP. 1-28, at Pg. 4, available at: 
<https://econrsa.org/system/files/publications/policy_papers/pp12.pdf>  last accessed  10th September, 2019 
15 PwC Nigeria : „Infrastructure Development in Nigeria: Better Late than Never‟ (2016) Pg. 1 
16 Ibid 
17 Ibid, PP. 1-2 
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Current economic realities in Nigeria indicate that active private sector engagement and 
innovation are critically needed in order to address infrastructure deficits. The significant 
drop in government revenue occasioned by shocks in global oil market and the ever-
increasing demand for infrastructure, justify the fact that government alone might not be able 
to conduct investment. By 2030, Nigeria‟s demand for energy is predicted to expand to 
around 119MW, while the state capacity is estimated to be able to generate only 17500MW, 
there is over 100MW gap, potentially the private sector could fill this gap.18 Therefore, on the 
part of government, there is need to forge stronger collaboration with both local and foreign 
investors to create public-private partnerships (PPPs) to be able to meet this demand. For 
investors, this huge gap presents an opportunity for investment with economic returns 
estimated to be between 5-25% per each dollar invested in infrastructure projects.19 
Nevertheless, to attract the right partnerships, the Nigerian government has a challenging task 
to create enabling business environment. 
 
Sound legal and policy frameworks are needed to persuade investor to contribute in key 
sectors. Frameworks must be comprehensive in incorporating national development 
objectives alongside investors‟ interests. To start with, well-articulated master plans 
providing all necessary information on what infrastructure is needed and where. The 
feasibility studies as well as the costs and regulations governing the projects are required to 
help build prospects for investment, and direct investors in injecting their capital into the 
sector. Furthermore, policy must provide for innovative financing arrangements, promote 
local content development, particularly in the form of technology and knowledge transfer, 
which can be crucial for maintaining existing assets and the future ability of actors to carry 
out expansion independently if investment dries up or disappears. 
 
1.2.2. Outcome and Social Benefits  
 
The principal objective of  mining  is to generate revenue for national prosperity. Essentially, 
revenue collected forms the basis for economic development, which is a precondition for the 
government‟s ability to provide development in other areas including socio-economic, human 
and infrastructure development in the country. The essence of mining law and regulations has 
been to implement a policy of natioal development through resource wealth. Development in 
                                                          
18 PwC Nigeria, „Infrastructure Development in Nigeria: Better Late than Never‟ (2016), PP. 1-2 
19 Ibid 
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this context means translating state wealth into opportunities for its citizens and providing 
good governance to tackle socio-economic problems such as poverty, poor health care and 
lack of education, growing unemployment and dilapidated infrastructure. Thus, failure of 
resource-endowed countries like Nigeria to deliver these public goods and services, must 
raise questions of sustainability in their pursuit of mineral exploitation, a situation referred to 
as the „resource curse‟. Furthermore, the need to address living conditions and quality of life 
in mining communities who may live in abject poverty, other mining-associated concerns 
include unsustainability of extractive industries have attracted attentions globally. 
International efforts to achieve sustainable development have been embedded in policy-level 
discussions through the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which through its 17 goals 
emphasises the need for integrated solutions to cross-cutting underdevelopment complaint. 
 
The SDGs include provision on health (SDG3), clean water (SDG6) and quality education 
(SDG4), eradicating hunger and poverty (SDGs1&2), ensuring economic growth through 
employment and equal opportunity (SDGs5,8 &10) as well as infrastructure (SDG9) and 
preservation of environment (SDGs7,13,14&15). Sustainability in mining means mineral 
extraction shall not be for profiteering purposes only. Rather, the mining sector must have 
regard to improving peoples‟ living conditions and protection of the environment (sea, land 
and air) as well. Additionally, sustainability requires that, future generation must be 
considered in resource exploitation, and that natural resources must not be exhausted at 
expense of the people yet unborn. The SDGs have potential implications for mining, because 
the latter has tendency to degrade the environment, affecting potential land use, water and air 
pollution and rural livelihoods. It is therefore expedient, if not imperative, for a study on 
mining to consider developmental concerns. 
 
The inability of Nigeria to address these competing objectives has been attributed to various 
issues surrounding extractive industries. Lack of effective management;20 resource curse and 
over dependence on oil;21 poor governance represented by systemic corruption and official 
                                                          
20 Subai P., Towards a Functional Petroleum Industry in Nigeria: A Critical Analysis of Nigeria‟s Petroleum 
Industry Reform (2014) Doctoral Thesis submitted to Newcastle Law School, available at 
<https://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?did=1&uin=uk.bl.ethos.654903> accessed 5th  December, 2018 
21 Chindo M., Ali I.N. and Abubakar A., „The Nigerian Extractive Economy and Development‟ (2014) Journal 
of Studies and Research in Human Geography, vol. 8, no. 2, PP. 1843-6587 
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impunity;22 presence of powerful NOC and government interference.23 No doubt, each of 
these issues has its own challenges, however in Nigeria scholars suggest an 
integrated/coordinated set of interventions are needed. This thesis sets out to examine the role 
of law in facilitating not only Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), but also innovative 
investment vehicles such as Sukuk with potential to generate liquidity for mining and enhance 
development.  
 
Furthermore, the recent and unprecedented rise in the number of resource-rich countries from 
Africa entering the global mining sector, is yet another challenge to compound the already 
existing problem of stiff competition for FDI among African states. In addition, Nigeria‟s 
mining sector is particularly disadvantaged: it is dominated by small scale miners who 
themselves are short of both liquidity and the technology needed to pursue serious mining. 
Thus, this thesis explores the question of how innovations in the current investment law and 
policy frameworks help to respond to new challenges and opportunities? This thesis, is 
therefore, about generating an integrated reform of Nigeria‟s mining sector investment 
framework. It therefore includes a socio-economic and political assessment of Nigeria‟s 
mining sector. 
 
1.3. Investment, Sukuk and Islamic/Ethical Finance 
 
1.3.1. Opportunities for use of Islamic Finance in the Mining sector   
 
Mining requires capital and sophisticated technology, which most developing countries, 
including Nigeria, do not have, hence such resource-rich countries need foreign multinational 
corporations (MNCs) to help extract their mineral wealth. Foreign companies can mobilise 
finance, equipment and expertise into a resource-endowed country through a special 
arrangement. This is commonly termed foreign direct investment. FDI is paramount to 
development and prosperity of poor nations, particularly those that depend substantially on 
natural resources, FDI can create revenue for governments, help bring development to 
citizens through localised job creation, local content development and a range of other socio-
                                                          
22 Mamman A. Lawan, The Paradox of Underdevelopment amidst Oil in Nigeria: A Socio-legal Explanation 
(2008), Doctoral Thesis submitted to Warwick School of Law, available at <http://Nigeria%20database/Lawan-
Warwick.pdf> accessed 8th  December, 2018 
23 Inomiesa Oghenemarho, Sustainable Exploration of Oil and Gas in the United Kingdom and Nigeria (2016) 
Doctoral Thesis submitted to Liverpool John Moores University, available at 
<https://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?did=1&uin=uk.bl.ethos.689382> accessed 8 December, 2018 
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economic benefits arising from CSR arrangement. Thus, FDI is significant to the mining 
sector process discussed in this thesis.  
 
However, due to factors including an increase in the number of mineral discoveries across 
Africa, the presence of MNCs in Nigeria is still below the threshold necessary for robust 
development of the mining sector. The sector is overcrowded with poorly equipped local 
enterprises that lack the finance to expand and sustain growth. Although, few foreign 
corporations do have the technology required for the resource extraction, the need for 
financial liquidity continues to be a common challenge for both domestic and external mining 
enterprises in Nigeria. It is usual that, corporate entities raise finance through loans or other 
credit facilities, and a conventional mode of project financing includes bond issuance. 
However, the main problem is high interest and possibility of default, which inhibits trust of 
investors. Therefore, potential alternative is Sukuk, an asset-backed bonds that have potential 
for greater ethical stewardship. Furthermore, while the use of conventional financing has 
been widely researched, the use of Islamic financial derivatives, particularly Sukuk, in 
relation to mining has been less-developed.  
 
A key challenge associated with researching Islamic finance is the limited literature. The 
interaction between Islamic finance and conventional approaches to finance has been 
evolving. More so, re-enactment of Sukuk from its classical construct into current 
conceptions of a financing vehicle is considered to be the latest development in the field of 
Islamic finance.  All this would suggest the validity of the general presumption that, bodies of 
references available in this area might not be enough to present convincing evidence from 
which researcher on sukuk might draw conclusion. However, the widespread use of Sukuk in 
many other jurisdictions of the world has led to production of significant amounts of 
academic work on this subject matter. By drawing on examples of best practices from 
documented experience of Malaysia, the United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.) and the United 
Kingdom (U.K.), this study pursues fundamental questions on the suitability and applicability 
of Islamic bonds in the Nigeria‟s mining sector. Nevertheless, use of Sukuk in the economic 
sector dominated by common law (Nigeria‟s mining industry) is likely to require engagement 
with Nigeria‟s legal system debates over legal pluralism. 
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1.3.2. Debates over legal pluralism and the role of Islamic legal systems 
 
Legal pluralism refers to „a context in which multiple legal terms co-exist‟.24 This is to say 
the co-existence of different legal traditions in a particular area or transaction. It could be 
either various laws that originated from different sources, or of similar origin but differing 
level of application. Therefore, relevance of legal pluralism to this study is multidimensional. 
Sukuk are a pragmatic but also pluralistic instrument, grounded in Islamic legal tradition but 
yet practically regulated by mainstream financial regulations. On the other hand, mining 
brings together different parties, namely foreign investors, the state and rural communities, 
and therefore is a complex venture. Stakeholders are grounded in different regulatory 
traditions, with a divergence of approaches on rights, responsibilities, and processes,‟25 which 
can impact on what is observed to be fair. In this thesis multiplicity of law is viewed as 
strength to the system rather than a weakness, because evidence exists to show that, „the same 
situation might provide incentives to certain aspects of mining such as dispute resolution.‟26 
 
Despite the differences between conventional understanding of Sukuk and mining, they are 
not mutually exclusive. While mineral investment is predominantly governed by western 
oriented laws that recognises rent payment on money i.e. interest and the fundamentals of 
Islamic finance involve total rejection of interest, beyond this reconcilable challenge, there 
are many factors to underpin the compatibility of Sukuk with minerals investment. Although 
mining is both time-consuming and capital-intensive, potentials of Sukuk can generate long 
term liquidity corresponding to land values. Thus, there is need to harmonise Sukuk and 
conventional investment frameworks using legal instruments. Countries like Malaysia have 
used comprehensive frameworks that allow for broad-based financing including Islamic 
finance instruments in their national investment regimes. Contrary to critics in Nigeria, who 
tended to see Islamic finance investment vehicles as a form of religion intervening in social 
areas of business and law. Literature show that, Sukuk have been used in various countries 
mainly for its ethical component. The pluralistic nature of Nigeria‟s social and legal system 
                                                          
24 Brian Z. Tamanaha, „The Rule of Law and Legal Pluralism in Development‟ in B. Z. Tamanaha, Caroline S. 
and M. Woodcock (eds) Legal Pluralism and Development (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 2012) 
pg.34 
25  Mey Taylor and Nicholas Menzies, „Unearthing Pluralism: Mining, Multilaterals, and State‟ in B. Z. 
Tamanaha, Caroline S. and M. Woodcock (eds) Legal Pluralism and Development (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press; 2012) pg. 229 
26 Taylor and Menzies, „Unearthing Pluralism: Mining, Multilaterals, and State‟ (2012), pg. 229 
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provides support for innovation, which by origin forms part of norms underlying the 
commercial practice of Nigerian firms and MNCs. 
 
Often legal order in a society reflects social norms underlying it.  Rene and Brierley assert 
that, „historically there are different legal systems corresponding to different social systems‟. 
Accordingly, where several social systems co-existed in a given community, it would be 
difficult to have only one legal order governing the entire affairs of that community without 
exclusion. The framework within which legal pluralism operates is therefore “legal system”. 
As far back as 1900 five legal systems were famous: Romanistic, Germanic, Anglo-Saxon, 
Slavic and Islamic,‟27 which sits alongside customary practices locally instituted. In many 
countries, two or more sources of law exist side-by-side, this is known as “pluralistic legal 
systems” evidenced by for example Nigeria‟s legal system contrasting with England‟s 
“monolithic legal system”. Socio-legal studies have found that, in every society there are 
social systems that underlie the existence of law.28 Therefore, the more the social orders that 
exist in an area, the more pluralistic its legal system, hence in order to appreciate legal 
pluralism, it is crucial to understand the relationship between law and society.  
 
In a social system, law is conducted through “norms”. How does norm evolve? Robert B. 
Seidman explained the process of evolving norms arguing that, „A repetitive pattern of 
behaviour in society is a by-product of a long standing practice that earned their legitimacy 
by reason of continuous usage through generations, and that is what Max Weber referred to 
as “norm”.‟29 People subscribe to norms of a society because they are viewed as socially  
accepted standards, and this is intuitive to law. To change any conduct in society, one must 
change norms.  Hence, in order to make law for the state, authorities often reiterate the same 
norms in official language. 30 This then becomes positive law, and this kind of law tends to be 
more popular in society because it originates from people‟s way of life. This sort of organic 
law contains “traditional legitimacy”31 in contrast to the one imported and imposed on  
society, which is often resisted. 
                                                          
27 David Rene and Brierley John Elmes Campbell, Major legal systems in the world today: an introduction to 
the comparative study of law (London: Stevens; 1985), Pg. 45 
28 David Rene and Brierley John Elmes Campbell, Major legal systems in the world today (1985),PP.22-30 
29 Robert B. Seidman, The State Law and Development (London: Croom Helm Ltd; 1978) PP. 16-17 
30 Ibid  
31 Weber Max, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, (Hoboken: Taylor and Francis; c2013), pg. 168,  E-
books,  available at  <https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uel/detail.action?docID=1111791>  accessed on 15th 
December, 2018 
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Pre-colonial Nigeria was made up of a typically diverse society. Principles of Islamic faith 
were deeply rooted into ways of life in what is currently the northern and the western regions. 
Eventually, this metamorphosed into norms governing the conduct of those communities. In 
contrast, social behaviour in the East and South was characterised by a set of norms that had 
emerged from traditional belief and superstitious practices dated back to generations of 
ancestors. Colonialism transformed these norms and faith based practices and as such the 
British colonial administration instituted common law and subsequently Nigerian 
governments have maintained this legacy in spite of  multiple and often competing norms 
guiding conduct of  society.32 Even though legal pluralism could bring challenges in 
developing countries including Nigeria, it also presents distinctive opportunities.33 For 
example, a tendency to accept law introduced by state officials, because the society is 
structurally diversified, and any formal innovation is therefore likely accepted. This is based 
on the legal tendency theory which says: 
 
(a)The social system which is based on the pluralistic values provides a means of 
introducing mutually acceptable order to the members of this society with precise 
formal prescriptions regulating their social behaviour, changeable only as a result of 
an outbreak of conflicting social forces. (b) The social system based on homogenous 
values also provides a means of introducing a mutually acceptable order to the 
members of this society but with few precise formal prescriptions, thus relying upon 
unified convictions and imposed informal measures of social control. 
 
However, although the structure of Sukuk instrument follows certain ethical principles that 
are based on Islamic orientation, it is not entirely regulated by Shari‟ah. The fact that, Sukuk 
transactions have been floated successfully in jurisdictions where the legal system is not 
Islamic, proves that Sukuk is a pragmatic tool, amenable to all legal systems within specific 
formal descriptions. It is an applied model rather than a rigid jurisprudential concept. 
 
 
 
                                                          
32 Oba A.A., „Islamic Law as Customary Law: The Changing Perspective in Nigeria‟ (2002), International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly, vol. 51, No. 4, pp. 817-820 
33 Caroline S. and Michael W., „Legal Pluralism and Development Policy‟, in Brian Z. and T. Caroline (eds) 
Legal Pluralism and Development (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 2012), Pg. 34 
 14 
 
1.4. Methodology and Research Scope  
 
1.4.1. Aims, Objectives and Research Questions 
 
This research seeks to critically evaluate Nigeria‟s existing policy and legal frameworks with 
respect to investment in Nigeria in relation to mining and development potentials, and to 
assess the relevant Nigerian legal provisions on the role of stakeholders in the mining 
industry, to understand the gaps between theoretical and practical contexts of the Mining and 
Minerals Act, 2007. Furthermore, it attempts to examine the responsiveness of Islamic law 
with the aim of ascertaining the adaptability of Sukuk investment to Nigeria‟s mining sector. 
Through the survey of different types of investment frameworks in various jurisdictions 
(Malaysia, the UAE and the UK), it seeks to make a comparative study with the aim of 
considering the feasibility of replicating such approaches in Nigeria to foster the realisation 
of national goals to revive the mining sector. Based on these aims and objectives, this study 
seeks to answer the following two questions. 
 
How flexible and innovative is the current Nigeria‟s mineral investment law and 
policy framework to respond to new challenges and opportunities? 
 
How does the current Nigeria‟s legal framework facilitate development through 
investment and Sukuk? 
 
1.4.2. Contribution to academic discourse and originality 
 
The original contributions of this thesis are twofold: it contributes to the existing literature by 
presenting innovative perspectives on investment strategies in Nigeria‟s mining sector for, 
inter alia, community and infrastructure development by considering a broader range of 
investment models, including alternate cash flows. It does so by introducing additional 
„investment Sukuk‟ as a model through which both foreign and local investment could be 
attracted to the sector and community development achieved. Sukuk instrument is, itself, a 
new investment mechanism that was first launched in 2001 by the Bahrain Monetary Agency 
(BMA) and since then, there has been a growing literature on Sukuk. However, none of them 
explores the viability and implications of using Sukuk to finance mining projects and to 
deliver developmental projects, such as infrastructure and social development, to resource 
communities in Nigeria. This research addresses this gap by drawing analogies with countries 
with similar legal systems to Nigeria where Sukuk have recorded remarkable success. 
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Therefore, the study aims at answering the following critical question: given the origin of 
Nigerian legal system in English common law, can Sukuk as a product of Islamic financial 
system be sustained under Nigerian law? Based upon this, the research explores relevance of 
Sukuk in Nigeria leading to eventual inducement of foreign investors, especially from the 
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).  
 
Beyond economic success approaches, the research also contributes to literature on corporate 
social responsibility (CSR). This study seeks to fill a gap between law in theory and law in 
practice with the context of CSR in Nigeria. Sections 116 & 117 of the Minerals Act, 2007 
provides for community development agreements (CDAs), which is widely acknowledged as 
the first legislative approach to declare CSR as a mandatory requirement in the mining 
industry. Although, by these provisions, the government is apparently seeking to create an 
enabling environment necessary to attract investment and development,34 this research argues 
that, the failure of the Act to provide for some crucial matters, such as „community 
representatives‟, could undermine practical success of the CDAs.  
 
While it is true, as suggested by empirical evidence that, the potentials of CDAs to reduce 
conflict with mining communities and assure uninterrupted business have proved attractive to 
many investors,35 lack of adequate provision on who represents communities is a source of  
tension. The findings of Eyen Okpanachi, underpins this argument. In that study, the author 
identified lack of confidence in representation and the way representatives redistributed 
dividends of resource extraction as one of the key factors responsible for sustained conflict in 
resource communities.36  
 
This, research contributes also to the debate on CDA‟s legal framework by discussing the 
practical consequences of its shortcomings and proposing a solution. This contribution is 
significant in terms of its aim to address loopholes in the CDAs regime that are capable of 
undermining the main objective of the law which is creating a „safe environment‟ for 
businesses to operate and for all actors to safeguard their rights. The argument of this thesis is 
therefore, unless there is effective legal mechanism to ensure proper representation 
                                                          
34 Eghosa Osa Ekhator and Linimose Anyiwe, „Foreign Direct Investment and Nigerian Law‟ (2016) IJLMA, 
Vol.58 No.1, Pg. 133 
35 Kendra E. Dupuy, „Requirement of community development in mining laws‟ (2014) The Extractive Industries 
and Society, Vol. 1, PP. 200-2015 
36 Eyene Okpanachi, „Confronting the Governance Challenges of Developing Nigeria‟s Extractive Industry: 
Policy and Performance in the Oil and Gas Sector‟ (2011) Review of Policy Research, Vol. 28, no. 1, PP. 25-34 
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communities in CDA negotiations, then mistrust is inevitable, and the consequence of may be 
stability of mining activities and investment more generally. This is supported by the U.S. 
Energy Report of May 2016 on Nigeria, which maintains, actions of sabotage by resource 
communities in Nigeria have resulted in massive divestment in the extractive resources.   
Furthermore, this research is interdisciplinary, using law and policy, investment and 
economics 
 
1.4.3. Legal reasoning, research methods and approach 
 
This research is case study based and adopts a qualitative approach relying mostly on a desk 
appraisal of legal, policy and investment documents as well as reports on the SDGs and from 
civil society organisations, periodicals, Islamic law codification and practice to explore the 
suitability of existing frameworks to achieve development objectives in the context of the 
mining industry and infrastructure needs in Nigeria. The focus is not merely on the formal 
legislative or policy framework but also on action plans and their implementation. The choice 
of methodology has been substantially determined by the nature and scope of the research, 
which is interdisciplinary in nature drawing on legal and policy assessments, economic and 
investment analysis as well as sociological contexts. In seeking to examine investment and 
legal frameworks relating to extractive industries, this study adopts qualitative methods. 
Qualitative research, as opposed to quantitative, is interpretative, exploratory and critical; it 
uses a range of data and material and does not provide a single answer to question. Unlike 
quantitative, qualitative research uses qualitative techniques within qualitative paradigm 
instead of theory-testing and identification of variables.37 
 
Although, this study involves economic and social concepts and reasoning, it is primarily 
legal in nature, focusing on evaluation of investment law and policy relating to Nigerian 
mineral sector. In selecting methodology, therefore, the question raised was what sort of 
paradigm guides a conceptual framework, through an interdisciplinary but predominantly 
legal approach? Discussion on the relevance of this paradigm to legal research has recently 
reached appreciation of relationship between law and other disciplines. Although, law is 
neither a natural nor social science by description, a legal paradigm facilitates identifying 
                                                          
37 Clarke V. and Braun, V. Successful Qualitative Research: A Practical Guide for Beginners (London: Sage; 
2013) PP. 20-27 
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vital concepts in theory building,38 and provides the way, pattern and system of doing 
interdisciplinary research.39 Law is a multidimensional and complex subject and therefore 
multiple theories are used for analysing different problems. To start with, this study adopts 
legal pluralism as the lens to recognise the socio-historical and cultural diversity of law in 
Nigeria. Furthermore, a Critical Legal Studies (CLS) approach has been adopted to 
interrogate socio-economic underpinnings of the key national investment instruments such as 
the Nigerian Minerals Act 2007. CLS is a technique of legal analysis that brings out the 
hidden political nature of law; also throws light on the interpretation nature of legal 
language.40  
 
The difficulty in using this legal approach lies in determining the boundaries and 
interlinkages between economic and law so as not to overshadow what is generally meant to 
be a pragmatic and inter-disciplinary study. To overcome this challenge, the research uses 
institutional theory which provides a deeper understanding of stakeholder and power 
relationships in participative governance. This will involve adopting a range of empirical 
research methods grounded in socio-legal approaches which have been successfully used in 
similar studies to investigate the impact of law, how it works, how the actors in a legal 
system behave, and more importantly the overall practical benefits of law to society. These 
methods will be adopted to test the international and domestic legal instruments and policy 
material that affects investment and development in Nigerian. Other legal approaches such as 
doctrinal analysis and black letter law are fit and proper for interpretation and policy analysis, 
yet they are not prioritised in this study due to the socio-economic element of the study. 
These alternative approaches can be quite exclusive and may fail to allow interdisciplinary 
research prospect. Hence, CLS and empirical methods are more suitable to this work for these 
reasons.41  
 
Finally, as a case study-based research that undertakes law and policy analysis involving 
various documents from different sources, identifying a uniform approach of analysis is 
crucial. Nature and source of data used contribute to the accurate decision as to the most 
suitable analytical approach. Therefore, data for this study is drawn from a range of resources 
                                                          
38 Ziegler, P.A. „General Theory of Law as a Paradigm for Legal Research‟ (1988) MLR, Vol. 51 Pg. 569 
39 Habermas, J. Knowledge and Human Interest (London: Heinman Publishers;1978), PP.20-30 
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such as e-databases in accessing books, journal articles and other relevant materials such as 
periodicals, policy documents, reports (including development indicators produced by 
international development agencies and reports on international and Islamic financial market) 
and legislations as well as newspapers. Accordingly, the content analysis method has been 
used to analyse information extracted from these sources. The criteria for selecting case 
studies namely Malaysia, the UAE and the UK, included historical ties, common legal system 
and level of development. Drawing on the best international practices obtained in those 
jurisdictions, this study makes a compelling conclusion on what needs to be done in Nigeria 
to reinvigorate the extractive minerals industry and achieve its national development 
objectives. 
 
This thesis is structured through 7 chapters. The first chapter is an introduction to the thesis. 
It introduces issues of mining, infrastructure development and investment in Nigeria. In 
addition to setting out the context of the study, aims and objectives of the research as well as 
its contribution to the discourse on investment and knowledge and the methodology used to 
carry out its investigation are discussed in the chapter. Chapter two provides a historical 
account of pluralism in the Nigerian legal system and the differentiated position of Islamic 
finance and Sukuk within Nigeria‟s investment frameworks, while chapter three provides 
conceptual argument on the key themes through a literature review. It explores the 
relationship between four following dimensions: law, development, investment, and Sukuk in 
order to contextualise their meanings within the conceptual framework of this thesis. But also 
highlights the current state in the literature and suggests a way forward.  
 
A critical review of legal and policy frameworks for development and investment in mining 
and infrastructure will be presented in chapter four, which includes interrogation of the duty 
of states to create prosperity as well as the role of the private sector in promoting 
development. Furthermore, the chapter looks at other elements critical for attractive 
investment regime, such as economic freedom and infrastructure. Inadequacies of Nigeria‟s 
regime are discussed in contrast with the trajectory of legal and policy improvements 
emerging in some African countries like Ghana and South Africa. Chapter five is on Sukuk 
investment and its potentials for Nigeria‟s extractive industries. In effect, the chapter looks at 
ethical constituents of Sukuk from the perspective of Islamic law and how these legal 
principles are embedded in the contractual structure of Sukuk. The chapter also investigates 
the roots of the contemporary arguments on the legality or otherwise of the conventional 
 19 
 
structuring with the aim to ascertaining what is both ethically and pragmatically suitable for 
the Nigeria‟s mining sector.  
In chapter six, cases of Malaysia, UAE and UK will be explored. Distinctive experience and 
differentiated practice of each jurisdiction along with their corresponding successes and 
challenges in the field of Islamic finance, investment and law are studied in this chapter in 
order to identify suitable model for Nigeria. Chapter seven is a conclusion for the thesis, 
where reflecting on issues raised in the preceding chapters, the final argument of this study 
has been made. Creating a proposed comprehensive investment framework for Nigeria‟s 
mining sector, the prospects and challenges of implementing the proposal of this study has 
been discussed. 
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2. Chapter Two: Historical Context of Law, Mineral investment and Sukuk in 
Nigerian 
 
Introduction 
Creating a legal investment framework for the Nigerian context requires an understanding of 
the historical development of Nigerian investment law and its relation to English common 
law. It is integral to reflect upon the extent to which Nigerian independence influenced policy 
changes and how the subsequent nationalization of foreign interest presented an opportunity 
for a newly independent Nigeria to assert its economic sovereignty. Through the presentation 
of the historical account of these relationships a critical perspective emerges helping to 
situate Islamic law within the Nigerian legal system as well as the differentiated position of 
Islamic finance within these legal perspectives. Thus, the overall aim of this chapter is to 
assess the compatibility of Sukuk investment models against the emergence of conventional 
financial legal approaches.  
 
2.1. Part A: A brief history of Nigeria with reference to the Mining Sector 
 
2.1.1. Legacies of Colonial Rule in Nigeria 
 
British colonial rule has had systemic impacts on Nigeria: forging its modern nation-state 
pluralistic legal traditions and framing issues of natural resource extraction. In understanding 
the development of modern Nigerian investment narratives and associated legal approaches it 
is essential to understand impact of colonial legal tradition on modern approaches. A major 
feature of British colonial rule in Nigeria and Empire more generally was the export of legal 
systems used to transform colonial territories. This is illustrated by the Companies Ordinance 
1912, which introduced the first legal instrument ever to regulate investment activities in 
Nigeria. Enacted by the British colonial administration, it was rooted in the English common 
law tradition of 'commercial justice' and arbitration, where common empire practice meant 
business entities that were mainly owned and run by aliens in Lagos were subject to 
Ordinance.42 However, it simply confirmed the transformation of British interest in the 
territory since first establishing the „Oil Rivers Protectorate‟ in 1884, some 20 years after the 
                                                          
42 Eghosa and Linimose, „FDI and the Law in Nigeria‟ (2016), PP. 126-127 
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annex of Lagos in 1861 which had placed commerce and natural resource extraction at its 
root.43  
 
Organised mining was not started until 1903 when the colonial government established the 
Mineral Survey of the Northern Protectorate.44 This Survey together with its counterpart in 
the Southern Protectorate have yielded result through to 1940 where Nigeria became a major 
producer of such minerals as tin and coal. Due to industrial and economic significance of 
coal, the Nigerian Coal Corporation was created in 1950 by the Nigerian Coal Corporation 
Act of the same year.45 With amalgamation of the different parts of Nigeria in 1914, a 
supreme court with nationwide jurisdiction was established through Ordinance to apply 
doctrines of common law and equity, and the statute of general application which was in 
force in England on the 1st January, 1900, the obvious implication of which means, 
applicability of English commercial/company law throughout Nigeria.46 This and the 
company ordinance, that had seen series of amendments, continued to represent the legal 
framework for investment in Nigeria up until 1960. 
 
2.1.2. Independence and Nationalisation and its links with foreign investment practices 
 
1960 was a turning point for economic regulations in the developing nations of the world; 
Africa, Asia and Latin America. Influenced by a growing tide of decolonisation, emerging 
states deemed foreign enterprises as rival elements that could, unless controlled, undermine 
                                                          
43 AOY Raji and TS Abejide, „The British Mining and Oil Regulations in Colonial Nigeria 1914-1960s: An 
Assessment‟  (2014) Singaporean Journal of Business Economics and Management Studies, Vol. 2, No. 10,        
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44 Generally, pre-independence mining was dominated by foreign enterprises. Royal Niger Company, a British 
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all previous guidelines issued by the regulatory institutions. With coal mining assuming prominence in the late 
1940s, the coal mines Ordinance 1950 was promulgated. 
45 Oladotun Alokolaro and George Ukwuoma, „Mining Law Review: Mining-Nigeria‟ (2017), Mining Law 
Review, Edition 6, available at: < https://thelawreviews.co.uk/edition/the-mining-law-review-edition-
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Clement A., „Legal Basis for Research Ethics Governance in Nigeria‟ (2014), available at: 
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both their sovereignty and the growth of domestic business.47 Consequently, a sway of 
legislations were made to ensure implementation of new policies adopted in order to check 
the influence of multinational corporations in those jurisdictions. In Nigeria, for example, the 
Exchange Control Act of 1962, the Immigration Act of 1963, the Company Decree of 1968 
and the Nigerian Enterprise Promotion Decree of 1970, came into existence with the principal 
objective being to stimulate indigenous business while crippling the foreign ones. Section 
10(1)(a) of the Exchange Control Act provides that, no one shall transfer any security to 
anyone outside Nigeria until permission from the minister sought for and obtained. Similarly, 
section 8(1) of the Immigration Act, prohibited a non-citizen from establishing or taking over 
a business or even to practicing a profession without clear consent of the minister.48 Such 
restrictions accompanied by the widespread nationalisation of alien economic interest were 
meant to, and did, indeed, operate to discourage foreign investment in Nigeria. This was also 
true in other countries in the 1970s.  
 
2.1.3.  Extractive Industries and the Policy of Nationalisation  
 
Due to the economic and industrial significance of coal mineral, the Nigerian Coal 
Corporation was established in 1950 as a state company with monopoly over mining, 
processing and sales of coal and coke products in Nigeria. This can be arguably, considered 
as a step towards expanding national influence on the resource industry. The fortunes of coal 
industry continued beyond independence. In the period after 1960 however, the industry 
declined in production and ultimately came to stop due to eruption of civil war in the country 
on one hand, and discovery of oil minerals on the other.49  From 1960, the minerals industry, 
specifically oil became very critical to Nigerian economy, replacing Marketing Board of 
1940s and1950s. Initially, in 1950‟s extraction of oil-mineral in the country was handled by 
Shell-BP, but by 1960s the potentials of the industry attracted many other foreign companies. 
Oil revenue became so significant that all development plans were based on it. Given that 
significance of oil, Nigeria needed to take control of the industry in order to maximise its 
revenue. The need for Nigerian nationals to acquire the technical know-how of mineral 
                                                          
47 Ismail M., The Nigerian enterprises Promotion Decrees (1972 and 1977) and Indigenisation in Nigeria (1985) 
PP. 57-85, a Ph.D. Thesis submitted to University of Warwick, available at: 
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48 Amao. O., „Corporate Social Responsibility, Multinationals and the Law in Nigeria: Controlling 
Multinationals in Home State‟ (2008), Journal of African Law, Vol. 52, No. 1, PP. 90-100 
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exploitation and marketing it was another factor that informed the resolution to get rid of 
foreign dominance in the sector.50  
 
The first policy step taken was the promulgation of Petroleum Decree of 1969, followed by 
establishment of Nigerian National Oil Company (NNOC) 1971. The Decree required 
participation of NNOC as a condition for validity of any mining lease. Accordingly, 35% 
shares of French Oil Company; SAFRAF (ELF) was acquired in the same year. Similarly, all 
other foreign companies were compelled to relinquish part of their equity ownership to 
NNOC. Not only that, but Nigeria signed agreement for progressive take over, “the greater 
the level of the company‟s crude oil output the greater the government share in ownership.”51 
The fortunes of oil improved greatly; by 1971 the production capacity was four times that of 
1966.Hence government ownership by 1974 was 55% as declared by the second national 
development plan (1970/74). Ever since then, Nigeria held the control of the oil industry. Of 
the 7 joint venture operated so far, the government had 60% of the equity, except in one 
where government had 55%, Shell had 30% while Elf and gip had 10% and 5% respectively. 
At present, no foreign company is granted OPL (Oil Prospecting Licence) directly, all OPL 
are held by NNPC, prospective companies can only negotiate partnership with the NNPC, 
and most of the agreements are PSC (Production Sharing Contracts), where the foreign 
partner bears the entire risk involved.52 However, some acts of nationalisation were fuelled 
international political reasons. The takeover by Nigerian government of the entire asset of 
British Petroleum in the late 1970s was intended to force British government soften its stance 
on South Africa and Rhodesia. 53  
 
2.1.4. International Efforts to Control Investment  
 
The formidable effort of new self-governed nations to control their economy began in 1960 
when about twenty states, including China and Nigeria, were admitted into the United 
Nations by resolution 1515.54 From this period, certain principles of international law 
relevant to investment were sharply contested by developing countries, including Nigeria. 
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Requirement to accord aliens a treatment of international minimum standard better known as 
the „principle of state responsibility‟ was considered to be unfairly weighted in favour of rich 
nations. Postulations of that principle demand host countries to provide investors a treatment 
higher than that available to their citizens where the latter falls below the so-called minimum 
international standard.55 Having contradicted clearly the determinations of the new sovereign 
states to promote local investments, the traditional formulation of the principle of state 
responsibility was very strongly rejected. Instead, the call for upholding permanent 
sovereignty of states over properties lying within their territory, especially, natural resources, 
prevailed. To further consolidate their powers to regulate investment affairs, developing 
countries asserted 4 basic principles, including the following:56 
 
1-State has the right to control entry, acquisition of property and activities of 
Transnational Corporations; 
2-The right to nationalise foreign property is inherent attribute of sovereignty and 
subject to no condition other than compensation; 
3-State will observe investment agreement voluntarily entered into subject to 
sovereign power to renegotiate, review or unilaterally modify in light of new 
developments.; and 
4-Whereas some incentives to drive FDI might be put in place, treatments accorded to 
foreigners shall in no way be better than those given to domestic ones. 
 
As a result, states‟ permanent sovereignty over natural resources became a settled principle of 
international law. And by UN resolution 1803, right of state to expropriate foreign property in 
the public interest has been well affirmed with the requirement of appropriate compensation 
been recognized as the only consequential obligation in that circumstance. The right of each 
nation to control investment has equally been lauded.57 With these principles of international 
investment law set in place, states begun to consolidate national development agendas by 
redirecting the focus of their respective investment policies inwards.  
 
However, owing to factors such as corruption, structural institutional failure and lack of 
effective governance, legislations aiming to drive internal development failed to achieve the 
intended goals, local enterprises could not prove ability to sustain the economy. Stimulated 
by the concrete reality of the need to attract FDI, Nigeria had to embraced liberalisation 
policy that was, then, being marketed by IMF and World Bank, infamously referred to as 
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„World Bank Structural Adjustment Policy‟ (SAP).58 This period has seen legislative reversal 
of laws made in 1970. In effect, Nigerian Investment Promotion Act 1988 came to water 
down the Enterprise Promotion Decree of 1977 by allowing 100% foreign participation with 
consent of the relevant authority. Ever since then, Nigeria has progressively continued to 
liberalise its economy, soften investment regime and improve the business climate in order to 
attract FDI into various sectors, especially natural resources.59 
 
 
2.2. The Nigerian Investment Promotion Commission Act and other legislation 
 
2.2.1. Current investment legislation and frameworks operating in Nigeria  
 
Although, there is, today, several legislations that together form up the regulatory framework 
for investment in the country, the Nigerian Investment Promotion Act is the lead document 
on the subject. This Act is meant to regulate, coordinate and promote investment activities in 
Nigeria. Through an agency called, Nigeria Investment Promotion Commission (NIPC), 
created by the Act, vital investment data including opportunities in the country and sources of 
capital are collected, collated and disseminated. Even though, other legislations regulating 
specific sectors of the economy do exist, NIPC Act is the centrepiece as far as investment in 
Nigeria is concerned. In fact, major changes to investment regime were reflected in the NIPC 
Act. For example, section 17 of the Act is the core of liberalism as it permits foreigners to 
invest and participate in the operation of any company or business in Nigeria subject to no 
limitation other than S.16 of the Nigerian constitution which termed some areas of business 
as „major economy‟ and declared them exclusive for the state for strategic reason, and that, 
the Act of National Assembly, which is the NIPC Act, shall be the one to determine those no-
go areas. Accordingly, section 33 of NIPC Act spelled out the „negative list‟ as including 
inter alia, production of arms and ammunition as well as production or dealing in narcotic 
drugs and psychotropic substances. In effect, the new provision has excluded oil and gas 
which used to be inclusive.60  
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In contrast, section 29 of Minerals and Mining Act incorporated the application of relevant 
provisions of Investment Promotion Commission Act and that Foreign Exchange (Monitoring 
and Miscellaneous) Act, Cap F34 LFN 2004 to all investment in minerals under the Act. The 
point is foreign investors are now allowed to own and run oil field without having to partner 
with indigenous company, which has never been the case. Prior to that, citizen participation 
was a condition necessary for foreign investment in Nigeria.61 Other restrictions that had 
sought to squeeze FDI in Nigeria, ware limitations imposed by Industrial Development 
Coordination Decree 1988, Nigerian Enterprise Promotion Decree 1972 and the Exchange 
Control Act 1962 on outflow of investment profit and use of foreign currency to fund 
business in Nigeria. All were removed by Foreign Exchange and Monetary Miscellaneous 
Protection Act, as well as by the NIPC Act. Instead, the Act dismantled all restrictions on 
repatriation of profit, and allowed the use of foreign currency to finance investment in 
Nigeria.62 To ease administration of the Act, a commission, Nigerian Investment Promotion 
Commission has, by virtue of S.4, been established to carry out the following functions:63 
 
Be the agency of the federal government to coordinate and monitor all promotion 
activities pertaining to investment 
Initiate and support measures which shall enhance investment climate for both 
domestic and foreign investors 
Collect, collate, analyse and disseminate information about investment opportunities 
and the sources of investment capital 
Register and keep record of all enterprises to which this Act applies 
 
The foregoing provisions of the NIPC Act means that, the commission shall be a platform 
that attract investors to and connect with their respective areas of interest. The commission 
would achieve these objectives by doing two things. First, is to support specific sectors create 
enabling environment for business. And second, is to research and publish investment 
opportunities that exist in Nigeria as well as sources of finance for investors. 
 
2.2.2. Other notable legislation and shifting approaches to encourage investment 
 
Although, the backward-and-forward shifts of investment policy were largely made by 
amending relevant provisions of the legislation, yet, there are few more enactments that are 
equally critical for investment in Nigeria. Compliance with other complementary instruments 
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is essential for putting up investment in Nigeria. NIPC Act itself provided that, no enterprise, 
domestic or foreign, can legally operate in Nigeria except in conformity with the Companies 
and Allied Matters Act (CAMA) 1999 (now 2004 as amended).64 One of those fundamental 
requirements under CAMA is obtaining valid registration of the company or business name, 
as the case may be. Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC) is the body statutorily empowered 
to administer CAMA, supervise and enforce compliance of corporate bodies with the 
provisions of the Act.  
 
Investment and Securities Act (ISA) is another essential legislation meant to govern issuance 
and transfer of company securities and companies‟ merger and acquisition among other 
things. The Act provided for establishment of security and exchange commission to 
coordinate portfolio investment and the capital market transactions being conducted on the 
floor of stock exchange. It also provides for Newmarket infrastructure and wide-ranging 
system of regulations and securities business in Nigeria. S. 21 of the NIPC Act allows foreign 
investors to acquire to invest in any enterprise in Nigeria by acquiring shares of such 
companies using whatever convertible currency with one condition. The purchase must be 
through Nigeria Stock Exchange.  In addition to the foregoing, legislation on tax has 
mandated all businesses within Nigeria to pay their tax to Federal Inland Revenue Service, a 
body created by a statute of Federal Inland Revenue Service (Establishment) Act 2007. 
Section 68 of the Act recognises all other relevant investment laws in force, but, where there 
is conflict between the FIRS Act and any other law or Act in matters relating to tax in 
Nigeria, the former shall, however, prevail.65 
 
Looking at the highlight of Nigerian investment regime given above, one will obviously 
perceive that, setting up business in that jurisdiction would certainly require putting a lot of 
bits and pieces together. Perhaps, one may need to visit various institutions at different 
locations, which entails extra effort that could discourage potential investors. However, that 
was the case, but not anymore. „To make business much easier than ever before, the NIPC 
has initiated a one stop investment centre (OSIC)‟, where in one closing, investors can meet 
with desk officers of all the important organisations they need to contact for necessary 
endorsement of their investment. Although, the idea of OSIC has made business climate a bit 
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more conducive, there exist yet another factor equally discouraging to investors. Where 
investors have to survey for relevant laws from different documents, it is most likely that they 
prefer rather a jurisdiction with a single but comprehensive codification of business 
regulations. 
 
 
 
2.3. Part B: The position of Islamic Law within Nigerian Legal System 
 
2.3.1. Questions of legal pluralism and the acceptance of Islamic law 
 
Paralleled to the ebbs and flows of investment regime in Nigeria, was the struggle for 
national identity and effort to create harmony between competing legal systems.  Nigeria has 
been a homogenous society which is typically pluralistic, not only culturally and religiously 
but also legally so. Even before superimposition of English common law through 
colonialism, there was existence of well-established Islamic law system in the north, and 
customary law in the south.66 The entrenchment of Islamic legal system in Nigeria has never 
been difficult to see even during colonial administration. The resolve of British power to 
avoid direct interference with the already existing Islamic institutions in the north, and its 
policy to rule indirectly through the traditional political structure was a testimony to the 
pervasiveness of Islam in Nigeria. However, the influence of that system and relevance of its 
institutions were gradually and very severely undermined by the subsequent imperial policies 
which aimed to replace indigenous law with English ordinance. Nevertheless, the spread of 
British common law in Nigeria had not been able to obliterate Islamic law completely.67  
 
By 1954 the colonial administration had no option but to acknowledge legal pluralism, 
federalism was therefore adopted whereby three regions-north, west and east-emerged with 
equally three distinct elements of pluralism. The north is dominated by Muslim majority 
Hausa-Fulani tribe, west is Yoruba tribe who has almost equal number of Muslim and 
Christian, and East with Igbo majority and prevailing number of traditional religion 
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adherents.68 Now, with exception of English law that applies nationwide, each region had 
some distinct law peculiar to their area. That is manifestation of legal pluralism. Legal 
pluralism is „when the sovereign commands different bodies of laws for different groups of 
the population varying by ethnicity, religion, nationality and geography.‟69 Accordingly, the 
Nigerian legal system has always preserved the application of English common law and 
doctrine of equity, Islamic law and customary law. This legal multiplicity corresponded to the 
prevailing ethnic and religious pluralism in the three regions of the country.70  
 
2.3.2. Islamic Law in Nigeria Before, During and After Colonialism 
 
Islamic civilisation, which includes its commercial law, existed in Nigeria long before British 
came into the country. Literature holds that, colonial masters did not arrive in Lagos until the 
second half of the 19th century, while by then Islamic legal tradition had spread wide and far 
into sub-Saharan region of Africa, Nigeria inclusive. Accounting for this, Alan Frishman71 
asserted „The evidence of Arabic writers shows that Islam had crossed the Sahara Desert and 
was being practiced by rulers and traders in the Sahel by the 13th century‟, pointing to a time 
when Islam became so entrenched in the region not the time of its arrival of course. While 
rulers of these new Islamic entities apply Shari‟ah in exercising their judicial and political 
functions, entrepreneurs conducted business transactions based on Islamic commercial law. 
Islam as a faith carries with it a civilisation, which covers all aspect of human life, religious, 
social, political and economic. Although, introduction of Islam has brought a total 
transformation in these territories in terms of modifying their land tenure systems and judicial 
settings among others, nothing is more strictly adhered to by Nigeria‟s Muslims than 
proscription of riba (usury or interest-bearing loan).72  
 
Prohibition of usury is the most famous and fundamental feature distinguishing Islamic 
finance, and as such, the strong abhorrence for interest indicates the prevalence of ethical 
financial principles in pre-colonial Nigeria. Furthermore, peoples‟ insistence to avoid 
commercial dealings involving interest may be attributed to the nature of the link and 
circumstances by which Islam was introduced to the country. It is a matter of common 
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knowledge that Islam did not come to Nigeria through a warfare, rather it was business 
interaction between Muslim traders of north Africa and entrepreneurs of an area known as 
western Sudan, which comprises today‟s Kanem Bornu, that made the latter cherish and 
admire the high level of fairness, honesty and integrity with which the former were handling 
transactions. Perhaps, as they subsequently went on to propagate Islam, the locals in Kanem 
Bornu continued to give emphasis on this fact which constituted attraction to them, hence the 
overwhelming rejection of riba among the Muslim community in Nigeria. 
 
As regards the first encounter of Nigeria with Islam, this varied significantly depending on 
which part of Nigeria is under reference. Early back as 9th century, Islam had penetrated some 
areas in the north, precisely the present day Borno state and from there proceeded after a 
short while to Hausa land in north west and central, and then subsequently to the south west 
of the country much later.73 Some records argued that, Kano and Katsina got acquaintance 
with the religion from north Africa independent of and around the same time as Kanem 
Bornu.74 This source maintained that, Islam entered the cities of north west through a Trans-
Saharan trade route linking Hausa land with Tuwat, a famous city in Algeria via Tunisia and 
Agadez city of Niger. In contrast, the introduction of Islam to Bornu had been from Egypt via 
a popular but yet another Trans-Saharan trade route across Tripoli cutting through Fezzan.75 
Whatever is the case, Islam had been firmly established in the entire north and Yoruba land in 
the south, long before European imperialism. Again, the early 19th century revolution, 
otherwise called Jihad led by Othman bin Fodio came to revive the practice of Islam in these 
areas by separating the genuine Islamic tradition from filthy adulterations and corrupt 
practices with which it was diluted over the period of time. This revival process gave birth to 
the famous Sokoto Caliphate, whose area of authority extended over the three geopolitical 
zones of the northern region and south western zone in the southern region. 
 
The extent of reform brought about by Dan Fodio movement had seen a widespread 
application of Islamic law throughout the Caliphate. Describing the entrenchment of Shari‟ah 
in the Caliphate, the legal and colonial orientalist scholar JND Anderson said, “Outside the 
Arab Peninsula I know of no place where Islam is more pervasive than northern Nigeria.” 
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Dan Fodio‟s movement had transformed the region both politically by replacing heather to 
corrupt leaderships of various emirates of northern Nigerian with his disciples who were 
righteously devoted to the system, and judicially by ensuring a structured court system 
manned by highly qualified personnel vast in Islamic legal tradition. There was in place a 
system of reproducing skilful judges, well-grounded in Qur‟an, hadith and principles of 
Islamic jurisprudence necessary for understanding of and deriving legal rulings from the 
primary sources of Shari‟ah. In depth knowledge of these subjects couple with 
unimpeachable character were the criteria for selecting the judges, and their appointment was 
made by the Amirul-Mumineen (commander of the faithful).76  
 
By nature of their training and virtue of their appointment combined, judges were imbued 
with the primary function of their office, which is, in the words of Yadudu, “removing 
injustice, restraining aggressors, and ensuring generally the prevalence of justice throughout 
the realm in accordance with the Shari‟ah”.77 Shari‟ah law was observed in the territory under 
the caliphal authority without exception. In other words, all aspect of Shari‟ah be it political, 
economic, family, civil or criminal had been applied according to the relevant sources of 
Islamic law. For most part, adherence to Islamic legal system and its institutions had 
remained functional until the forceful domination by British empire in 1904.This was attested 
to by the colonial administrator, Lugard himself, who acknowledged that the system he found 
was highly sophisticated and politically organised, with judicial officers that are both 
respectable and admirably knowledgeable.78 
 
However, with the inception of the 20th century which mark the beginning of European 
imperialism in the region following the fall of Sokoto Caliphate, the influence of Islamic law 
was to be ousted and eventually replaced by the English common law. Although, this agenda 
would not be expressed explicitly and the British power would continue to maintain those 
Islamic legal institutions and its personnel for considerable length of time, but subsequent 
developments in the region would reveal the main objective underlying the entire process. 
Colonial administration only wanted to and did indeed take advantage of the existing system 
to build its empire gradually and systematically. The power to appoint judges was slowly 
removed from the emir, and the freedom of judicial officers to administer justice in 
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conformity with Islamic law was carefully dismantled. By virtue of series of proclamations 
and ordinances (of inter alia 1906, 1914, and 1933), new grades of courts were introduced, 
emir‟s power to make outright appointment of judges was reduced to mere nomination 
subjected to confirmation and approval of a superior colonial officer in the area. More so, 
imperial officials, who have no acquaintance whatsoever with Islamic law, were empowered 
to supervise and, where they deem necessary, to interfere with proceedings of the courts.79  
 
The implication of the new supervisory function allocated to British officials in the region 
was that, power to regulate the judiciary had shifted to the imperial administrator, by dint of 
which they could exploit the legitimacy of the existing Alkalis to import English legal order 
surreptitiously. The first such interference was to do with the criminal justice, which came in 
a form of an order suspending any court sentence that entails „inhumane treatment‟. Again, 
what amounts to „inhumane treatment‟ was to be judged according to British legal tradition as 
the power to determine whether or not a particular sentence of court was inhumane treatment 
lies with the colonial officers. Consequently, this had led to serious conflict and even 
confusion in judicial pronouncement, a person might be tried and pronounced guilty under 
Islamic law, yet the sentence could not be given in line with the same law. As time went by, 
several other changes were introduced. The mode of training judges and the content of their 
learning was transformed substantially with bias for English orientation over the Islamic law. 
Correlatively, different grades of court emerged, and judges with skills in indigenous law80 
were appointed to lower grades, rendering the latter less prestigious. Following the 
amalgamation of the southern protectorate and the northern protectorate into single and 
united Nigeria, English law received into Lagos by virtue of Ordinance No. 3 of 1863 was 
extended to the north. 
 
Unlike the case of Northern Nigeria, application of English law started the same year Lagos 
was ceded to British power, and it continued to be applicable in the South for half a century 
before its eventual extension to the north. It was neither the Ordinance of 1863 nor it 
extension that actually displaced the native system, because the former applied subject to 
certain codes. However, the decisive moment, as for Islamic law in the north, came shortly 
before Nigeria attained the status of self-governing entity. Sections 28 and 38 of the High 
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Court Law, Northern Region of Nigeria (No. 8 of 1955), for example, respectively sanctioned 
the wholesale application of English law and its superiority over and above the native law. By 
virtue of these sections, which remain functional and intact, the High Court shall apply the 
common law, the doctrine of equity and the statutes of general application which were in 
force in England on the 1st day of January 1900. Furthermore, native law and custom shall 
only be observed by the court if they are not repugnant to natural justice, equity and good 
conscience, nor incompatible either directly or by implication with any law for the time being 
in force. Ultimately, the combined effect of these provisions of the law virtually rendered 
Islamic law subservient to the English law. Even though, it can be argued that the total import 
of the sections has endorsed the co-existence of multiple legal systems. Nevertheless, the 
terms upon which this pluralism operates are heavily weighted in favour of the English legal 
system. The implication of this colonial version of pluralism has been aptly observed by 
Yadudu when he said:81 
 
But this ostensible co-existence of plural legal systems, particularly of Islamic law 
and the common law should not deceive us. For it does not permit Islamic law to exist 
as an all-embracing legal system nor as an independent and autonomous partner of 
the English common law. It exists as an appendage and a tolerated nuisance in 
relation to the pre-eminent „received‟ English law. 
 
It was clear to the general public that, by allocating this type of relevance to common law just 
few years before its departure from Nigeria, the imperial power aimed at supplanting Islamic 
law with British legal system, and to do so subtly through promulgation by the regional 
parliament. Although, the northern assembly consisted of local Nigerians, people saw them 
and their actions as a mere colonial stratagem to obtain legitimacy for foreign agenda through 
the use of domestic elements. This explains the reason behind series of mass protest that 
followed certain legislative developments in the north around that period. There was element 
of proof that, local politicians had, at some point, lent themselves to the service of colonial 
interest against the yearnings of their compatriots, and they did that due to not only political 
reasons but also economic benefits. Ahmadu Bello,82 premier of the northern region conceded 
as follows: 
 
                                                          
81Yadudu, „Colonialism and the Transformation of Islamic Law‟ (1992), PP. 117-118  
82 Bello, Ahmadu, My Life (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962) Pg. 217 (as quoted, as well, in 
Yadudu,‟ Colonialism and the Transformation of Islamic Law‟ (1992), Pg. 116 
 34 
 
It was borne upon us that these legal and judicial reforms would have to be carried out if the 
self-governing region was to fulfil its role in the federation of Nigeria and command respect 
amongst the nations of the world…finally, there are the commercial and industrial interests, 
mainly financed by capital brought into this country from abroad, which we are doing our 
best to encourage and foster. 
 
Clear imports of the above quote indicate that, in addition to political exigency of the time, 
northern politicians had to accept the superimposition of the western oriented legal system in 
fulfilment of conditions attached to an external capital to be obtained for the region. 
Obviously, these political figures ware persuaded into this by Justice Abu Rannat, the 
chairman for the 6-man committee employed by the colonial office to work out which code 
will be appropriate for northern Nigeria.83 After a considerable survey and debate, the 
committee resolved to propose for the north, a penal code modelled on one of the three 
famous English criminal codifications. Faced by resistance from the regional elites, who 
themselves were under intense pressure generated by anti-imperialist campaign 
overwhelmingly supported throughout the region, the then chief justice of Sudan, Abu Rannat 
quickly felt the need to use a carrot and stick approach if he were to change perception of the 
northern elders. Cited his experience of Sudan where foreign laws ware initially loathed and 
rejected in the worst possible manner, but no sooner than independence was granted, people 
came to realise the benefits the reform agenda brings to the economy. Accordingly, he 
advised northerners to endorse the penal code, because “After independence they would need 
to attract foreign capital, so they must have a legal and judicial system which would give 
confidence to foreigners.”84 Not just that, he added, “They would wish to be members of the 
United Nations Organisation, so they must expect awkward questions and put themselves in a 
position to give satisfactory answers.”85 In effect, failure to change the law, at that point in 
time, could, soon thereafter, expose politicians to embarrassment before international 
community. Consequently, this approach had not only instilled fear in the politically exposed 
northerners, it boosted their hope to drive investment capital into the region. 
 
 It is noteworthy that, it was not only in northern Nigeria that colonial policy to import and 
impose a foreign system was resisted. Jamaica had fiercely protested British attempt to adopt 
St. Lucia code of 1889 for Jamaica and British Honduras; the extension of Queensland 
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modelled criminal code of Gold Coast to Lagos was not straightforward.86 Nor did India, 
Sudan and Pakistan feel too glad to exchange their pre-colonial systems for the infamous 
Penal Code. This highlights the correlation between social and legal systems, which is critical 
to legitimacy of law itself as emphasised in legitimacy theory. Any law that originates from 
practices and behaviour underpinned by prevailing norms in a society, will have a normative 
value and imbued legitimacy.87 In contrast, foreign law imposed upon unrelated social order 
is most likely to be resisted and will require official intervention to be observed and 
legitimated. 
 
 Likewise, in the case of British colonial office in Africa, the legal system sought to and, in 
some cases, did impose, were more European than African. All criminal codes adopted for 
ex-British dependencies, including the famous four colonies of West Africa, originated from 
one of the three main English codifications. Main Queensland code; St. Lucia Code; and 
Indian Penal Code.88 The controversial promulgation of 1959 in the northern Nigeria was a 
reproduction of a British suited criminal justice which was used for India and Sudan in 1837 
and 1899 respectively. The idea of introducing the code was conceived in response to public 
outcry and clamour of northerners for a criminal justice consistent with the tenets of Islamic 
law.89 The mass movement against this code in the north was due to serious and alarming 
discrepancies that exist between the provisions of the code and those of the actual Shari‟ah. 
People had been longing for pre-colonial justice with which they were more acquainted since 
before British assumed control over the territories under Sokoto caliphate. Consequently, the 
overall objective of the colonial code seemed to be total obliteration, or at least, subjugation 
of the Shari‟ah.90  
 
Furthermore, in 1956 justly before British departure from Nigeria, a Muslim Court of Appeal 
was created. The court was meant to have appellate jurisdiction over appeals from Emir‟s and 
Alkali‟s courts, and deal with such cases in conformance with the principles and precepts of 
Shari‟ah. However, the adjudicatory powers of this court were significantly limited, in terms 
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of subject matter, to matters “governed Muslim law” only,91 which consist of matters to do 
with marriage, divorce, child custody and inheritance. By implication, the comprehensive 
application of the principles of Islamic law in the pre-colonial north, broad powers of its 
judicial institutions covering all private and public domain of human conduct, as well as 
relevance and influence of its personnel were all reduced to simply a niche in Islamic civil 
law generally referred to as “family” law. Consequently, this has excluded all other social, 
economic and commercial aspects of Islamic law and placed them under the jurisdiction of 
common law-oriented courts. Fortunately, or unfortunately, this position of the Muslim court 
has successfully been successively kept intact by subsequent constitutions as will be 
discussed later.  
 
2.3.3. Constitutional Status of Islamic Law 
 
The first federal constitution that recognized Islamic law in Nigeria was the 1979 
constitution. It does not only acknowledge its application but also provided for its 
administration by establishing a Shari‟ah Court of Appeal. This constitutional landmark was 
not without controversy. The move to formulate a new grand norm to replace the republican 
constitution 1963, was accompanied by series of agitations, notably the one staged by 
Muslims clamouring for recognition of Shari‟ah. Consequent upon that, both Shari‟ah and 
customary court of Appeals were incorporated in the new constitution. Contrary to what the 
north had actually yearned for, adjudicatory powers of those courts were critically limited. 
Operative parts of Section 242(2) (e) of the constitution states that, the court shall here cases 
where parties to the proceedings chose to be governed by Islamic law at the court of first 
instance regardless of their faith.92 The overall implication of this provision was sensitive. 
Islamic law was made to be a choice of law open to all Nigerians. While, a non-Muslim may 
wilfully opt to be bound by Shari‟ah, a Muslim has the right to reject its application 
altogether.  
 
In 1999 Constitution, the provision on the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal was retained 
under section 277(2). The words: „Muslim Shari‟ah or not Muslim‟ was however, removed 
and replaced with the phrase: “where all parties being Muslim”93 however. In effect, this has 
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limited the application of Islamic law to Muslims only. It must be noted that, in both 
constitutions, the adjudicatory powers of Shari‟ah Court of Appeal are limited to matters of 
“Personal Law”, and they are matters relating to inheritance, marriage and divorce, 
guardianship of an infant as well as waqf.94  
 
To sum it up, the sources of law in Nigeria are Nigerian legislation, case law, English 
common law and equity as well as Islamic and customary law. Islamic law applies to Muslim 
only. The jurisdiction of the Shari‟ah Court of Appeal is limited to “Muslim Personal Law” 
only. All other matters, including investment, are to be heard and determined by the High 
Court, even where the parties involved are Muslims and the matter relates to Islamic law 
generally. That was the decision of Court of Appeal in the case of Usman v. Umaru.95  
 
2.4. Legal Framework for Islamic Finance in Nigeria  
 
The first legal endorsement of Islamic financial transactions in the modern Nigeria dates back 
to tail end of the 19th century. By virtue of the decree of military government of 1991, 
specialised banking, which includes non-interest banking were allowed. Pursuant to this, 
Musharaka transactions begun to appear in some of Nigeria‟s bank. However, in 2012 full-
fledge Islamic banking was licensed in the country under the Banks and Other Financial 
Institution Act, 2012. Sections 43 and 63 of the Act allow for operations of interest-free 
banking system in the country and empowered the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) to issue 
guidelines to the practice of Islamic banks in Nigeria. Accordingly, the CBN Drafted 
guidelines of 2012 came in being. Furthermore, the law empowered the CBN to inaugurate a 
committee of experts on Islamic law and finance for proper advice and supervision. 
Although, there is full legal backing for Islamic finance, this is yet poorly developed, 
particularly with respect to other products like Takaful (Islamic insurance) and Sukuk. 
 
Nevertheless, the position of law is that, all interest-free versions of transactions, including 
Sukuk, are lawful. Based on this, Nigeria issued its first Islamic bonds to generate N100 
billion for financing road infrastructure in the country. While, sukuk issuance of 2017 was 
very successful and even over-subscribed, lack of robust legal infrastructure to support 
widespread application of sukuk remain a going concern in Nigeria. 
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2.4.1. Place of Sukuk within the Nigerian Legal System 
 
Sukuk, popularly known as „Islamic bonds‟, is a product of Islamic financial system, and 
belongs to the broad branch of Islamic law that deals with commercial transactions, called 
„Mu‟amalat‟. As already mentioned, the Nigerian legal system allows administration of 
Islamic law in a limited area of „personal law‟ only, it does not apply to financial dealings. 
For financial system in Nigeria is entirely secular. It has also been noted earlier that, 
investment is largely regulated by NIPC Act (2004). The question now arises as to, how then 
do Sukuk (Islamic bonds) become compatible or applicable in Nigeria? This question is 
controversially exciting, it is so particularly in the light of the current debate in Nigeria where 
some groups are determined to challenge the constitutionality of the N100 billion sovereign 
Sukuk recently issued by the government.96 Before any attempt to provide an answer, in the 
affirmative or negative, both the Sukuk and Nigerian investment policy shall be examined. 
Policy is defined as the total objectives of the state, including legislations, regulations and 
procedure.97 Law plays an important role of achieving the underlined objectives of a 
particular policy, and the law itself needs institution for effective implementation.  
 
Section 16 of the constitution of federal republic of Nigeria has outlined the policy-objective 
of the government as far as investment is concerned. The government will harness the 
resources of the nation to promote national prosperity and dynamic self-reliant economy and 
social development.98 In other words, the overall objective of government in managing 
natural resources and all other sectors of economy is to attain national development. Effective 
management of these resources would require policy that attracts investors and bring along 
sophisticated technology and huge revenue. To facilitate realisation of this objective, section 
16(3) said, an Act of National Assembly, which is the law, shall be enacted to establish a 
body to regulate and promote enterprises and investment in all sectors, except what is termed 
as „negative list‟, in order to achieve „national development.‟ Accordingly, NIPC was created 
pursuant to the above provision of the constitution. Arguably, therefore, any investment 
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initiative that satisfied the foregoing three conditions is compatible with the general context 
of investment policy as per constitution and NIPC Act.  
 
Sukuk on the other hand, is an investment tool, used for generating funds by government or 
private companies for financing developmental projects, particularly infrastructure.99 Sukuk 
are not a religious initiative per se; it is rather an investment alternative to conventional 
bonds, the success of which has been widely acknowledged.100 The recent road infrastructure 
Sukuk of N100 billion, issued in Nigeria, has underscored this point. This research will 
examine, the subsequent chapters, the applicability of Sukuk to finance not only infrastructure 
but also mining projects in Nigeria. In chapters 3 and 4 precisely, phenomenal success of 
Sukuk investment in financing a range of projects in different jurisdictions across the world 
would be highlighted with aim to ascertaining international best practice which Nigeria could 
adopt. The purpose here in this chapter is, however, to assess whether within the purview of 
NIPC Act, Sukuk is relevant and generally compatible.  
 
Sukuk have been defined as “Certificates of equal value representing undivided shares in 
ownership of tangible assets, usufruct and services or the asset of particular project or special 
investment activity.”101 Simply put, Sukuk are shares in investment. Section 33 of NIPC Act 
provides thus, “investment” means an expenditure made to acquire an interest in an enterprise 
operating within and outside the economy of Nigeria.” Again, section 22 of the Act allows 
investors local or foreign to buy shares of any Nigerian enterprise in any convertible currency 
provided such transaction is concluded through Nigerian stock exchange. From the section 
arise two points for consideration. Whether Sukuk for development projects qualify to be an 
enterprise within the purview of the Act? And whether it is conducted on the floor of stock 
exchange. Section 33(interpretation) of the Act states, an “enterprise” means an industry, 
project, undertaking or business owed by a Nigerian or non-Nigerian or an expansion of that 
industry, undertaking or business. In this thesis, Sukuk for mining industry and Sukuk for 
infrastructure development would be discussed and some structure proposed.  
 
                                                          
99 Nigeria Debt Management Office „Sovereign Sukuk Bond‟, available at: < https://www.dmo.gov.ng/fgn-
bonds/sovereign-sukuk>  last accessed 20th October, 2017 
100 Julio C. Colon, „Choice of Law and Islamic Finance‟ (2011) Texas International Law Journal, Vol. 46, PP. 
412-424, PP. 412-415 
101 AAOIFI, „Shari‟ah Standard No. (17): Investment Sukuk‟ (2007), PP. 467-487, at Pg. 468, available at 
<http://aaoifi.com/shariaa-standards/?lang=en>  accessed 9th May, 2019 
 40 
 
The key words that are essential to this research from the definition of enterprise by the Act, 
therefore, are “project” and “industry”, these will be extensively explored in chapter 2, 3 and 
4. The second issue from section 22 is the requirement that Sukuk be marketed through stock 
exchange. By nature, Sukuk is a portfolio investment like conventional bond and has always 
been traded through the same medium as bond in line with relevant regulations, it has been 
traded at the floor of London Exchange for example. And the remarkable Nigerian Sukuk of 
last September was conducted through Stock Exchange via Debt Management Office. As 
shall be seen in the subsequent chapter, Sukuk, unlike bond, is not a debt, it is an ownership 
of the underlying asset, and this so because Islamic law does not allow trading in debt. This 
raises the question as to whether this character of Islamic bond may result in conflict of laws 
in states where the legal system is not based on Shari‟ah, like Nigeria.  
 
2.4.2. Sukuk under State Law 
 
As stated above, legal pluralism presupposes the existence of multiple legal systems side by 
side unhindered. It however presents a complex legal problem as to having to decide which 
law to govern a particular transaction at a given time.102 Ideally, Sukuk should be governed 
exclusively by Islamic law, but the reality is however majority of Sukuk issuance have been 
governed by English common law. In Nakheel Sukuk of Dubai of 2009, for building a city 
twice the size of Hong Kong Ireland at Dubai Waterfront at total cost of $26 billion (USD), 
the governing law was English law.103 This is because as noted by one writer, “activities in 
the Islamic financial sector are not confined to countries whose legal systems are Shari‟ah 
based.”104 Example is United Kingdom which ranked number 9th in holdings of Sukuk asset 
in the world.105 Secondly, there is not much difference between Islamic commercial law 
(Mu‟amalat) that governs financial transactions and English law. Accordingly, evidence has 
shown that, Islamic bonds have been successful in countries with legal systems dominated by 
English common law.106  
 
Furthermore, even where the contractual document provides for choice of law, conflict of law 
that may arise under such circumstances shall be resolved in favour of the law of the state. In 
                                                          
102 Sally, „Legal Pluralism‟ (1988) pg.871 
103 Omar Salah, Dubai Debt Crisis: A Legal Analysis of the Nakheel Sukuk (2010), Berkeley Journal of 
International Law, Vol. 4, PP. 19-30 
104 Julio, Choice of Law and Islamic Finance (2011), pp. 412-415 
105 ibid 
106 Ibid 
 41 
 
Shamil Bank of Bahrain E.C. v. Beximco Pharmaceuticals Ltd,107 a British Court was called 
upon to examine the validity of the contract under Islamic law. It was a financing contract 
based on Murabaha model whereby the parties executed the contractual document and asset 
of about $47 million (USD) was acquired. The document contained a choice of law clause 
that reads: “[s]ubject to the principles of the glorious shari‟ah, this agreement shall be 
governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of England”. The contention of the 
defendant Beximco, who defaulted on payment, that the agreement is invalid as it violates 
Shari‟ah was rejected by the court. The reason of the Appellate Court was that, the clause for 
choice of law in the agreement cannot stand in the face of 1980 Rome Convention on the law 
applicable to contractual obligations, which stipulates that only one law shall govern a 
contract and that the law so chosen must be law of a state. The governing law can either be 
that of a state that is not necessarily based on Islam, such as Nigeria, or where combined 
principles of Shari‟ah apply side by side as the main legal system.108 Dispute resolution in 
Sukuk will be looked at in-depth towards the end of this thesis. 
 
2.5. Conclusion on the evolution, role and possible use of sukuk in Nigeria 
 
This chapter has looked at historical account of multiple legal systems that shaped Nigeria‟s 
investment framework. From pre-colonial era up until present, several systems had 
influenced the business regime. Exposition of their respective evolution as well as interaction 
with one another as presented in this chapter is critical to clear understanding of their role, the 
terms of their co-existence within the national legal system, and more importantly their 
interplay in promoting investment and development today. 
 
The chapter pointed out predominance of customary and Islamic law in governing the affairs 
of pre-colonial Nigeria. Various tribes in the south had subscribed to social norms that had 
evolved over long period of time and been accepted as common standard to guide conduct in 
the society. Therefore, people in the South used to lead their economic, social and public 
lives in accordance with that standard. In contrast, Islam had since 14th century been widely 
embraced in the north. Although, the practice of subsequent rulers in the north had 
significantly compromised the ideals and teachings of Islam, the revival movement of Dan 
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Fodio in early 19th century did eventually bring the entire region back on course under Sokoto 
Caliphate. Traditional institution of emirates was functioning in a robust manner, with a 
highly organised judicial system manned by well-trained judges and headed by the emirs. 
Under this sophisticated and hierarchical structure of governance, principles of Islamic law 
continued to apply without let or hindrance. Within this region, all activities including 
commercial and financial dealings were conducted in accordance with jurisprudential views 
of Maliki Islamic school of thought. 
 
The chapter also discussed the evolution of English legal system in Nigeria and the influence 
of its commercial principles on Nigeria‟s investment framework. With declaration of Lagos 
as a colony in 1862, British economic activities intensified in the area and soon thereafter the 
company Ordinance of 1863 was introduced to guide commercial transactions in the colony. 
Gradually and somewhat smoothly, English statutes and legal order was made to apply and 
replace customary norms not only in Lagos but even the rest of southern protectorate. 
Similarly, the British acquisition of the north in 1904 saw a significant dismantle of Islamic 
legal system, more gradually and subtly though. By virtue of amalgamating southern and 
northern protectorates in 1914, applicability of laws in the former were extended to the latter. 
Ultimately, in the second half of the century, sphere of operation for Islamic law was reduced 
to Muslim personal matters only, broadly substituting English common law for Shari‟ah in 
most areas including commercial. 
 
As conspicuously noted in the chapter, this domineering process of common law, was not 
without resistance, particularly in the north. While the imperial agenda of transforming the 
pre-colonial legal system in favour of their own imported one was being implemented very 
cautiously, contestations accompanied the entire period in the north, and to a much lesser 
degree to there were protests to retain native law in the south. Consequently, the colonial 
administration could not fail to observe the need for retaining Islamic and customary systems 
alongside the superimposed English legal systems, and it did so, albeit asymmetrically. 
Principles of both Islamic and customary law were made applicable only where they are not 
inconsistent with the received English law or local legislations. The latter is nothing but 
repackaged and legitimated version of the English law. For most part, allocation of this 
subservient status to Islamic law continued to be one of the colonial heritages that survived 
all pre-independence protests and continued to feature even within the local statutes of post-
independence era. 
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Upon attaining its independence in 1960, Nigeria started a new era. Policy and law, relating 
to economy, took a different dimension. Like many other countries that had just emerged 
from colonialism, Nigeria focused on internal development through empowering domestic 
enterprises. Accordingly, most of policy formulation and legislations of this period were not 
favourable to foreign investors and many of them had to leave. Failure to provide good 
governance by the subsequent leadership of developing nations coupled with the global 
economic crisis of 1970s forced a reversal of those investment policies. Nigeria had to follow 
specific guidelines by the World Bank, as did many other countries, softened its regime to 
attract external capital through investment. The use of law and policy instruments to create a 
friendly business environment has continued to be the trend embraced by states to stimulate 
both foreign and domestic investors. 
 
Given the rise in factors necessitating development in Africa and beyond, competition for 
investors has naturally increased and innovation became inevitable. One such innovation 
happens to be Islamic bonds, otherwise known as Sukuk. Like any other business layout, this 
instrument requires enabling environment necessary for its functional existence. Even though, 
it is a product of Islamic finance and governed substantially by a branch of Islamic law, 
Sukuk does not need an ideal Islamic territory in the calibre of Sokoto caliphate to operate. 
Rather, it is a form of financial inclusion and a pragmatic investment alternative compatible 
to various frameworks. This chapter did not look at whether or not Nigeria has in place an 
appropriate structure for this business instrument. However, having recounted the long 
existence and application of Islamic law side by side with other systems in the country, the 
chapter has tended to draw a compelling analogy to establish mutual compatibility of two 
financial orders within a framework. Hence, this chapter has sought to answer the question as 
to whether the current legal and policy framework for investment in Nigeria is generally 
tooled to support Sukuk investment. 
 
Analysis made in this chapter has shed light on compatibility of Sukuk to Nigerian investment 
regime, not directly though. The concepts of legal pluralism as well as flexibility of Islamic 
law have made adaptability and applicability of investment tools such as Sukuk, feasible in 
Nigeria. Accordingly, the country had issued its debut Islamic bonds in September 2017. 
Moreover, the fact that, this Road Infrastructure Sukuk issued by the Federal Government of 
Nigeria was oversubscribed by both Muslims and non-Muslims indicates potentials of this 
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investment mechanism in Nigeria, on one hand. On the other, this widespread patronage 
would dislodge any allegations that, institutionalising financial inclusivity in Nigeria is 
tantamount to an effort to islamise the country wholesale. Overall, this chapter has 
demonstrated that, given the pluralism of Nigeria‟s legal system and openness of its business 
framework, Sukuk is not incompatible to the current investment regime. Nevertheless, 
assessing conduciveness of the existing legal and policy structure to facilitate sustainable and 
productive Sukuk in Nigeria is beyond the ambit of this chapter. Thus, subsequent chapters 
will examine nature and needs of specific sectors, namely mining and infrastructure, where 
demand for investment is particularly high, and further evaluate potentials of the current legal 
and policy regime to stimulate development in these sectors through investment and Sukuk.  
 
The next chapter reviews the critical literature on mining, law and development with specific 
reference to the differentiated regulatory needs of the mining sector, as well as issues of Corporate 
Social Responsibility (CSR) and the need for innovative financing strategies to enhance investment 
prospects and deliver sustainability. 
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3. Chapter Three: Key Themes and Issues (Literature Review) 
 
3.1. Chapter Overview  
 
The aim in this chapter is to explore the relationship between four following dimensions: law, 
development, investment, and Sukuk in order to contextualise their meanings within the 
conceptual framework of this thesis. This chapter also discusses the role of state and investors 
in the management of natural resources of a country. Although, minerals belong to the 
collective people of a state as their common wealth, the legal ownership of these resources is 
entrusted in the state authorities to manage it for sole purpose of creating prosperity for the 
citizen. Owing to the complexity of unearthing these resources, which requires huge capital 
and technical know-how, it has always been critical for governments in Africa to involve 
specialised multinational enterprises. However, as these companies are profit-oriented 
entities, the process of attracting them into a country as well as terms of engagement, with 
reference to exploration and exploitation of the minerals, is not without challenges. For 
example, the state would need to fulfil certain requirements, indicating not only the extent of 
geological prospects it holds, but also what kind of protection is available for potential 
investors. These challenges are discussed in this chapter. 
 
Further, the chapter highlights the relationship between mining and development. In mining 
context, both the exploitation of minerals to generate revenue, and the proper redistribution of 
such revenue is referred to as “development”. Thus, development could be one of successful   
outcome of mining. The chapter explores relevant literature to argue that, while both the state 
officials and private investors have responsibility to deliver mining benefits to the citizens, 
yet, basic development challenges, namely socio-economic issues, have continued to 
characterized the living condition of the resource-endowed countries of Africa, including 
Nigeria. Current regional and international efforts aiming, respectively, at including 
development agenda in the state mining legislation and mapping up mining to SDGs, are 
assessed in the chapter. Although, generally at the centre of mining issues across developing 
nations is the failure to pacify the community as a stakeholder, the main challenge in Nigeria 
specifically has been lack of investors.  
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Finally, this chapter looks at the multidimensional role of law in relation to myriad of 
challenges mentioned above. In as much as it is important to adopt legislative provisions 
necessary to stimulate FDI, it is also critical to consider innovative investment tools such as 
Sukuk through the instrument of legal pluralism to effectively address lack of investment in 
the mining sector of Nigeria. Overall, the chapter argues that, beyond responding to the need 
for investment capital, Sukuk instrument has the potentials of creating proactive role for the 
community given its character of financial inclusion. Nevertheless, Sukuk requires 
appropriate legal structure to support its smooth flow in a country like Nigeria. Hence, a 
comprehensive legal framework for investment is crucial. 
 
3.2. Mining and Law 
 
Mining is defined as “the industrial process of removing a mineral-bearing substance from 
the place of its natural occurrence in the earth‟s crust”. 109 This includes oil and hard 
minerals. Minerals resources have always been a precious treasure of all societies since pre-
modern history and with modern technology and industry development the world became 
even more dependent on the extractive products than ever before. Due to its critical economic 
value today, in most countries of the world, ownership, control and management of minerals 
vest with the state authorities to hold in trust for the benefit of their entire population.110 The 
global demand for minerals creates potentials in the resource to generate revenue needed by 
states to provide prosperity to their citizens on one hand, and return on investment for 
business entities, on the other. Thus, by virtue of these economic and social opportunities, it 
brings various stakeholders-state, private investors and communities-and bind them together 
in a complex relationship through the instrument of law. Law becomes relevant because, for 
this multi-layer relationship to succeed there is need for not only substantial partnership 
between the stakeholders, but also a well-defined and smoothly regulated set of duties and 
obligations for each party. Law is the most available instrument to do that.111 
 
 At the centre of the debate about mineral wealth is the community or citizens of a state. To 
create a condition whereby economic prosperity and social as well as political rights can be 
                                                          
109 P.V. McDade, „Materials on Mineral Law; A Survey of U.K Comparative and International Legal Issues 
Relating to Hard Minerals‟, Vol. 1 CMPL University of Dundee, pp. A1-01(quoted in Walied E., Mineral 
Investment Under the Shari‟ah Law (London: Graham and Trotman; 1993), pg. 17) 
110 Eghosa and Linimose, „Foreign Direct Investment and the Law in Nigeria‟ (2016), PP. 126-127 
111 Wolfgang G. Friedman, „The Role of Law and the Function of the Lawyer in the Developing Countries‟, 
(1963) Vand. L. Rev., Vol. 17, PP. 181-191 
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enjoyed by individuals, rule of law is necessary. According to the International Congress of 
Jurists (1995), “The rule of law should be employed not only to safeguard and advance the 
civil and political rights of the individual in a free society, but also to establish social, 
political, educational and cultural conditions under which his legitimate aspirations and 
dignity may be realised.”112 Equally, states use the policy and regulatory instrument to attract 
investors and to direct their conduct in a certain desired way to benefit its citizens. Fall or rise 
in the flow of both foreign direct and portfolio investment is often achieved by governments 
change to its regulatory framework.113 Investors are generally attracted to countries with 
fiscal regime favourable to their investment, tax relief, easy documentation processes and 
effective dispute resolution mechanisms. States persuade investors through these elements of 
the mining law (regulatory framework).114 To sum up, law is the ligament bonding the 
stakeholders around mineral investment, thus law will continue to feature in discussing the 
relationship between mining and other concepts below. 
 
However, besides all these opportunities, mining also presents myriad of challenges.  
Adverse impacts of mining affect social and environmental lives. To reduce the negative 
effect of resource extraction on human and the ecosystem, stakeholders are world-wide 
committed to the global agenda for sustainable development.115 
 
3.3. Mining and Development 
 
3.3.1. Exploring the relationship between mining and development 
 
Scholars have attempted to explain the relationship between “mining” and “development” in 
different ways. According to Friedman, 116 the gap between economic fortunes of a given 
state and the level of social prosperity available to its citizens defines lack of development. 
To bridge this gap (in other words to bring development) use of law is not only desirable but 
also necessary as constitutional and statutory amendment is the only way to effective change 
of social dynamics in a state. This definition of development as failure to translate wealth into 
                                                          
112 Congress of Jurists, 1995 (quoted in Seidman, The State Law and Development (1978), pg. 17 
113 Congress of Jurists, 1995  
23 Thomas W. Waelde, „International Energy Investment‟, 17 Energy L.J. (1996), PP. 191-215 
115A.T. Kearney, „Mining Takes on the Sustainability Challenges: Article on Mining and Metal‟ (2019), PP. 4-
10 available at: <https://www.atkearney.com/metals-mining/article?/a/mining-takes-on-the-sustainability-
challenge> , accessed 10th January, 2019 
116Friedman., The Role of Law (1963), PP. 181-191 at Pg.183 
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basic civic needs, is consistent with the practical realities of many developing countries 
including Nigeria as described by a World Bank report that, „even with the large economy in 
Africa such as Nigeria, their challenge has been the failure to translate growth into 
widespread earning opportunity for its people.117 However, this refers to the relationship 
between state and its citizen within the context of human development only. The interface 
between mining and development goes beyond that. 
 
Friedman118 argues that, in the context of modern multi-stakeholder interface, the 
significance of “mining” to “development” process is even more pronounced. He gave the 
example of a complex investment relationship, where rather than simply two individuals were 
involved as parties, it is a foreign company with special know-how getting involved to 
develop an asset (e.g, minerals) belonging to a sovereign authority, while a third party to 
provide the financial commitment known as „capital‟, with a community living next to the 
project and participates actively as a host. Although, this kind of project has been the major 
source for economic fortunes of many states in the world, it does also potends serious threats 
to both society and environment. Challenges ranging from disturbing use of land (affecting 
dwellings, earnings and agrarian lands); contamination of water (affecting human 
consumption leading to serious health issues); to air pollution and issues to do with mine pits 
closure.119  
 
Considering the serious nature of the negative consequesncies of the mining industry, the 
international community formed a global synergistic response initiative in the form of the 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in 2015, to address a range of development issues. 
One such issues happen to be the menance of “resource curse”. To realise full socio-economic 
benefit of mining for current and future generation, international community have collectively 
conceived the SDGs, which all stakeholders, including Nigeria, are committed to achieve by 
2030.120  
                                                          
117  World Bank Development Indicator (2011), available at:  https://databank.worldbank.org/data/source/world-
development-indicators> accessed 30th  April, 2019 
118 Friedman, The Role of Law (1963), PP. 181-191 
119 A.T. Kearney, „Sustainability Challenges‟ (2019), PP. 4-10, available at: 
<https://www.atkearney.com/metals-mining/article?/a/mining-takes-on-the-sustainability-challenge> , accessed 
10th January, 2019 
120 United Nations Sustainable Development Solution Network, „Mapping Mining to the Sustainable 
Development Goals: An Atlas‟ (July, 2016), a white paper submitted to the World Economic Forum, PP. 3-4, 
available at <http://unsdsn.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Mapping_Mining_SDGs_An_Atlas.pdf > accessed 
15th July, 2018 
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The Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) are comprised of 17 goals aiming at, among other 
things, addressing the adverse impact of mining on the environment and the community on one 
hand and realising social benefits and preserving the environment alongside economic 
development. The goals include among other things, clean water and sanitation, poverty 
eradication, peace and strong institutions, infrastructure and economic development. Global 
stakeholders assert that, mining industry has the potentials to deliver on all the goals if properly 
managed, and warn that, the same industry can prove devastative if abandoned. Therefore, all 
stakeholders-governments, investors and communities-are bound to adopt SDGs into their 
practices.121 
 
3.3.2. Implimentation of development strategies and agendas 
 
States primarily exist to create good life and prosperity for its people through harnessing and 
effective management of national resources. Accordingly, upon emergence from colonialism 
developing states across Africa, Asia and Latin America consolidated their sovereignty over 
all resources (natural resources in particular) and came up with policies meant to foster 
national development through empowering domestic enterprises and rejection of foreign 
domination.122 These internal efforts were, to some extent, internationally supported. Through 
the united nations, sovereignty of states over their political and economic affairs were 
strongly upheld.  Also to help national government facilitate development and formulate 
effective policies multinational organisations like World Bank and IMF were established. 
 
Following the financial crises  of 1970s through to 1980s, it became clear that due to factors 
associated with poor governance, government in developing states have failed to deliver 
development as many of the state were under huge debt. Thus, neoliberalism was introduced. In 
effect, the concept of governance was reinterpreted to bring in private sector as partners with 
states in ensuring development. Consequently, Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) 
advocated through the World Bank encouraging states to soften their investment regime and 
privatize national enterprises in order to allow more participatory power to corporate entities.123 
The thrust of this model is to limit states‟ role to be a regulator defining the role for investors to 
                                                          
121 UNSDSN, „Mapping Mining to SDGs: An Atlas‟ (2016), PP. 3-4 
122 Samuel K. B. Asante, „International Law and Foreign Investment: A Reappraisal‟ (1988) International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly, vol. 37, pp. 590-592 
123 Adaeze Okoye, „Exploring the Relationship between Corporate Social Responsibility, Law and Development 
in an African Context‟ (2012) International Journal of Law and Management, Vol. 54, no. 5, PP. 364-378 
 50 
 
play in development agenda. Thus, regionally AU has directed member states to integrate 
national development agenda into their respective investment legislations.124 
 
Although, mining legislations in Nigeria have incorporated CSR, and the country also 
participated in various international development initiatives such as SDGs and UNDP among 
others, but yet development indicators have consistently rated the country as one that suffers 
severe development challenges. Recent literature blames this situation on poor governance, 
archaic and inadequate investment regulations. The latter is said to have caused significant 
divestment from the country‟s natural resource sector (Nigeria Extractive Industry Transparency 
Initiative Report, 2016; US Assessment of Nigerian Energy Sector). 
 
3.3. Mining and Investment  
 
3.3.1. FDI and Investment in the Mining Sector 
 
Due to lack of technical know-how and financial capacity necessary to undertake mineral 
extraction, developing countries including Nigeria must rely on foreign investors to develop 
such resources. Generally, investment comes in the form of FDI or portfolio investment. FDI 
has been defined by UNCTAD as „an investment involving a long-term relationship and 
reflecting a lasting interest and control by a resident entity in one economy in an enterprise 
resident in an economy other than that of the foreign direct investor‟.125 It is also defined as 
“Flow of business capital, technological and management know-how from foreign entities 
into an economy of a state with a view to obtain the target returns over specific period of 
time.”126  While portfolio investment is a movement of capital to acquire interest (not control) 
in an already formed and functioning enterprise, the interest could be shares or any other 
instrument through which company raises capital for its operation.127 This includes Sukuk 
bonds. These definitions highlight the positive role of FDI in explaining why resource 
countries compete to attract them. Cave128  has summarised the benefits of FDI as:  
 
                                                          
124  ECOWAS Harmonization Directives (2008); African Mining Vision (2009) 
125 UNCTAD Definitions, available at:  <https://unctad.org/en/Docs/wir2007p4_en.pdf>  last accessed 18th 
October, 2018) 
126Sornarajah, M. The International Law on Foreign Investment, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2010), Pg. 8 
127 Ibid 
128 Caves, R.E. Multinational Enterprise and Economic Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
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The effort made by various countries in attracting FDI are due to the potential 
positive effects that this would have on economy. FDI would increase productivity, 
technology transfer, managerial skills, know-how, international production network, 
reducing unemployment, and access to external market.  
 
Generally, after the Second World War, FDI acquired a prominent position in the global 
economic landscape, but its gradual control over economic and political affairs of host states 
has generated criticism. Common criticism includes the tendency to crowd out domestic 
enterprises, and undue interference with governance regimes thereby undermining socio-
economic development. For this reason, governments in developing countries have viewed 
FDI as a potential threat to their sovereignty.129 This is a pattern of the situation that 
prompted nationalisation policy in 1970s, where host states took over foreign businesses. 
Despite these negative elements, FDI remains crucial to developing countries until there is 
alternative source of investment.130 Economists believe that once the potential benefits 
provided by FDI can be created locally, FDI will no longer be relevant. They maintained that, 
as domestic enterprise will naturally be better informed about internal business environments, 
there must be certain prevailing conditions to warrant FDI. Yet foreign firm possess certain 
advantages that allow them to pursue investment, which includes ability to generate finance 
from abroad, mobilise technology and take risks in a way that domestic companies are unable 
to do.131 
 
However, the reason for which states attract foreign investor, then on the flip side of the coin 
one may ask what is it that the investors look for? The answer is business-friendly 
environment, and this is always gleaned from the legal framework of a state.132 Law enables 
smooth and productive transactions between states and resource developers. Through mining 
regulations, host governments in developing countries seek to achieve national growth both 
economically and otherwise, with the principal objective of investors being to maximise 
shareholder benefits from the investment and increasing their capital base. Generally, in 
deciding where to invest their capital, mining companies primarily look at the investment 
legal framework of a particular state to assess and ascertain whether the jurisdiction is an 
attractive one. Thus, to attract investment, sovereign states need to frame their investment 
                                                          
129 Vintila Denisia, „Foreign Direct Investment Theories: An Overview of the Main FDI Theories‟ (2010) 
European Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies, Vol. 2, no. 2, PP. 104-110 
130 Denisia, „Foreign Direct Investment Theories‟ (2010) PP. 104-110 
131 Ibid, pp. 104-110 
132 Walied E, Mineral Investment Under the Shari‟ah Law (1993) PP. 35-43 
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policy and laws in ways that capture not only their own developmental goals but also the 
legitimate interests of private enterprises as potential development partners. It is from this 
concept that the theory „investors are attracted to a system that is predictable and efficient‟133 
has emerged.  
 
3.3.2.  CSR, Mining and Investment 
 
In a qualitative study assessing the extent to which Nigeria‟s legal framework promotes 
investment, Ekhator and Anyiwe134 found that, there is downturn of investment flow into 
Nigeria due to some limitations in the law, which impede the desired level of investment in 
all sectors including minerals. This limitation has to do with provisions on responsibility of 
investors to contribute towards community development. The authors conclude that, the   
„amendment of the extant laws regulating the different sectors is necessary to encourage 
social and corporate responsibility; and improve and promote the inflow of FDI into the 
country‟.135 Literature also indicates that, existence of clear and effective provisions on how 
mining benefit be delivered to the citizen provides assurance of safe environment to 
investors, and failure to make such provisions has led to tensions and ultimately significant 
divestment from Nigeria‟s extractive industries.136 It is therefore in the interest of all 
stakeholders that, states make laws defining clearly and seeking to enforce effectively the role 
of investors in community development. Scholars have however differed in their opinion as 
to whether hard or soft law is appropriate to be adopted by states in framing the provisions 
for corporate social responsibility of the investors. Hard law refers to law in a form of 
command followed by sanction, while soft law entails use of law in its liberal sense as 
persuading instrument seeking to achieve its goal through incentives rather than threat of 
punitive measures.  
 
3.3.3. Relationship between CSR, Law and Development  
 
                                                          
133 Amanda Perry, „An Ideal Legal System for Attracting Foreign Direct Investment? Some Theory and 
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Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is a growing part of the discourse on the role of 
investment firms in the resource extractive industry. The work of Okoye137 on the 
relationship between CSR, Law and development in an African context” is particularly 
relevant. In the article, Okoye reviewed extensive literature on governance and perception of 
development in African context. Furthermore, the author reiterated the growing perspective 
on governance which views private sector as partners to state in development agenda. In the 
light of this perspective, Okoye then assessed various approaches to CSR obtained in 
different developing countries, especially African. Below are the major arguments of Okoye.  
 
First, she argues that, the traditional view of CSR as a charity and voluntary initiative by 
investors cannot achieve development. States need to regulate CSR through the instrument of 
law. However, the role of law is to define and concretise CSR objectives to cover basic 
development challenges peculiar to African states. Therefore, contrary to the standard view of 
CSR in developed countries promoting elements such as consumer protection and climate 
change among other things, the African version need to be more concerned with socio-
economic challenges. 138 Also she argues that, states‟ performance on development might 
have direct impact on CSR, unless states themselves are seen to be leading by example any 
attempt to regulate the private sector is likely to fail.139 Okoye‟s last but more important 
argument is about the appropriate type of law to be used in framing corporate obligations 
towards development. 
 
Okoye finally suggest that, the major issue with regulating CSR in African lies in the 
conceptual misperception of “law” and “CSR”. While investors view their corporate 
contribution to development as voluntary, governments‟ authorities in Africa tend to use only 
hard law rather than adopting holistic approach to the use of law. Okoye argues that, this 
element of state officials seeking to control investors by way of punitive law was responsible 
for the failure of a CSR Bill (208) in Nigeria.140 In essence, the author found that, even 
though the traditional perception of CSR as mere voluntary investor initiative is increasingly 
fading out, yet seeking to impose CSR by way of mandatory legislation could be 
                                                          
137 Okoye, „CSR, Law and Development‟ (2012), Pg. 368 
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counterproductive. She concludes, „consequently, law which is broadly conceived 
considering hard law and soft law, appears most relevant in this category.‟141 
 
 
3.3.4. A Critique of Okoye‟s Paper 
 
Okoye‟s argument that, the major problem of engagement between state and investors in 
relation to CSR lies in the dominance of using law in command fashion, is not always the 
case. African countries, including Nigeria, have incorporated CSR of mining companies into 
their Mining legislations. It is the same Nigeria‟s parliament passed the mining legislation in 
2007 and rejected the said CSR Bill in 2008. In the mining sector, CSR is referred to as 
Community Development Agreement (CDA). CDA in most mining jurisdictions of African is 
couched in mandatory language. Section 116(1) of Nigeria‟s Minerals Development Act 2007 
declared mandatory for a holder of mining lease to sign CDA before commencing any work. 
Moreover, sub-section (5) made it further clear that, CDA is binding on the parties. 
Nevertheless, evidence from empirical study indicates that, use of hard law in CDA has not 
recorded any damage to state-investor relationship. In the contrary, CDA signifies quality of 
regulations and security in a country and thereby attracts FDI.142 Kendra143 concludes: 
 
As both cross-national data and the case of Sierra Leone demonstrate, states are 
seeking to attract foreign investment into their mining sectors by imposing higher 
regulatory standards, and they are using community development legal provisions to 
communicate the security of their investment environment to potential investors. This 
challenges the conventional wisdom that globalization necessarily leads to regulatory 
races to the bottom, including in the mining sector.   
 
Moreover, Okoye‟s paper did not seem to have considered rival explanation contained in 
other existing literature as to why bills to do with CSR in oil and gas sector such as Petroleum 
Industry Bill (PIB) and CSR Bill 2018 were unsuccessful. Reports from Nigeria‟s Extractive 
Industries Transparency Initiative (NEITI) for example cited a different reason. Things 
including lack of efficiency in governance, transparency problem, and conflicting interest 
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142 Kendra, „Community Development in Mining Laws‟ (2014),1, PP. 200–215, at pp. 206-207 
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among politicians and bureaucrats of regulatory institutions, as well as systemic corruption 
rather than strict regulations.144  
 
 
 
3.3.5 Community Development Agreements and their implementation 
 
CDA represents an important milestone of the recent process for reforming the mining sector 
in Nigeria. Sections 116 and 117 of Nigeria‟s Mining Act, 2007, creates robust framework 
for CDA. Objectives of CDA were consistent with particular needs of Africa‟s communities, 
as they reflect all basic socio-economic and environmental challenges. However, research 
highlight some important concerns with practicality of the agreement in African nations 
(Nigeria inclusive). Ekhator and Anyiwe145 feared that CDA implementation might be 
unlikely in Nigeria. Because institutional decay and poor governance which defeated CSR in 
oil sector are still present in the state. The author assert, „Arguably, the weaknesses of the 
extant MOU/GMoU initiatives in the oil sector will be replicated in the solid minerals/steel 
sector in Nigeria.‟146 Nwapi147 pointed out two major shortcomings of the CDA to include 
representation and capacity building.CDA regime did not provide for who should represent 
the community or how such representation be drawn up. Nwapi highlighted that it is 
important to specify representative, because there is tendency of people to disagree on this 
point. Nwapi148 argues: 
 
The only exception is Kenya‟s Draft CDA Regulations, which prescribe the 
membership of the CDA monitoring and implementation committee. But this is only a 
limited exception, because the committee is charged only with implementation of a 
CDA that has already been concluded and approved. The guidelines do not apply to 
the negotiation of CDAs. Meaning that dominant groups within a community may 
hijack the negotiation process. Since CDAs result in benefits to the community, such 
as employment and educational scholarships, the groups which dominated the 
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negotiation process are also likely to dominate in the enjoyment of the benefits. In 
addition, the draft regulations do not 
 
Similarly, hesitance of major foreign investors to invest directly in Nigeria‟s solid mineral 
sector despite proven geological potentials has been linked to investors being unsure of the 
“business-enabling environment”. In spite all incentives necessary for investment prosperity 
put in place by the government, yet the major challenge is that the mining sector is beset by 
lack of capital; the sector is dominated by local artisanal miners who are skilled but lack 
technology and capital, while foreign investors are hesitant to step into the country.149 This 
situation creates a gap which portfolio investment can set in. Although, this thesis is equally 
concerned with concretising the provisions on the right of people to socio-economic 
development, it focuses on examining Sukuk portfolio investment as a viable means to 
generating investment capital for mining from within and outside Nigeria. 
 
Portfolio investment theory asserts that, „as long as there is no risk or barrier in the way of 
capital movement; the capital will go from countries with low interest rates to countries with 
high interest rates.‟150 However, this definition was rejected by some other economist stating 
that, no barrier to capital flow in business reality and it can move freely in any direction.151 
High interest rate in the above quote is taken to mean high return on investment, which is the 
profit yield for purpose of Sukuk in this thesis. It is therefore clear from the theory that, what 
attracts capital for portfolio investment is the return on investment (i.e. high interest rates) 
across jurisdictions. Thus, it is also safe to theorise that, potentials for high return created as 
incentives within investment framework, might attract capital through Sukuk portfolio.  
 
3.4. Mining Law and Sukuk Investment 
 
2.4.1. Introducing Sukuk and Islamic Financial systems 
Sukuk can be loosely translated as “Islamic bonds”, but more accurately as “Islamic 
investment certificate.” The word Sukuk is a plural of the Arabic word “Sak”, which is a 
long-standing parlance within the classic Islamic commercial law, referring to a paper that 
represents undischarged financial obligation. Historically, first appearance of this term was in 
                                                          
149 Nigeria Mining Investment Promotion Brochure, 2017 
150 Denisia, Foreign Direct Investment Theories (2010), p. 105 
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7th century, when the second caliph, Omar said, “I have been presented with a Sak, due for 
redemption in the “month of Rajab”, but which Rajab? Last, present or the following year? 
Hence, we need to have a calendar system to have our transactions properly dated.”152 There 
is a widely documented claim that the conventional word “check” is an onomatopoeia of the 
Arabic word “Sak”153 In nowadays financial world, Sukuk are translated as „Islamic bonds‟, 
but many researchers object to this loose translation, arguing that Sukuk is broader than the 
word „bonds‟ and therefore should rather be translated as Islamic „investment certificates‟154 
This is consistent with the official definition of Sukuk provided by Accounting and Auditing 
Organisation for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI), where the word „bond‟ has 
completely been avoided. Eventually, the AAOIFI definition, which emerged in the year 
2003, seems to be accepted as the most official definition of Sukuk so far, it reads as “Sukuk 
are certificates of equal value, which represent an undivided pro-rate ownership of underlying 
assets….” The major problem with this definition is that, it has failed to make reference to the 
ethical dimension within which Islamic finance sits. The working definition adopted in this 
study will be, “Investment instrument structured along ethically oriented Islamic principles”.  
 
Sukuk as Islamic bonds continue to gain popularity throughout the relevant literature for 
obvious reason of similarity between the two. Selim Cakir and Faezeh Raei have maintained 
that, “Sukuk are, in many respects, similar to conventional bonds. They further noted that, 
Sukuk are also considered to serve as security instruments that provide a predictable level of 
return; they are traded in the secondary market albeit less than conventional bonds; they are 
assessed and rated by internal rating agencies; and are mostly cleared under Euroclear (listed 
in Luxemburg)”. Nonetheless, they also noted some key differences, “For example” they 
continued “an Ijara (lease) contract that is often used to structure sovereign Sukuk, creates a 
lessee/lessor relationship which is different from a lender/borrower relationship. Investor 
protection mechanism for Sukuk remain largely untested, taxation could also become an issue 
to certain investors where the legal basis for taxation of Islamic securities is not legislated in 
the home country”.155 Additionally, the authors have noted further differences relating to 
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issuance and market behaviour that would be considered later. Yet, the main factor 
underlying the distinctiveness of Sukuk is beyond what has so far been mentioned.  
 
According to Omar Salah156 Sukuk are structurally unique, and this uniqueness is due to 
something owing to the main origin, “the Shari‟ah background of Sukuk results in concrete 
requirements, which in turn determine the formation of Sukuk structure”.157 Concrete 
requirements refer to ethical standard set up by the principles of Islamic law governing 
commercial activities which all financial products, including Sukuk, must adhere to. The 
ethics fundamentally require that, money should be seen as a medium of facilitating a trade 
but not a tradable commodity in its own right, and therefore no interest shall be paid or 
received for lending it, and by extension, this rule applies to any instrument representing 
money e.g. debt (such as bond), hence cannot be traded according to Shari‟ah. This second 
requirement is however contestable as some scholars view the permissibility of trading in 
debt, which is the reason why Malaysia endorsed trading Sukuk structured as debt 
instrument.158 This represents a minority opinion though. By operation, the view of majority 
imposes the essential requirement for tangible asset in structuring Sukuk so that ownership 
thereof can be conferred on the potential investors (Sukuk-holders) through issuance of the 
Sukuk certificates to them, making it thereby legitimate commodity that can be lawfully 
traded in the secondary markets after issuance.159  
 
Although, Sukuk differs significantly from traditional bonds, it serves similar purpose as the 
latter in terms of generating finance for the issuing body. Mining, on the other hand, is a 
capital-intensive project, and as such, companies involved in resource extraction need 
liquidity to carry out the project. More so, one of the conditions for obtaining the lease is, 
applicant companies must demonstrate financial capability to undertake the project, in 
addition to technical know-how. Under corporate finance arrangement, Sukuk hold potentials 
to provide mining corporations with the much-needed funds for the operations. However, 
when Sukuk are used by companies registered and regulated in accordance with common law 
tradition, then question of legal pluralism arises. At times, when parties to Sukuk investment 
fail to indicate their choice of law clearly, conflict of laws become inevitable. 
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Beyond its legal framework, this study is equally interested in how the Sukuk affect the 
mining outcomes. To assess the outcome, one may need to know what the objectives of 
mining are. Although, mining is fundamentally to generate revenue for the host state through 
rents payment, royalty and tax regime, it is also to create profit and return on investment for 
the benefit of multinationals who have risked their capital and technical knowledge. Above 
all however the right of the host communities to benefit as stakeholders is one important 
objective of mining. While, the respective interest of these stakeholders may not run pari 
passu with one another, an ideal framework must be able to provide for, and reconcile 
between these competing objectives. Contrary to the practice of many less developed 
jurisdictions including Nigeria, investment regimes envisage that, communities in the host 
state should drive greater benefit from natural resources compare to any of the two other 
stakeholders. Sukuk is a kind of bond but a participatory bond, its nature allows for multi-
stakeholder participation, which entails participation of various parties. Now the question is 
whom does the minerals belong to?  
 
In Nigeria, the law vests the ownership of all mineral resources in the government of the 
federation as a trustee to regulate and manage it for the ultimate benefit of the citizens of 
Nigeria.160 More so, the right of people to socio-economic development has been sanctioned 
by regional and international instruments on human right. The African Charter on People and 
Human Right and United Nations Covenant on Social, Economic and Cultural Right have 
both declared that, there is obligation on the states to work towards full realisation of those 
rights.161 Article 3 of the International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(1976) states, „The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to ensure the equal right 
of men and women to the enjoyment of all economic, social and cultural rights set forth in the 
present Covenant.‟; and Article 22(1&2) of African Charter on Human and Peoples Right 
(1986) provides, „All peoples shall have the right to their economic, social and cultural 
development with due regard to their freedom and identity and in the equal enjoyment of the 
                                                          
160  S.44 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria; s. 1 of the Nigeria Minerals Act (2007); 
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common heritage of mankind. States shall have the duty, individually or collectively, to 
ensure the exercise of the right to development.‟ This creates not only social responsibility 
but also the obligation to bring the laws to benefit the people. While many African states 
have already incorporated this obligation into their national constitutions, yet social and 
economic rights of citizens remain non-justiciable in Nigeria.162 For this and other 
inadequacies, this study would recommend holistic reform of the legal and policy framework 
for both investment and development in Nigeria, and how would bringing Sukuk into the 
framework facilitate realisation of those rights? 
 
Like all other concepts, the concept of Sukuk has also been challenged. Critics assert that 
Sukuk instrument is a religious tool; not professional as there is no sophisticated global 
standard for regulation and accountability like that of conventional bonds. However, Sukuk 
are not merely a religious instrument, rather it is a pragmatic investment vehicle that has been 
used by many countries (including secular ones) around the world; it is also ethical, non-
exploitative and driven by results; and it can be listed as national or international stock, either 
private or sovereign. Under corporate finance structure arrangement, the private Sukuk have 
had a track record of potentials in raising much-desired capital for mineral development in 
many jurisdictions including in the United States. Of course, its governance would involve 
certain aspect of Shari‟ah law principles, but yet dominated by national and international 
financial regulations. These layers of law governing its transaction are more likely to provide 
checks and balance rather than a loophole. And this formal description is, arguably, the 
framework. 
 
3.4.2. Legal framework for Sukuk 
 
Numerous studies have indicated the significance of a legal framework to smooth and orderly 
conduct of any important transaction. For law is essential to existence of ideal state and 
society. According to Elsie Addo Awadzi, “Sound public debt policies and debt management 
practices require robust legal underpinnings”. Examining the main characteristics of 
comprehensive legal framework for managing any sovereign bonds, the author asserts that, “a 
good PDM legal framework will reflect an optimal balance between flexibility (power of 
                                                          
162 S. 6 of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution made it clear that, provisions of chapter 2 thereof, which contains all 
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 61 
 
government to borrow) on one hand and appropriate constraints on the other. A well-designed 
legal framework helps to promote clarity, transparency and discipline, which ultimately 
support sustainability objectives”. He further stated that, in assessing legal framework of any 
affairs in a particular jurisdiction, the sovereign document of that state (i.e. constitution) 
should constitute the first pot of call.  
 
In structuring out demography of government, the constitution allocates fiscal powers and 
authority to borrow across the respective levels of government, and then confers legislative 
powers on the parliament to enact subsidiary laws in that regard. Looking at the subsidiary 
laws of different jurisdictions, the study found that legal framework of several states may 
differ from one another in material. While some states would treat any contravention of the 
law in a bond transaction as a serious violation of the framework capable of vitiating the 
entire contract, other states do not consider it to be more than mere irregularity. Overall, the 
study concluded that “generally addressing weaknesses in the existing legal framework 
should be pragmatic and be carefully calibrated to help meet reform objectives”. 163 This 
study has two main limitations. First, it addresses public debt management framework only. 
In other words, it focuses on sovereign bonds and did say nothing about private bonds. This is 
significant because investors would require more of legal protection when dealing with 
private entities particularly in matters relating to bonds for the obvious fact that government 
has better ability to redress loss in the event of default. Second limitation of this study, which 
is more relevant here, happens to be the failure to address specific demands of Islamic bonds. 
This is crucial as Sukuk have unique requirements in addition to the general characters they 
share with the conventional bonds that might not be covered by the PDM framework. 
 
3.4.3. Legal framework for Sukuk issuance in Saudi Arabia 
 
Alshamrani164 extensively reviewed the regulatory framework that governs Sukuk issuance in 
Saudi Arabia and found that, despite the distinctive nature of Sukuk which naturally demands 
a specific regulatory framework, there is no such provision in the current legislation of the 
Kingdom. Instead, Sukuk have been defined and regulated by the policies meant and 
structured for the purpose of debt instrument in the Kingdom. There are two bodies of law 
that regulate Saudi Capital Markets: Capital Market Law (CML) and the Offer of Securities 
                                                          
163S. 6 of the Constitution of  the Federal Republic of Nigeria Nigerian, 1999 
164Alshamrani, „Sukuk Issuance and its Regulatory Framework in Saudi Arabia‟ (2014), PP. 305-333 
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Issuance Regulations, both are administered by a statutory body known as Saudi Capital 
Market Authority (SCMA) which was established by Royal Decree No. M/30 of 2nd July, 
2003, but neither of them made mention of Sukuk or any of its derivatives. Lack of legislation 
to cater for the special character of Sukuk investment has had and might continue to have 
serious implications on Sukuk investment in the Kingdom.  
 
The author mentioned three consequences of Saudi framework. Firstly, he noted that, failure 
to provide for Sukuk in the regulatory framework explains why there was no issuance of 
Sukuk in the Kingdom until 2004; all the issuances made so far (about fifteen in total) were 
made under and in accordance with the Offer of Securities Issuance Regulations, which 
defines Sukuk as debt instrument, and this definition sharply contradicts the inherent nature of 
Islamic bonds; and finally, the failure of the current framework to „provide for an efficient 
mechanism necessary for setting up and maintaining transaction-specific special purpose 
companies, has created considerable obstacles thereby hindering investors ability to gain 
access to capital markets‟. To bring the Saudi framework into conformity with the essentials 
of Sukuk investment consistent with Shari‟ah principles, the author suggested that, there must 
be a Shari‟ah Advisory Committee with mandate to scrutinize issuance and check for 
compliance, and the current securities dispute resolution mechanism be amended to 
accommodate Sukuk disputes.165 The focus of this paper is geographically limited as it 
investigates only Saudi Arabia whose Islamic finance industry is not yet as sophisticated as 
those of countries such as Turkey, Malaysia and UAE.   
 
3.4.4. International Approaches to Sukuk 
 
The widespread issuance of Sukuk by both sovereign and corporate entities is a testimony for 
the need of proper regulation to ensure smooth governance of those transactions. Countries 
from not only south Asia and Middle East but also Europe and Far East have embraced 
Islamic bonds, and due to its distinctive nature, the need to provide a suitable legal 
framework for it has since been acknowledged by authorities in those jurisdictions. However, 
lack of comprehensive domestic and international legal framework has been widely noted and 
documented.  
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Balibek166 reviewed the framework of five different countries: UK, Indonesia, Luxembourg, 
Turkey and Hong Kong Special Administration Region (HKSAR) of China and found that 
each of these countries has developed legal framework which enabled them made successful 
issuance of Sukuk. Except Indonesia and Honk Kong who have an independent legislation, all 
other states created their legal framework for Sukuk by simply amending their Debt 
Management Law. To assess comprehensiveness of these frameworks, the author measured 
them against four factors: issuance; accountability of SPV; assurance of redemption; and 
provision for reducing operational cost of asset. With regard to issuance almost all of the 
states involved provided for necessary regulations required for Sukuk although not all of them 
referred to the instrument by name, for example both UK and Luxembourg described it as 
alternative financing instrument. Again, there is clear statement warning investors of no 
guarantee to invest the Sukuk proceeds in Shari‟ah compliant business, in case of UK.167  
 
Balibek did not however, point out that, this proviso could have serious implication on the 
legitimacy of such an investment from Shari‟ah perspective. One of the fundamental 
principles forming the shari‟ah background of Sukuk is the requirement to be clear of being 
invested in any commercial activities that contravene the tenets of Shari‟ah. „These are 
investments relating to, inter alia, alcohol, drugs, armaments, military technology, 
pornography, prostitution, and gambling.‟168 The study also noted that, for better 
accountability there is need to bring the responsibility of collecting and managing the Sukuk 
proceeds under debt management office and not under a separate SPV. Noted also, is the lack 
of clear provision assuring investors of redemption even in case of complete loss of the asset. 
The study has acknowledged the effort of framework of each state to remove operational 
burden on Sukuk investment by reducing tax chargeable to several asset transfer. However, 
provisions for discounted tax exist only in debt management law while other taxation 
instruments stand intact without any incentives for Sukuk.169 This study has a number of 
limitations: It focuses on public issuance only nothing on private and corporate Sukuk. It also 
did not consider most popular destinations of Sukuk such as Malaysia and United Arab 
Emirate which are seen as the major global hubs for this instrument, thereby missing 
discussion about irrelevant aspects of governance like rights of parties in the events of default 
                                                          
166 Emre Balibek, „Establishing a Legal Framework for Sovereign Sukuk Issuance: A Public Debt Management 
Perspective‟ (2017), World Bank MFM Paper No. 18  
167 Balibek, Establishing a Legal Framework for Sovereign Sukuk Issuance (2017)  
168 Salah, „A Legal Analysis of Nakheel Investment‟ (2010), PP. 20-32 
169 Ibid 
 64 
 
and dispute resolution mechanisms that are covered by the more comprehensive and robust 
legal framework of such countries as the ones just mentioned. 
 
 
 
3.5. Dispute Resolution Mechanisms 
 
The existence of dispute resolution mechanism is a significant mark of an effective 
investment framework, for it signals availability of legal protection for investors and thereby 
wins their confidence. Accordingly, all investment regimes both conventional and Islamic do 
contain provisions on dispute settlement. In this study, conventional framework for disputes 
resolution as well as shari‟ah-based mechanisms would be considered. Researchers have 
looked at the significance of legal framework in creating enabling environment for Sukuk 
investment with reference to provisions for dispute resolution in the framework. An empirical 
research (Umar and Kabir) assessed the far-reaching impact the existence of dispute 
resolution mechanism might have on the success of Islamic capital market (ICM). The 
authors reviewed 10 different Sukuk prospectus, conducted direct interview with 10 
prominent Shari‟ah scholars with vast experience in Sukuk and examined financial 
legislations of five leading jurisdictions. These countries are Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, Cayman 
Island, United Kingdom and United Arab Emirates.  
 
Umar and Kabir observed that, although, the widespread adoption of Sukuk as a new method 
of financing development has been paralleled by tremendous legislative efforts necessary for 
the Islamic bonds across the countries, lack of proper and comprehensive legal 
documentation, which incorporates reference to Shari‟ah-compliant dispute resolution 
mechanism, has continued to undermine the modern practice of Sukuk. Although the authors 
acknowledged contractual documentation can hardly be absolute, yet, they argue that, 
consideration of some concrete legal elements would make significant difference. They 
wrote:  
 
However, the impact of the post-default legal battles and stakeholders' tantrums can 
be minimized through proper legal documentation that takes into consideration key 
aspects of shari'a -based procedures of liquidation, debt-restructuring and dispute 
resolution. Given the fact that different jurisdictions have been coming up with 
legislations and regulations on issuance of Sukuk, much is left to be desired, 
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especially when one considers the scanty references to post-default liquidation and 
dispute resolution processes that are originally shari'a -based.  
 
Generally, this study found that, overwhelming majority of governing clauses in Sukuk 
prospectuses analysed, have invoked the jurisdiction of English court, by implication, the 
entire transaction has been subjected to the dictates of the Anglo-American legal system, 
where judges may not have the expertise to appreciate the contractual underpinnings of Sukuk 
as they are substantially based on permutations native to Islamic legal system. Furthermore, 
the study maintained that, even in the most advanced jurisdictions, Malaysia and Saudi 
Arabia, choice of law clauses inserted into the contract tend to place Sukuk matters under 
national courts. To be precise, in the case of Saudi Arabian Electricity Sukuk, particular 
reference has been made to domestic securities dispute resolution mechanism, while in 
Malaysia national High Courts who are normally seized with the matter, would refer to and 
rely on the verdict of Shari‟ah committee.  
 
The authors proposed that, shari‟ah-based alternative dispute resolution as against normal 
court room litigation should be widely embraced in drafting Sukuk contracts. The limitation 
of this finding resides in failure to consider the weakness of arbitration process itself, as 
submission to arbitration is generally optional and enforcement of any award issued by 
arbitral panel is not legally binding, parties dissatisfied with such outcome are likely to 
disrespect it altogether. In effect, as a rule of arbitration, parties can withdraw from 
proceedings any time before the award is given, and even after handing down the award, 
there are challenges associated with enforcement. Also, the study has missed to consider that, 
arbitrators themselves could be compromised by their appointers, as they are mostly 
appointed by the parties to the matter who have vested interest in it.170 Other researchers, who 
explored arbitration in the past and present, have acknowledged these defects.  
 
Colon,171 extensively reviewed resolution of Islamic commercial cases by courts and by 
Alternative Disputes Resolution (ADR) forums as well, pointed out the major problems 
national and international forums for alternative dispute resolution and discussed their 
practices as relate to Islamic financial transaction globally present in each option.172 
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Although, he concurred with the finding of other researchers that, Sharia-based ADR would 
be the most ideal forum to which matters on Islamic finance be referred right from drafting 
stage, but reiterated the challenges associated with arbitration as already noted. The author 
has, nevertheless, suggested that, the none-binding nature of arbitral proceedings can be 
rectified through a national legislation or multi-lateral investment agreement giving legal 
force to such arbitral effort. This is however defeated by the right of parties to approach court 
of law seeking review of arbitral proceedings as it was the case in Sanghi Polyesters Ltd 
(India) V. the International Investment KCFC (Kuwait). Besides, prevailing practice of 
Islamic finance industry indicates that, parties opt to be bound by national laws of a particular 
jurisdiction that has world-wide reputation in finance such as that of United Kingdom.  
 
However, this is not to say that, the parties were shunning the jurisdiction of Islamic law, but 
they do that in keeping with the main objective of Islamic finance, which is achieving an 
Islamic transaction within a conventional regulatory framework.173 Reviewing some notable 
and significant cases on Islamic finance that were adjudicated before English courts, the same 
author confirmed this reality and further found that, intention of parties to Islamic financial 
contracts is to subject their transaction to „a combined system that pairs a national legal 
system with Islamic principles‟, the author cited in evidence, the choice of law clauses in the 
transaction leading to the famous case of Shamil Bank of Bahrain EC V. Beximco 
Pharmaceuticals Ltd and that of Sanghi Polyesters Ltd V. The International Investment 
KCFC which read respectively, “Subject to the principles of the Glorious shari‟a, this 
agreement shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the law of England” and 
“Disputes arising out of this transaction shall be governed by law of England except to the 
extent it may conflict with Islamic shari‟ah, which shall prevail”.174  
 
The main finding of Colon was that, the phrase „combined law‟ does not mean choosing two 
bodies of law to govern a particular contractual obligation concurrently, rather it means 
disputes under the contract shall be analysed mainly according to the national legal system 
chosen by the parties, and only in the event of conflict shari‟ah law will prevail. This finding 
was pivotal as it goes to rectify the supposed conflict between the clauses referred to in those 
cases and the provision of Rome Convention on the Law applicable to contractual obligation 
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of 1980, which stipulates that only one law shall govern a particular contract. In effect, it is 
based on this seeming conflict that, English court held the choice of law clause in Shamil‟s 
case supra as invalid. In practical terms, this study proposes the adoption of „combined law‟ 
approach by English courts, and that Western courts are guided by the practice of Shari‟ah 
arbitration forums on Islamic finance disputes. As it is obvious, the study limited itself to 
pure shari‟a-based conflict resolution prevailing in countries with Islamic law principles as 
the main or even the only recognised source of legislation on the one hand, and on the other 
hand it deals with conflict of law existing between instruments inherently meant to be 
governed by Islamic law and a legal system that does not consider Shari‟ah relevant to it such 
as European states, thereby neglecting what is in between the two and these are countries 
with legal system mainly common law but also recognises the influence of Islamic law and 
regards it as a source of legislation like Nigeria. 
 
It is clear from this dimension that, previous studies have considered the need to create 
enabling environment for Sukuk investment by providing regulations that ensures proper 
structuring of the instrument in accordance with Islamic legal principles and assuring 
investment profitability. However, they generally focused on sovereign issuance and 
substantially neglected private issuance by enterprises. Also, in terms of creation of 
incentives through tax relief policy, existing literature mentioned removing tax on multiple 
asset transfer in Sukuk transaction, losing sight of many other relevant layers of tax burdens 
which private issuers may consider essential. Finally, on dispute resolution, which is the 
corner stone of any investment framework as far as investors‟ protection is concerned, the 
current literature is silent on two important accounts. First, Africa as a continent has been 
conspicuously absent, and secondly, the literature did not mention anything about the main 
international forum for dispute resolution on investment i.e. International Centre for 
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). This study will attempt to fill this gap and 
discuss these issues within the general context of this thesis, which is examining the legal 
framework for investment and Sukuk in the mineral sector. 
 
3.6. Discussions on Ways Forward/Conclusion 
 
This chapter has discussed main issues to be addressed in this study. It has focused on the 
need for robust regulations in order for the mining industry to achieve its primary objectives. 
The chapter highlighted that, the positive impact of resource revenue on the Nigerian 
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communities, which is the core objective of the mining is insignificant. Hence, there is need 
to enhance socio-economic benefits of the natural wealth for the citizen through improving 
the regulatory framework to broaden the role of all stakeholders including communities and 
engage with international development initiatives such as SDGs. However, this is only 
possible when there is good inflow of investment in the sector, which is not the case in 
Nigeria at present. This is because investors find other mining destinations more attractive to 
them than Nigeria. Again, the chapter argued that, to attract investors into the mining 
industry, enabling instruments must be reformed in such a way to reflect not only the factors 
that are traditionally used to attract FDI but also innovative investment tools. For example, 
Sukuk. 
 
Literature reviewed in the chapter indicated that, generally the problem with mining in 
Nigeria is lack of serious investors. Consequently, the sector has been dominated by artisanal 
and illegal miners, leading to loss of huge revenue by the state. Further, although, normally 
states were able to attract investment capital by demonstrating high geological endowment in 
terms of mineral reserves lying underneath their seabed, as well as by providing for certain 
fiscal incentives in their framework, this alone is now unlikely to produce a sustainable 
solution in the face of the ever-increasing demand for FDI in Africa as the number of 
resource countries has kept swelling. 
 
Almost concurrently with the rise of the number of natural resource-wealthy nations is the 
growth of socio-economic problems within those states, Nigeria inclusive. Literature both 
academic and national instruments, including constitution and specific mineral legislations 
referred to in this chapter show that governments have a duty to translate the earnings from 
mining into opportunities for their people. Yet, practical reality of most countries reveal cases 
of abject poverty, high proportion of illiteracy, lack of health care infrastructure and even 
insecurity. Thus, in line with the new perception of governance where development is viewed 
as a task for both state and investors, scholars proposed that, CSR should be the vehicle 
through which private enterprises may deliver on development goals. Okoye argues that, state 
officials in Africa should use legal instrument to formulate development agenda into CSR of 
mining companies. This proposal is, again, not tenable. The usual question is which version 
of the law (hard or soft) is to be used by the authorities to concretise the responsibility of 
business entities. Eventually, there have been instances where attempts to enforce CSR by 
use of law with sanction were have failed mainly due to sustained objections by 
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multinationals. The multinationals maintained that CSR is voluntary. Yet, evidence exist to 
show that, multinationals in developing countries have rarely demonstrated sufficient 
commitment to “voluntary CSR”. 
 
Subsequent chapters of this study would seek to address these issues differently. Overall, the 
study aims propose internal and external reform to the investment framework for Nigeria‟s 
mining sector. In effect, internal reform consists of critical assessment of the framework 
against fundamental elements of persuasive business environment, usually appealing to FDI, 
namely reduced size of government; community development; access to sound money; and 
investment protection. External reform represents an investment innovation, namely Sukuk. 
Sukuk is an Islamic financial instrument widely used for generating investment capital. The 
application of this instrument in Nigeria‟s mining sector is both crucial and controversial. It is 
crucial because it creates liquidity for foreign behemoth corporations as well as for the rising 
medium scale domestic miners. The implication of which means that, in this case the industry 
might function well with or somewhat even without FDI. Moreover, it provides opportunity 
for communities to become active rather than passive stakeholders, because Sukuk by nature 
is a participatory instrument. This way, it addresses community neglect problem. 
 
Being a product of Islamic finance, its application within Nigeria‟s investment framework 
would trigger some legal questions. One such question is whether two or more different legal 
systems can co-exist to govern a transaction. This legal controversy goes to challenge the 
pluralism of Nigeria‟s legal system. Hence, the historical development of Nigeria‟s legal 
system and its diversity vis-à-vis the impact of this development on commercial activities 
will be explored in chapter three to provide historical perspective for this instrument. These 
perspectives have eventually continued to have impact on the construct of Nigeria‟s 
investment outlook till present day. 
 
Modern Nigeria‟s mining industry is then critically examined in chapter four to ascertain the 
extent to which it provides for economic freedom of investors and community rights, legal 
protection as well as sanctity of contract and access to sound money. These elements are 
essential for designing attractive investment atmosphere in a state. They provide greater 
certainty for investors and therefore attract investment. However, given stiff competition for 
FDI worldwide, countries tend to provide for broader economic freedom with a range of legal 
systems for investors to subscribe as it pleases them. Accordingly, access to sound money is 
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given expanded interpretation to mean also financial inclusion. Islamic finance is discussed 
as a source of liquidity for mining companies. Precisely, Islamic bonds; its legal structure; 
and its applications in relation to investment broadly and mining would be considered is 
chapter five.  
 
However, given that, no enough precedent in Nigeria, case studies of three other countries 
will be used for the purpose comparative study. These jurisdictions were selected based on 
unique qualities they exhibited. Malaysia has a similar historical antecedence to Nigeria with 
multiplicity of legal systems forming the core of federalism. They both had Islamic law 
rooted in their culture before British colonialism. However, Malaysia developed faster than 
Nigeria in many respects, including in Islamic finance and has become a world leader in this 
area. On the other hand, UAE presents an entirely distinct scenario. It was a predominantly 
Islamic state but embraced relaxed economic policy free economic zones, which proved 
successful. The UK is weaker in terms of Islamic bonds, however its legal system (British 
common law) has become a preferred system for dispute resolution in Islamic finance 
transactions world-wide. Essentially, these three case studies each presents distinct features, 
with varying strengths and weakness, however. The model emerged from each study will be 
analysed and then assessed in relation to its suitability to the Nigerian framework for possible 
adoption.  
 
The next chapter will examine nature and needs of specific sectors, namely mining and 
infrastructure, where demand for investment is particularly high, and further evaluate 
potentials of the current legal and policy regime to stimulate development in these sectors 
through investment. 
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4. Chapter Four: Critical Review of the Frameworks for Development through Mining 
and the need for Infrastructure investment to enable sustainable development in 
Nigeria 
 
4.1. Chapter Overview (Introduction) 
 
This chapter aims to critically examine the current legal framework for investment and 
development in Nigeria. From the outset, it investigates the relationship between investment 
and development. Looks at development in terms of raising the living standard of a people 
socio-economically as the primary responsibility of states, but also explores the nexus 
between the ability of state to pursue development and the role of FDI. Given the fact that, 
only through revenue generation and achieving inclusive economic growth can government 
undertake any meaningful development. Thus, FDI is critical for development. In addition, 
the chapter also discusses investors‟ contribution to development of their host state in the 
context of CSR. The debate as to whether the social responsibility of mining companies be 
made mandatory or left to remain as an act of charity is explored. Given the peculiar state of 
underdevelopment in Africa as well as investors‟ need for social license, redefined and 
entrenched version of CSR would boost investor confidence in the jurisdiction.  
 
Furthermore, the chapter looks at other elements critical for attractive investment regime. A 
system that provides for enhanced certainty and cater for investor freedom would naturally 
persuade more investors. Economic freedom is normally assessed based on such factors as 
access to sound money, well-regulated credit facilities, legal protection for private property 
and contractual obligation as well as eased documentation process, which are necessary for 
creation of favourable business environment. However, this chapter will primarily focus on 
three elements potential investors would use to predict efficiency and assess level of risk that 
exist in a mining sectors. Their relationship with the state, which is determined by the mining 
regime; relationship with host community (social license) usually assed from level of 
development and clarity of law on what mining communities should expect; and finally 
necessary infrastructure, which includes institutions. It has been theorised that, “investors are 
attracted to the legal system that is both predictable and efficient.”175  
                                                          
175 Amanda, An Ideal Legal System for Attracting Foreign Direct Investment (2000) pg. 1628 
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Considering that, infrastructure is particularly crucial, second half of this chapter (part B) is 
dedicated to discussions on the relationship between infrastructure development and 
achieving a functional mining industry in Nigeria. The chapter begins by looking at different 
definitions of infrastructure both broad and specific with aim to arriving at a working 
definition narrowed down to minerals sector. Further, a discussion on the mutual benefits 
linking the two sectors with each other is explored. Using Atlas (2016), a global framework 
developed by UN and partners as well as National Policy on Minerals Metal in Nigeria, 
potentials of the mining industry to spur infrastructure development is discussed. On the other 
hand, broad effect of infrastructure on the mining is presented through an intuitive theoretical 
framework developed by Johannes and Rob (2008). Finally, and based on the foregoing, 
Nigeria‟s policy and legal framework for infrastructure development is reviewed to evaluate 
current successes and challenges. Global indicators are used to compare development level in 
Nigeria with other mining jurisdictions, with aim to highlight extent of gap to fill with 
emphasis on the amount of funding required, possible sources and overall policy implication 
of the entire review. Furthermore, the chapter highlights the potential of Islamic bonds to 
contribute to development of both mining and infrastructure in Nigeria. As an investment 
vehicle sukuk is globally recognised to be a source of generating capital for long time 
investment, a characteristic that fits into the nature of both mining and infrastructure 
investment. 
 
4.2. PART A: The Role of Investment in fostering development 
 
4.2.1. Obligations for development as part of investment 
 
Although, investment is quite a broad concept which encompasses different types within 
itself and denotes various industries and sectors of a state, the extractive industry is central to 
investment in a country like Nigeria. Thus, in this chapter, reference to laws governing 
investment and development within that industry would be made in addition to the leading 
documents, namely the constitution, investment promotion act and the companies act to 
demonstrate the impact of the system on development through both FDI and portfolio 
investment. Precisely, role and the rights of the key stakeholders-government, indigenous 
people and the investors-are explored. Community Development Agreement (CDA) 
contained in the mining Act as well as the arguments around the long-awaited Petroleum 
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Industry Bill (PIB) would be looked at.  CDA is another name for Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR) of mining companies. However, in the case of CDA both the 
obligations as well as the objectives of the CSR have been specified and concretized by law. 
The provision of Sections 116, 117 and 118, as shown below, specifically demanded that, 
CDA shall ensure social and infrastructure development within mining communities. This is 
discussed alongside the historical evolution of CSR which serves as the original basis for the 
CDA, in order to highlight the growing role of law in bringing together private actors and the 
government as partners in delivering development.  
 
4.2.2. Role of Government in Providing Predictability and Effectiveness 
 
„Legal systems that fail to provide credible information regarding the status of legal rights 
and obligations must be reformed in order to create greater certainty for foreign 
investors.‟176 
 
From the outset, the constitution of Nigeria serves as the fundamental framework for both 
governance and development, since the constitution is essentially a „contractual document 
between government and the citizens‟, and more so, it is the grand norm from which all other 
laws drive their legitimacy. Section 44 of 1999 constitution of the federal republic of Nigeria 
vests the ownership of minerals resources in the government of Nigeria, and this has led to 
section 1 of the Petroleum Act (1969) as well as section 1 of the Mining Act (2007) focusing 
on resource ownership. Thus, there is no concept of private ownership of minerals in Nigeria, 
as all minerals are a property of the state, be it solid or oil and regardless of whether they 
happen to be on private or public land. However, state is a mere trustee, holding legal title to 
the resources for the sole benefit of the citizens of Nigeria. This trust has been envisaged by 
the constitution itself, recognising government‟s obligation to manage the resources 
efficiently to create development. Section 16(1) of the constitution stipulates that, 
„government shall harness the resources of the nation and promote national prosperity and an 
efficient, a dynamic and self-reliant economy‟. And even more clearly, the constitution 
declares „exploitation of natural resources is prohibited for any reason whatsoever except for 
the benefit of the community‟177.  
 
                                                          
176 Amanda, „An Ideal Legal System for Attracting Foreign Direct Investment‟ (2000), Pg. 1627 
177 S. 17(2(d) the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 
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The combined effect of the two sections are taken to mean that, government shall manage all 
national resources in order to create prosperity for the citizens and to promote national 
development. The key phrases in the foregoing provisions are „national prosperity‟ and 
„benefit of the community‟. Taken together, these phrases may mean that, government shall 
use revenue from extractive industries mainly to provide social and public goods. Subsequent 
provisions of the constitution hinted towards human and socio-economic development. The 
emphasis of section 17 (3 a-d)178 is on equality, rule of law, efficiency and independence of 
judiciary to ensure accessible justice. Furthermore, the section emphasizes creation of earning 
opportunities for people, provision of adequate and equal healthcare facilities for all as well 
skills acquisition scheme. S. 18 (1)179 is on provision of free education for all citizens from 
primary to university level. Whereas S. 20180 is on environmental protection. By and large, 
Nigeria‟s constitution has conferred on the state powers to control resources but has also 
placed a broad range of duty to create a widespread development. Nonetheless, literature 
show that, in spite of huge revenue gained mainly from natural resources, government has 
failed to achieve any meaningful development in the country. 
 
4.2.3. Indications of governance failures in Nigeria‟s approach to development 
 
It should be noted here that, there was international initiatives to promote development in 
developing countries like Nigeria. In addition to the presupposed effort of the national 
government under the constitution, there had been a corresponding international effort 
through United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). This initiative was launched in 
the year 2000 to implement development agenda declared by international community as 
development priority in selected countries. The central objective was to „eradicate extreme 
poverty and hunger, achieve universal primary education, promote gender equality and 
empower women, reduce child mortality and improve maternal health, combat HIV/AIDS, 
Malaria and other diseases, ensure environmental sustainability and develop a global 
partnership for development.‟181 All necessary facilities for the success of this project had 
been provided by UN department responsible for partnering with concerned states‟ 
                                                          
178 S. 17(2(d) the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 
179 S. 18 the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 
180 S. 20 the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 
181 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) : Millennium Development Goals (2000),  available at 
<http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/sdgoverview/mdg_goals.html> accessed 26th September, 2019 
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authorities to ensure smooth implementation of the programme. Preliminary studies 
conducted and resources supplied. 
 
However, by the year 2015, when the timeframe for the project had ended, there was no 
meaningful achievement recorded in Nigeria. Sadly, country MDG report of Nigeria suggests 
that, the overall result for the period of one and the half decade was an extremely weak or 
very poor performance across almost all indicators (see table 2, below): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 76 
 
 
 
 
Table 1:4 Selected MDGs Indicators  
No. OF 
INDICATOR 
NAME OF INDICATOR REMARK 
Indicator 1.1 Proportion of population below USD 1 per day (%) weak 
Indicator 1.8 National level prevalence of underweight children under five years of age fair 
Indicator 2.1 Net enrolment in primary education (%) weak 
Indicator 2.2 Primary six completion rate weak 
Indicator 2.3 Literacy rate of 15 to 24-year olds weak 
Indicator 3.1a Ratio of girls to boys in primary education strong 
Indicator 3.1b Ratio of girls to boys in secondary education fair 
Indicator 3.2 Share of women in wage employment in non-agricultural sector (%) weak 
Indicator 3.3 Proportion of seats held by women in the national parliament (%) weak 
Indicator 4.1 Under-five mortality rate strong 
Indicator 4.2 Infant mortality rate fair 
Indicator 4.3 Proportion of 1-year-old children immunized against measles  weak 
Indicator 5.1 Maternal mortality ratio  met 
Indicator 5.2  Proportion of births attended by skilled health personnel weak 
Indicator 5.3 Contraceptive prevalence rate  weak 
Indicator 5.5 Antenatal care coverage (at least one visit)  weak 
Indicator 6.1 HIV prevalence among pregnant young women aged 15 – 24  weak 
Indicator 6.2 Young people aged 15–24 years reporting the use of a condom during sexual 
intercourse with a non-regular sexual partner 
weak 
Indicator 6.3 Proportion of the population aged 15–24 years with 
comprehensive correct knowledge of HIV and AIDS 
weak 
Indicator 6.5 Indicator 6.5 Proportion of the population with advanced HIV infection with 
access to antiretroviral drugs 
weak 
Indicator 6.7  Proportion of under-five children sleeping under insecticide-treated bed nets weak 
Indicator 6.9 Incidence of TB per 100,000 population  None 
Indicator 7.1 Proportion of land area covered by forest  
 
weak 
Indicator 7.9 Proportion of population using an improved drinking water source  
 
weak 
Indicator 7.10 Proportion of urban population living in slums  
 
weak 
Indicator 8.1 Per capita ODA to Nigeria  
 
Fair 
Indicator 8.2 Debt service as a percentage of exports of goods and services  
 
Strong 
Indicator 8.14 Telephone lines per 100 people  
 
weak 
Indicator 8.15 Cellular phone subscribers per 100 people  
 
Strong 
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Indicator 8.16 Internet users per 100 people  Fair 
Indicator 8.17 Tele-density  Strong 
80% weak 
 Source: Nigeria 2015 MDG End-Point Report 
 
4.2.4. Analysis of Millennium Development Goal Indicators  
Generally, the table above indicates level of performance in key areas of socio-economic 
development goals. These areas are poverty (lack of earning opportunity); education and 
literacy; health care for mothers and their children; environmental safety; and gender 
equality. Several indicators have been used to represent and provide information on each of 
the goals. Remark on each indicator alongside its name and number has been given in the 
table. Now, these indicators and the respective remarks provided on them will be used to 
analyse Nigeria‟s performance on MDGs. 
 
Healthcare: The table shows high rate of infant and children mortality alongside low 
proportion of children immunized against killer diseases like measles, low or weak 
proportion of children sleeping under insecticide-treated bed nets, weak antenatal care 
coverage and low number of births attended by skilled personnel indicates poor performance 
or even failure to achieve MDGs on healthcare. Quality healthcare for mothers and their 
children is necessary for combating maternal mortality and ensuring greater chance of 
survival for them. However, the table shows that prevalence of HIV is not high among 
pregnant women, even though awareness about it and precautions against it is also weak. This 
suggest that, the high rate of maternal and infant mortality is unrelated to HIV. 
 
Education and equal opportunity for women: Similarly, in the area of education the table 
shows overall weak or poor performance. Indicators on literacy among teenagers and young 
adults are remarked as weak, the rate of primary six completions is also weak. Although, the 
ratio of girls to boys in both primary and secondary education is fair or strong, enrolment of 
children into primary education is generally weak. Report from other sources indicate that, 
Nigeria is one of the countries with alarming number of children out of school. Remarks on 
gender equality appears to be fair or even strong, but this is not the case when it comes to 
non-agricultural (salaried) employment and political office. Women representation is yet 
indicated to be weak. Thus, the outcome of MDGs on equal opportunity for women is weak 
or poor performance in Nigeria.  
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Poverty reduction: High rate of poverty is indicated for on the table by weakness of the effort 
to reduce the number of people living below USD 1 a day. This is also true of issues to do 
with environmental safety, as only small proportion have access to improved drinking-water 
source. Overall, the table represents 80% weakness in Nigeria‟s performance on the MDGs, 
while 20% shows work done. This is below average. The table indicates that, implementation 
of MDGs in Nigeria has been only 20% success or well-performed, while 80% is poorly 
performed or even a failure. This assessment of Nigeria‟s performance on MDGs is 
significant as it may serve as precursor to the way and manner SDGs should be handled in 
order to avoid repeating similar outcome.  
 
Lack of development has been attributed to several factors. Inadequacy of the laws to enforce 
accountability and check corruption were among the most cited elements responsible for 
underdevelopment in most third world countries including Nigeria. Inadequate legal backing 
to hold the government accountable for its failure to deliver on developmental rights is 
represented by the constitutional declaration of those rights as non-justiciable. S. 6 (6) of the 
constitution provides that, the judicial power: 
 
shall not except as otherwise provided by this Constitution, extend to any issue or 
question as to whether any act of omission by any authority or person or as to 
whether any law or any judicial decision is in conformity with the Fundamental 
Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy set out in Chapter II of this 
Constitution 
 
By implication, the above provision has removed the duty of state to create economic and 
social and infrastructure development from judicial powers, hence in effect, government is 
simply at discretion with regards to the provision of chapter II. Eventually, S. 6(6) has widely 
been viewed as constitutional impediment to development.182 Given the persistent failure of 
states to realise their national development aspirations, consensus has gradually emerged to 
allocate private sector a role to pursue developmental goals alongside the state. This rise in 
corporate power has been paralleled with not only the collapse of the Soviet Union, but also 
the emergence of neoliberalism shifting significant influence onto the private sector to take 
part in governance. Thus, governance has been reinterpreted to mean the state creating a role 
for investors to contribute to national development. Yet, as the MDG indicators reveal, 
                                                          
182 Olaolu S Opadere, „Non-justiciability of the Fundamental Objectives: Paradox and the Bane of Governance 
in Nigeria‟ (2018), Journal of Law Policy and Globalisation, Vol. 74, PP. 37-46 
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creating development outcomes can be more complex in practice and may often require 
multi-scalar, multi-stakeholder governance and buy-in that currently does not exist in 
Nigeria.   
 
4.2.5. The Sustainable Development Goals and the post-2015 development agenda 
 
SDGs initiative has been the natural successor to the MDGs. Towards the expiration of 
MDGs timeframe (2000-2015), Rio conference on sustainable development held in 2012 
recommended that a committee shall be set up to come up with post-MDGs development 
plan. Accordingly, by 2014 the UN Open Working Group (OWG) put together a zero draft of 
SDGs comprising of 17 goals, which was later finalised and adopted by the UNGA in its 68th 
session. By 2015 September, “193 United Nations (UN) member states adopted 
“Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development”, which includes a 
set of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) for 2015-2030”. In addition to the 17 goals, it 
also consists of 169 targets (desired features) and 330 indicators (requirements). Of the 17, 6 
goals are reiteration if not reproduction of the core message of MDGs.183 Given the 
underperformance recorded in some countries, SDGs is a continuation of the MDGs in a 
broader and more expanded framework.184 
 
As regards mining, literature shows strong linkages between mineral development and SDGs. 
Considering strategic place mining industry occupies both in terms of geography and its 
impacts on environment, economy and society, the industry has naturally conformed to the 
core components of sustainable development.185 For most part, the sustainability goals can be   
grouped in line with these fundamental components, namely preservation of environment, 
social inclusion and economic development. Accordingly, potentials of mining to contribute 
to SDGs have been widely acknowledged. 
 
From an environmental perspective, mining activities share the use of some natural resources 
such as water, land and air with human beings, flora and fauna. Unless, regulated, mining 
tends to create adverse impact on the lives on land by polluting and oversubscribing to these 
                                                          
183 Svatva Janouskova and Bedrick Moldan, „Sustainable Development Goals: A need for relevant indicators‟ 
(2016) Ecological indicators, 60, PP. 565-573 at Pg. 566 
184 Svatna and Bedrich, „Sustainable development goals‟ (2016), Pg. 566 
185 Andre Xavier, Bern Klein and Fatima Regina Ney Matos, „Mining and the sustainable Development Goals: 
A Systematic Literature Review‟ (2017), Conference Proceedings of 8th conference on Sustainable Development 
in the mineral industry, PP. 29-34, at Pg. 29, available at <www.camdemia.ca/publications/press@camdemia>    
accessed 20th November, 2018 
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shared resources. Avoidance of this, would contribute to objects of SDG6 and 15, which 
respectively seek to achieve clean water and sanitation, and life on land. Furthermore, 
“mining activities are energy and emission intensive presenting opportunities for greater 
efficiency as well as expanding access to energy”. 186 This represents a direct contribution to 
SDG7: energy access and sustainability, and SDG 13: Climate action. 
 
Core objective of SDGs1(end poverty), 5(gender equality), 10(reduced inequalities) and 
16(peace, justice and strong institutions) has a social dimension, which mining can be 
promoted through mining. Resource industry generates huge income to both the state and 
mining companies. If equitably redistributed and fairly used, mining revenue will create 
socio-economic prosperity by enhancing household earning through job creation. In addition, 
proper regulation of employment into slots provided by government and private investor must 
ensure equal opportunities for those that are often neglected including women. Entrenching 
such ideals of social justice in the practice of mining industry, avoidance of any action or 
inaction capable of undermining trust between investor and host community, will go a long 
way in creating not only a peaceful society but also social license for investors.187 
 
Turning to economic development, fortunes derived from mining has the potentials to create 
widespread development. While SDG8 is about decent work and economic growth, mining 
offers opportunity acquire technical skills and expertise for citizens by working with industry 
companies in addition to earning opportunities. More so, operations of giant companies will 
naturally create an economic impact on the local businesses providing mining-related 
services. Further in this regard, mining contributes to SDG (infrastructure innovation and 
industrialisation) in the sense that, diversification from industry revenue into infrastructure 
can give rise to new physical development in communication facilities, road and transport 
system as well as enhanced power generation. Furthermore, “mining provides materials 
critical for renewable technologies and the opportunities for companies to collaborate across 
the supply chain to minimise waste, and to reuse and recycle”.188  Generating these raw 
materials will induce industrial development, and the opportunity to recycle them marks the 
significant contribution this can make to SDG 12 (responsible consumption and production). 
 
                                                          
186 Mapping Mining to SDGs: An Atlas (2016), Pg. 4 
187
 Ibid 
188 Ibid 
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It is immediately obvious from the above that, mining can contribute to SDGs, however it is 
not inherently so. Proactive steps need to be taken by stakeholders to create a framework 
necessary to realising potentials of minerals industry to facilitate SDGs in the manner 
outlined above.189 Legal and policy framework for mineral investment must incorporate 
provision aiming at attaining sustainability and development goals through mining in 
collaboration with the private sector. The role of private sector is critical and hence must be 
clearly defined and regulated by the state. Regardless of size and nationality, all companies 
must be made accountable to the realisation of this global agenda for sustainability. Scholars 
have identified ways by which mining enterprise may deliver sustainability to include, 
provision of quality training to employees, use of high level and clean technology as well as 
effective discharge of their social responsibilities.190 
 
4.3. Role of the Private Sector in delivering sustainable development 
 
4.3.1. Shifting debates over the role of businesses in development discourse  
 
With the emergence of neoliberalism as a dominant force in contemporary debate over 
governance, the role of private sector has become more asserted within the global economic 
landscape. Capitalism as a dominant economic order has brought foreign investors and their 
interest to be the focal point of investment policy of the states. Parallel to the growth of 
corporate popularity was a global acknowledgement of the reality that development is not a 
task to be performed by government alone. As a result, most countries adopted a policy that 
allows private sector to take lead in investment and contribute directly to community 
development, while government remains mainly as a regulator whose role has been to create 
enabling environment for business through policy and law. Enabling environment includes 
defining the role of private sector within development framework.191 In most jurisdictions, 
especially Africa, this is contained in mining legislations.  
 
In mining discourse, development refers to ways in which mining benefits may be delivered 
to mining communities in order to achieve both national development and a stable investment 
climate. This will include not only maximising earning opportunities through creation of 
wealth to reduce poverty, but also the trickle down of benefits from extraction of the 
                                                          
189 Andre, Bern and Fatima, „A Systematic Literature Review‟ (2017), PP. 30-33 
190 Ibid, Pg. 31 
191 Okoye, „Corporate Social Responsibility, Law and Development in African Context‟ (2012), Pg. 369 
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resources through to investment in community projects in agriculture, healthcare and 
education services as well as physical infrastructure. Return of resource revenue to the local 
communities in this way became necessary for both the state and investors to avoid 
distributional conflict, otherwise known as „resource curse‟. Although, the need for investors 
to do good to the host community has been a point of consensus, but there is argument as to 
whether this should be an obligation or a mere goodwill gesture. Nevertheless, it has 
remained largely at investors‟ discretion with attendant consequence. In some places, Nigeria 
and Sierra Leone for example, failure to fulfil this responsibility had made exploration for 
mining companies difficult or impossible without state-sanctioned military protection due to 
violent resistance from the society.192 As a result, businesses started to prioritize their social 
responsibility through the concept of corporate social responsibility (CSR). 
 
4.3.2. Evolution of Corporate Social Responsibility and linkages with development processes 
 
In response to the growing social anger, CSR was conceptualised and further strengthened 
through international organisations such as the World Bank and World Business Council for 
Sustainable Development (WBCSD). This concept is defined as the continuing commitment 
by business enterprises to behave ethically and contribute to its own economic development 
and that of local society.193 Over the years, business entities have been seen to operationalise 
their CSR strategy through, among other things, corporate philanthropy, waste management 
and good working practice, yet it has been criticized as insufficient to deliver developmental 
objectives. In the Niger-Delta region of Nigeria, for example, despite sustained philanthropic 
efforts made by multinationals in the recent years, yet social resistance persists in some 
communities.194 CSR being voluntary initiatives of a company, as defined by UK department 
for international development (DFID), that voluntariness might be the reason why it has not 
been effective. Some scholars have identified lack of legal framework as the main limitation 
of CSR. Government has a responsibility to concretize the objectives of CSR especially in 
developing worlds through the instrument of law to drive development.195 The need for 
private investors to contribute to the collective development agenda alongside states has been 
                                                          
192 Bruce Harvey, „Social development will not deliver social licence to operate for extractive sector‟ (2014) The 
Extractive Industries and Society, Vol. 1, PP. 7-11 
193 Andrew W. and Yvonne D., „Managerial and stakeholder perception of an Africa-based multinational mining 
company‟s corporate social responsibility‟ (2014), The Extractive Industries and Society, Vol.1, PP. 225-236 
194 Idemudia U., „Corporate-community engagement strategies in the Niger Delta: some critical reflections‟ 
(2014) The Extractive Industries and the Society, Vol. 1 PP. 154-162 
195 Okoye, „Corporate Social Responsibility, Law and Development in African Context‟ (2012), Pg. 369 
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an international initiative, which was subsequently domesticated through regional and 
national bodies. 
4.3.3. CSR in International Law 
 
As far back as 1972, the international community did acknowledge the fact that, unless 
managed carefully, resource development can cause more harm than benefit to human being 
and the environment. Hence, Stockholm Convention was held in June 1972 for urgent 
response to environmental deterioration. Overall, the conference formulated 26 guiding 
principles necessary for preserving and enhancing human environment with aim to inspiring 
stakeholders to, without prejudice to the sovereign right of member states to pursue 
development of their natural resources, to act responsibly and accordingly. Although, the 
permanent and unconditional sovereignty of states over their natural resources has, at least 
since the emergence of most states from colonial rule, been settled under the law of 
nations,196 Stockholm Declarations has been seen as a legal limitation to that right.197 This is 
because failure to protect environment may be so consequential that even the most 
fundamental of human rights, right to life is threatened.198 The idea of CSR became more 
consolidated twenty years later within the concept of sustainable development at 1992 UN 
Conference held in Rio.  
 
Fundamentally, Rio Declaration conceptualized the concept of sustainable development and 
more importantly stressed on the three pillars of that concept-economic development, social 
development and environment protection. Given the situation of social unrest that 
characterized majority of resource-wealthy countries of the world where resource 
communities resented both their governments and business entities for failure to deliver 
socio-economic development, the international community put human development as 
topmost element of sustainable development. The first principle of Rio Declaration states: 
“Human beings are at the centre of concern for sustainable development. They are entitled to 
healthy and productive life in harmony with nature.”199 Accordingly, all stakeholders, public 
and private were mandated to work together to actualize the declaration and particularly so to 
                                                          
196 Asante, International Law and Foreign Direct Investment (1988), PP. 593-595 
197 Schwartz, Priscilla, „Sustainable Development and Mining in Sierra Leone‟ (2005), PP. 40-50, PhD Thesis 
accessed via Ethos Online Thesis of British Library, available at: 
<http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?did=11&uin=uk.bl.ethos.420594>  accessed 20th September, 2017  
198 UN Proclamation at 1972 Stockholm Conference, available at: <http://un-document.net/unchedec.htm>    
199 Principle 1 of Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (UN Conference of June, 1992), available 
at: < www.un.org/documents/ga/conf151/aconf15126-1annex1.htm>  accessed 21st September, 2017 
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achieve social development through poverty eradication.200 Again in the year 2002, World 
Summit on Sustainable Development, held in Johannesburg, South-Africa, made 
responsibility of resource developers towards their host community clearer. “In pursuit of 
their legitimate business, private sector has a duty to contribute to the evolution of equitable 
sustainable society.”201 By virtue of principles 18, 19, 20 and 23 enunciated by the summit, 
regional groupings and national governments were urged to fight anything that undermines 
social development and more generally expedite implementation of UN Declarations on 
sustainable development.202 And this is achieved by internalising them through domestic 
legislations. 
 
Following these important declarations, several international, regional and national initiatives 
have evolved targeting development in mining-affected communities, including but not 
limited to, Extractive Industry Transparency Initiatives (EITI:200). All set out to mitigate the 
destructive social and environmental impact of mining on local communities.” Accordingly, 
the 2008 ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) Harmonization 
Directives and 2009 African Mining Vision stipulate that, all ECOWAS and AU member 
states should better connect minerals exploitation to the fulfilment of national socio-
economic development goals and should include community development requirements into 
their harmonized mining laws. 
 
4.4. Incorporating Corporate Social Responsibility into Nigeria‟s investment framework 
 
4.4.1. Corporate Social Responsibility and Mining 
 
Nigeria‟s legal framework for mining is fragmented, not centralised. Although, both oil and 
solid minerals fall under the rubric of “extractive industry”, yet, the two exist and function 
each separately in Nigeria. More so, in contrast to many other jurisdictions, these industries 
are regulated by distinct legislation and functions independent of the other. Eventually, each 
sector has a different approach to CSR. 
 
                                                          
200 Ibid, Principles 4,10 &27 
201Principle 27: World Summit on Sustainable Development (Johannesburg August, 2002) available at: 
<www.un.org/events/wssd/summaries/envdevj1.htm>  accessed 21st September, 2019 
202 Ibid Principles 18, 19, 20 & 23 
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Nigeria reviewed its legislation in line with the global concern for mining communities noted 
above. Adoption of standard regulatory tools has become imperative to address growing 
social insecurity triggered by uneven distribution of resource benefit across mineral rich 
nations. The approach aimed at making a solid framework that ensures provision of 
significant social and economic advantage in favour of those who bear the greater cost of 
mining. As a result, states with mining sectors, were therefore called upon to incorporate 
community development covenants into their mining regimes. Many states across the world, 
including Nigeria, responded accordingly quickly. Between 1986 and 2012, 32 countries, 
with China and Ghana being the earliest while Kyrgyzstan and Sudan the latest; had made a 
provision for community development in their respective mining laws.203 This postulation, 
which is consistent with the concept of CSR, is popularly known as Community 
Development Agreement (CDA). 
 
CDA refers to provision of social goods and services to mining communities. It is a 
comprehensive term, which includes all that which is necessary to improve living standards 
of the concerned communities, raise their living standard socio-economically, transform them 
intellectually, and generally includes physical infrastructure needed for functional society, 
such as schools, roads networks, healthcare delivery centres, scholarship awards, boreholes as 
well as agricultural and business assistance.204 This regulation mandates multinationals to 
enter into a legally binding agreements with local communities as condition precedent to any 
operation on minefields. The distinction between this new approach and the older measures is 
that, while the latter meant to address damages caused to the community by demanding 
mining companies to clean up after usage, and compensate individual for disturbing their 
titles to land under the general principle of “polluter pays”, the new approach, in addition, 
seeks to ensure that, communities affected have not only benefited from the revenue 
generated by raising their socio-economic condition, but also permanently transform them 
through establishing a development trust fund that would survive the duration of mining 
concessions granted to foreign investors.205  
 
The provision for a trust fund that would outlive the duration of resource extraction is in line 
with the UN Declaration directing stakeholders in the mineral sector to take proactive 
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measures so as to guard against dangers associated with future exhaustion of non-renewable 
natural resources.206 In effect, this provision envisages that, the resource that belongs to all 
mankind might be exhausted by oversubscription of the present generation, in which case 
nothing of it would be left for generation yet unborn and therefore it is a duty upon the world 
to employ means and method capable of providing a lasting substitute. The Nigerian Minerals 
and Mining Act 2007, for example, made a comprehensive provision for establishment of a 
development fund to be run and managed by a Board known as Solid Minerals Development 
Board, a body registered, with perpetual existence and legal capacity to sue and be sued.207 
The intendment of this provision might be that, proper and effective management of the trust 
fund via reinvestment in developmental project, can provide substitute to, and reduce 
dependence of present and next generation on the exhaustible mineral resources. The 
objectives of the Fund include, inter alia, investing in developing human and technical 
capacity as well as infrastructure, and ways of raising funds include loan, donations and 
bonds.208  
 
4.4.2. Corporate Social Responsibility in the Oil and Gas Sector in Nigeria 
 
In contrast to mandatory CDA in the mining sector, the role of private investor with reference 
to host community within oil and gas framework has not been well-developed. Petroleum 
industry has been the major foreign exchange earner and the back-borne of Nigerian 
economy from 1956 and ever since, and the level of hazard faced and being faced by the 
people living within and around exploration activities has reached an internationally alarming 
threshold,209 yet corporate social responsibility remains voluntary as charity work.210 
Evidence from existing literature shows that, oil-producing communities of Niger Delta, in 
Nigeria, suffer devastating impact from the activities of resource developers, those activities 
include seismic, exploration, production, storage, and transportation by ocean-going vessels 
and pipelines, as well as refining or processing. Crude from production sites are usually 
transported through pipelines to storage deports-terminals near the loading points for onward 
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loading unto ocean-going vessels, the pipelines runs up to hundreds of miles crisscrossing 
farmlands, creeks, maze and coastal area where several communities live. Spillage from oil 
fields into water, refinery effluent, pipeline leakage, spills during storage and loading have 
caused massive pollution in the community. For example, an incidental rupture of a pipeline 
in Jesse community in 1988 and its eventual explosion had caused the loss of more than 1000 
human lives.211  
 
The common practice of CSR that prevail within those communities is in form of voluntary 
agreement. This agreement is called „memorandum of understanding‟ (MoU), entered into by 
the community and oil enterprises, it has failed to yield any meaningful development over the 
years. In fact, empirical data indicate that, oil producing areas suffer from abject poverty, 
unemployment, presence of health-threatening factors emanating from oil spills and gas 
flaring which affected drinking water as well as lack of infrastructure.212 This lack of socio-
economic and infrastructure development prompted sustained agitations from affected 
communities which eventually culminated into crisis that has rendered the entire region 
hostile to investment.213 These agitators have breaded various groups who have engaged in 
several acts of high crime profile: illicit oil bunkering, kidnapping of foreign oil workers, 
vandalising oil installations all as part of general campaign to destroy the capacity of the 
Nigerian government to explore, exploit and export resources.214  
 
This hostility can undermine investors‟ confidence to invest in Nigeria, as safety constitute a 
key factor to all investors (FDI and portfolio) when it comes to risk assessment. Eventually, 
the prevailing social unrest targeting foreign investors and oil infrastructure in the Niger 
Delta region of Nigeria said to have accounted for a significant shrink in crude production 
capacity of the country in the recent time.215 Literature asserts that, although the possible 
cause of this menace popularly known as “resource curse” may include the fact that 
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stakeholders‟ contribution and compensation to the community isn‟t adequate and the 
existence of some corrupt elements within the ranks of the indigenous people themselves who 
divert public funds to their private purse, but the principal factor is the failure of successive 
governments to effectively address  the challenges associated with governance and to 
concretise the objectives of CSR by way of clear regulations.216  In other words, there is 
inadequacy of law and inefficiency in governance. 
 
4.4.3. Assessing effectiveness of Community Development Agreements within Nigeria 
 
Community Development Agreement has widely been celebrated as one of the major 
achievements of the recent legislation on mining in Nigeria. The Act made CDA a mandatory 
requirement of law which a mining company must fulfil before it can be permitted to embark 
on any exploration work, that aspect of hard law approach to enforce CSR is unprecedented, 
and it is the celebre cause for applauding the new regime in Nigeria.217  Section 116(1) of the 
Act provides: 
 
Subject to the provision of this section, the Holder of a Mining Lease, Small Scale 
Mining Lease or Quarry Lease shall prior to the commencement of any development 
activity within the lease area, conclude with the host community, where the operations 
are to be conducted an agreement referred to as a Community Development 
Agreement or other such agreement that will ensure the transfer of social and 
economic benefits to the community. 
 
Furthermore, subsection (2) elaborated on what the agreement shall address. Depending on 
the needs of communities, the agreement shall address contribution to development of 
infrastructure necessary for education, health-care and community services like road, water 
and power. It shall also provide for ways to improve local content and capacity building by 
means of educational scholarship, technical training, employment opportunities and 
assistance needed to stimulate small scale domestic enterprises.218 For this elaborate 
provision, CDA has been widely applauded, with some scholars describing it as  „a formal 
agreement designed to impose obligations on each participating entity and affect the 
distribution of costs and the allocation of benefits from a project with the goal of reducing 
conflict surrounding mineral extraction.‟219 Similarly, sections 116-118 of Petroleum Industry 
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Bill(PIB) provided for the establishment of Petroleum Host Communities Fund (PHCF) for 
developing social infrastructure the communities affected by the activities of oil companies. 
It further prescribes payment of 10% of profit companies made from the resources extracted 
from the area. The strength of CDA is however enshrined in section 117 of the Act, which 
considers the community as partners in development activities. It provides: 
 
 
The Community Development Agreement shall specify appropriate consultative and 
monitoring framework between the mineral title holder and the host community and 
the means by which the community may participate in the planning, implementation, 
management and monitoring of activities carried out under the agreement.  
 
To assess the effectiveness of this provision, two things must be considered: adequacy and 
practicability. Although, the foregoing provisions on CDA seem to be very comprehensive in 
terms of investors‟ role in development, there is hardly enough evidence to show its practical 
implementation in Nigeria. By implication, this lack of practical examples may undermine 
any attempt to describe this substantive provision as effective. It has been concluded that „as 
important as what rules say…is what they mean in practice. A pristine statute on investment 
that is unknown, administered and unenforced is ineffective.‟220 While absence of clear 
record of implementation considered being due to the slow inflow of investors into the sector 
as well as time factor being a new legislation which only came to existence in 2007, some 
commentators rejected this claim and blamed lack of investment on the law. 
 
Adoption of this approach (mandatory CDA) was principally meant to deliver significant 
mining benefit to the community through the instrument of law. However, there is scepticism 
that, the adoption of high standard regulations could discourage investors. This scepticism 
explains why community development law is not yet mandatory in many mining 
jurisdictions. In Ghana, Australia and some parts of Canada, this important convention 
remains a voluntary initiative.221 In other words, it is at the goodwill of multinationals to 
implement it. This argument is important as it aims to show the effect of mining regime of a 
country, such as Nigeria, with a mandatory CDA.  
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While liberals may argue that, a conventional wisdom that countries should soften domestic 
legislations, adopting liberal social and labour policies and relaxing tax regime to attract FDI, 
CDA would appear to remove incentives and could thereby operate to drive potential 
investors away from states that adopted them.222 This argument finds some corroboration in 
the words of Rusal, the largest world‟s aluminium company operating in Guinea for Bauxite 
extraction, when the country incorporated CDA into its mining laws, the company remarked: 
“Any investor with good sense would look for investment opportunities outside of 
Guinea.”223  
 
However, in contrast to outright neo-liberalism of the 1980s and 1990s which failed to 
achieve development, national governments and international organisations now favoured a 
new legal approach as a path to realisation of national development goals.224 This is because, 
apart from its potentials to promote community interest, CDA offers vital incentives to 
investors, informing them of safety of the mining environment and thereby mitigating 
political risk of operation. “Higher regulatory standard can be viewed as a benefit by foreign 
investors since community development requirements clarify responsibilities towards, and 
thus, reduce the potentials of conflict with mining affected communities.”225  
 
Nevertheless, implementation of the code might depend largely on how serious the will of the 
regulators, regardless of its binding force. If government being the custodian of the resource 
on behalf of the community is determined to pursue community benefits, investors have no 
option but to follow. A study conducted by the World Bank shows that, gold mining in Ghana 
has produced significant improvement to the community. The positive spill over includes 
employment opportunity and reduced inequality. Ten percent of men and about nine percent 
of women living near the mine have been employed by the investor. This is perhaps due to 
government‟s policies indicating that community is important. One such policy, is the 
requirement that, investor must get clearance from communal authority in charge of land 
before any application for license to pursue mining is granted.226 
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Another factor essential to measuring effectiveness is adequacy of the law. Clear and 
unambiguous rules with respect to rights and obligations of the parties, creates greater 
certainty for investors.227 Again, even where these agreements are legally binding like in 
Guinea, Sierra Leon and Mali, beneficiaries of the scheme seem caught struggling to 
surmount certain technicalities that have become hard hurdles in the process of realising the 
actual benefit enshrined in the law. Issues to do with capacity of rural communities to 
negotiate technical documents (agreements) with highly experienced company personnel; 
representation of the community; land tenure; and enforceability of CDA are generally raised 
as the short comings of this model across Africa.228 Equally important but omitted is who 
amongst the community should oversee money meant for CDA? The Act is silent on this vital 
point. The presumption would be to consider dealing with the community through their 
traditional rulers and tribal chiefs. This approach might be considered objectionable by the 
community. Research indicates that, in the Niger-Delta oil producing region, traditional 
institutions have failed to account for what they have been handed by the oil companies.229 
Thus, some scepticism is required when arguing that CDA alone can solve development 
challenges or make corporate actors take charge of the negative consequences of their 
actions. Instead, it might form part of a wider set of tools that can enable ethical investment 
practice. Yet, even before reaching this point, a critical challenge is having the infrastructure 
to enable investment and therefore development. 
 
4.5. PART B: Infrastructure Development 
 
4.5.1. Conceptualising infrastructure?  
 
The term infrastructure generally refers to all that a society needs to function well, which 
includes roads, houses, schools and health-care facilities as well as economic, political and 
social structure. Olufemi described it as „the set of interconnected structural elements that 
provide framework supporting an entire structure of development‟.230 Fulmer defined it in 
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narrow and technical sense as „the physical component of interrelated system providing 
commodities and services essential to enable, sustain or enhance societal living condition‟.231 
While this definition comprises things that are necessary for the well-being of human 
community such as clean water supply, electricity, hospitals, learning centres, shopping 
malls, transportation and communication system, it might not contemplate that the state in 
which they live possess particular kind of weapon, for example, a nuclear arsenal.  
 
Definitions of infrastructure can be even narrower and more restricted when referenced to a 
sector or profession. Military infrastructure, for instance, refers to “building and permanent 
installations necessary for the support, redeployment and operations of military forces.” 232 
Likewise, in mining discourse, infrastructure refers to those structural elements that enable, 
sustain and enhance the efficiency and functionality of the resource industry. Although, what 
is required to improve productivity of a mining sector may differ from one jurisdiction to 
another, key infrastructure essential to mining seems to be common worldwide. To name the 
most critical, but also lacking in African states, including Nigeria, stable power supply and 
well-connected transportation system. Nigeria‟s mining industry is less competitive due to 
high cost of operation caused mainly by lack of energy infrastructure, and difficulty in 
accessing international market exacerbated by weak transport infrastructure. It is also noted 
that infrastructure need not be physical, it can also be institutional support that aids 
businesses and communities in implementation agreements and resolving conflicts that could 
possibly arise. Therefore, it is also about legal tools that can enable investment.  
 
4.5.2. Linkages between infrastructure development and mining industry 
 
Relationship between infrastructure development and mining is symbiotic one. Generally, 
literature show that, mining industry has direct and indirect potential impact on infrastructure. 
A report compiled by UNDP in collaboration with several other research and development 
partners underscored this point. Famously known as Atlas (2016), was a scholarly effort 
mapping up mining to SDGs. With reference to SDG 7 (infrastructure, innovation and 
industrialisation, the report remarked, “mining can help drive economic development and 
diversification through direct and indirect economic benefits and by spurring the construction 
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of new infrastructure for transport, communication, water and energy.”233 These categories of 
infrastructure represent basic framework critical for well-being of every economy.234 Thus, 
the National Policy on Minerals Metal in Nigeria noted the potentials of a functional mining 
industry as such that creates impacts on all other sectors of the economy in the country. 
 
Mining contributes to the economy not only by enhancing national revenue base, it also 
generates a widespread earning opportunity for household through massive job creation.235 
“In addition, solid minerals will provide local raw materials for industries and bring vital 
infrastructure and wealth to rural areas.”236 As most of the mines in Nigeria are in the rural 
areas, it is obvious that majority of the host communities need basic infrastructure such as 
clean water, power, and road network connecting them to the main cities. In the past, the 
industry played critical role in spurring energy and railway infrastructure through production 
of coal minerals. Furthermore, most of roads, education and health-care infrastructure 
construction of 20th century were financed through export-earnings generated by the 
industry.237 
With regards to impact of infrastructure on mining, discussion here would be in the context of 
five channels formulated by Johannes and Rob (2008).238 Exploring the relationship between 
infrastructure and growth the authors identified five specific channels through which 
infrastructure can enhance growth. It can be a factor of production; a complement to other 
factors of production; a stimulus to factor accumulation; a stimulus to aggregate demand; and 
a tool for industrial policy. Although, the scope of their analysis relates to the broad subject 
of economic growth, it is possible that discourse on productivity of mining industry be 
situated within that context, more so, the analysis has focused on industry and production. 
Having said that, it is significant to highlight at least some aspects of the analytical 
framework within which they discussed this relationship and the theory upon which it is 
based. 
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Growth theory postulates that, "aggregate economic output is a function of a collection of 
production inputs”,239 production input is same as factors of production. Thus, simply means, 
factors of production involved and used as input determine the overall outcome, which is 
growth. Furthermore, there are no specific and uniform factors of production applicable to all 
sectors, rather they are determined by circumstances of each sector. However, such factors as 
technology, human capital, physical capital, level of labour force, government policy and 
viable institutions are frequently regarded by majority.240 
 
Some infrastructures are directly involved in the production process. As a result, they are 
regarded as an actual input and accordingly termed as factors of production. In a mining 
perspective, this might include heavy-duty machines needed for mineral extraction or 
electricity, which is crucial for efficient mining activities. It has been theorised that, "an 
increase in the stock of infrastructure would increase the output of the economy as a 
whole".241 Thus, stable power supply makes mining more efficient, less costly and hence 
functions to improve overall productivity of the sector in terms of greater revenue generation 
and widespread benefits to stakeholders. "The role of power generation infrastructure 
provides a concrete example of this channel. It is a necessary input into many production 
processes for both goods and services and so unreliable power supplies render this process 
either more expensive or entirely impossible."242 Lack of this infrastructure explains the 
current state malfunction of many sectors of economy in Nigeria. As it is the case with 
infrastructure generally, significance of electric power is not exclusive for mining industry, 
several other industries such as textile, crude oil refineries and steel factory have shut down 
partly due to absence of this critical infrastructure in the country. 
 
In yet some other cases, an infrastructure may not be itself a direct factor, it generates impact 
by complementing other factors of production. Popular example again is that of transport 
infrastructure. Even though, transport is not considered as a factor directly involved in the 
actual process of mineral extraction on site, it creates impact to the overall performance of the 
resource development process with respect to cost. Because availability of adequate transport 
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infrastructure facilitates movements of goods and services, while “inadequate infrastructure 
creates a number of costs for firms who may have to develop contingency plan against 
infrastructure failure or even build infrastructure themselves.”243 Consequently, where there 
is inadequate road-network to link minefields with main outlets to international market, as it 
is the case in Nigeria, investors would inevitably incur huge cost to mobilise physical capital 
to the mining site and to transport extracted minerals to points of exportation. 
 
Closely related to the above, is impact of infrastructure on mining through factor 
accumulation. Electricity and road, for example, may function to produce some other factors 
of high significance to the resource industry. Besides their direct contribution to the mining, 
energy and transport infrastructure bolster the function of social infrastructure in the form of 
school facilities to produce human resources with necessary expertise needed to direct both 
managerial and technical affairs of the industry for greater productivity.244 Finally, 
infrastructure can be used as a policy tool to incite growth. To ensure smooth relocation of a 
rural settlement existing on an area later designated for mining, offer of an alternative space 
with superb infrastructure may be used to induce the process. Again, to persuade private 
investment into new mining areas, state policy might be directed towards creating some 
incentives in terms of infrastructure development. Construction of transport infrastructure 
liking those localities to major strategic national and international business hubs,245 for 
example. 
 
The foregoing provided an overview of how mining and infrastructure impact on each other. 
The World Economic Forum once noted the broad impact of infrastructure on development 
by saying, “Much of the debate on ways to spur growth, reduce poverty, and achieve other 
sustainable development goals (SDGs) is centred on the need to promote large increase in 
infrastructure investment.”246 While economic infrastructure-energy, transport, water system 
and sanitation facilities-effect industry productive capacity directly, social infrastructure-
education and health-care structures-do create an indirect impact on the sector performance. 
Likewise, a functional resource industry is a crucial driver for creation and sustaining both 
types of infrastructure through its capacity as economic booster and diversification driver. 
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Overall, these two sectors are not mutually exclusive, rather they are indeed critical to each 
other‟s efficiency and productivity. Thus, unless adequate infrastructure is available, it is 
most unlikely that mining industry becomes attractive to investment. 
 
4.6. Comments on the state of infrastructure in Nigeria 
 
4.6.1. Current state of infrastructure  
 
Infrastructure deficits have been identified as one of the key areas undermining Nigeria‟s 
growth and development. Literature to date has shown that, although countries can attain 
growth without having adequate infrastructure, lack of functional infrastructure would 
constrain such nations from translating growth into development. An example was given of 
how countries with developed infrastructure were able to receive technology transfer through 
dealing with US enterprises while underdeveloped countries dealing with the same investors 
could not due to weak infrastructure.247 Similarly, using Nigeria as a focal state, Scholars 
have extensively reviewed existing literature on FDI, economic growth and development to 
establish that, although FDI leads to significant raise of income, the link between growth and 
economic development can be challenged by absence of requisite infrastructure.248 Further, 
the literature holds that, growth, which, is explained as increase in per capita output and boost 
in labour force and consumption is a common outcome of FDI, however, “the benefit of FDI 
is strongly contingent on the existence of appropriate infrastructure in the recipient 
country”.249  
 
The ultimate benefit of FDI lies in its potential to enable economic development and to aid 
investment that might otherwise be hampered in the absence of necessary infrastructure. 
Economic development therefore relates to ability of a state to translate national earning into 
widespread opportunities with positive impact on general social system through 
diversification and other direct and indirect economic benefits, including institutional 
expansion to generate employment and eradicate poverty.250 However, despite the rise in 
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national revenue generated over the years, Nigeria's infrastructure still remains very poor as a 
result of lack of investment. This has deprived Nigeria‟s attainment of development targets 
and the same reason has been used to explain the country's failure to realise the strategic 
Millennium Development Goals in 2015.251 The World Bank had made it clear then that 
states need to upgrade their infrastructure in order to meet the goal to reduce poverty, boost 
growth and even to realise their Millennium Development Goals.252 This continues to be a 
challenge when focusing on the Sustainable Development Goals. 
 
There is huge gap in key infrastructure that would have high impact on the economy in 
Nigeria. Although, there has been improvement in telecommunication sector and computer 
literacy, the state of other economic infrastructure such as road and electricity among other 
things are deplorable.253 With a land mass of 9, 110,000 square kilometre of land and a 
population of about 200 million people, only 193, 200 kilometres has been covered by the 
road network,254 and currently over 80 per cent is begging for repair.255 This is because the 
infrastructures are very old as much of were built in the 1970 s.256 As regards electricity, 
"55.6 per cent of the total population do not have access to electricity."257 Translated into 
actual number, that means over 100 million people do not enjoy electricity at all, while the 
rest, who are less, enjoy poor supply. In terms of these key economic infrastructure, data 
indicates that Nigeria is far below some comparable countries even within the African region. 
Schematic comparison between Nigeria and South Africa is shown in the table below: 
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Table 2:4 Infrastructure Stock in Nigeria 
Core Infrastructure Nigeria South Africa 
Road km per 100 sq2 21% 30% 
Energy consumption per capita 
(KWh) 
136 4803 
Mining, sanitation and access to 
water 
31 79 
Security number of police per 
100,000 
205 317 
ICT, use of phone 68% 140% 
Source: Carthena Advisory: Presentation of NIIMP 
 
The above table suggests that the aggregate infrastructure stock in Nigeria is simply 
inadequate. In addition to the data above, empirical literature further indicates the level of 
core infrastructure in Nigeria is 45-50, which is below the benchmark of 70. International 
statistic of core infrastructure show countries of similar potentials has either hit or been above 
the benchmark. South Africa, for example, has been rated 87, while Indonesia has been 70.258 
Overall infrastructure regional ranking in terms of quality published in 2015 in the World 
Bank Global Report placed Nigeria as number eight in West Africa sub-region.259 Deficits in 
power infrastructure are the most concerning because Nigeria has the natural resources 
needed to generate electric power- coal, gas, hydro, thermal among others; yet it has been 
unable to generate efficient and stable electricity enough for residential let alone industrial 
consumption. With a population of over 200 million, Nigeria generates less than 4000MW, 
while Malaysia generates 19,023MW for a population of only 32 million. In fact, reliable 
power supply is one of the key reasons that mining has been more efficient and attractive in 
other African countries. South Africa, for instance, currently generates 51,309MW with a 
population of just 56.72million. In transportation sector the narrative is similar: Nigeria‟s 
road network is 80% unpaved, only 20% of the country is linked, consequently most of the 
mines are left out of this coverage as they are predominantly in the rural areas. The cause of 
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this infrastructure constrain has been attributed to lack of investment, weak institutions and 
poor regulatory framework.260 
4.6.2. Infrastructure Challenges in Nigeria 
 
Several scholars have identified various challenges that retard infrastructure development in 
Nigeria. Low and inconsistent public spending on capital projects has been highlighted as the 
principal factor underlying inadequacy of infrastructure in Nigeria. In a research co-authored 
by three Nigerian scholars, capital expenditure record spanning over 40 years has been 
analysed. The authors observed that, “capital expenditure, construction expenditure and non-
oil revenue have the potency of accentuating infrastructure development in the long-run, but 
such is being hampered by external debt.”261 Essentially, this observation led to the 
conclusion that, increase public spending on infrastructure and non-oil revenue generating 
sectors is crucial for closing the gap in infrastructure.262 
 
Other scholars have attributed the poor state of infrastructure largely to the policy framework. 
Main factors for neglecting infrastructure, according to this group, have been poor 
implementation of the national plan and instability in oil revenue which necessitated policy 
change. Accordingly, they emphasise the need to strengthen regulatory institutions and the 
necessity of improving infrastructure to drive FDI into non-oil vital economy sectors.263 
Some development scholars had argued that, the fundamental challenge of developing 
countries with respect to development was to do with the innovativeness and literacy of the 
individuals in charge. They maintained that, developed nations were able to excel because of 
“individuals with high level of achievement motivation”,264 whereas leaders in less developed 
countries (LDCs) were “authoritarian personalities who lacked self-confidence, exhibited a 
high level of anxiety when faced with new situations and who were content to preserve the 
status quo.”265  Thus, to promote infrastructure and other development people must change 
psychologically and states must strive to improve level of literacy and general awareness. 
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Olufemi266 offered a comprehensive analysis of challenges facing Nigeria‟s infrastructure 
sector. To capture myriad of issues associated with the sector, he adopted various models of 
analysis including PESTLES. In other words, the problem with infrastructure development in 
Nigeria involves different perspectives: Political, economic, social, technology, legal, 
environment and security. In conclusion, the author summarised all the challenges in two 
points. First, “the demand surpasses the supply and finance that will stimulate rapid provision 
is not there.”267 This can be aligned with inadequate public spending on infrastructure noted 
by other scholars as well.268 In addition, however, this author has pointed out an important 
issue to do with finance. The fact that, the state has been financially unable to allocate 
resources necessary to provide adequate infrastructure and that private investment is critical 
to development of the sector is widely documented. The existing literature have however 
missed the discussion on the way to diversify the source of financing infrastructure using 
innovative approaches including from different legal traditions, such as Sukuk.  
 
As discussed subsequently, although Sukuk has been tested successfully in Nigeria, proper 
structure to support its wider application has not been developed.269 Creating linkages 
between Sukuk and the legal framework of other economic sectors including infrastructure is 
yet to be done. This leads us naturally into the second issue adumbrated by Olufemi that, 
“government do not set the priority right”.270 This is critical as capital projects require 
planning, which includes consideration of factors to do with design, finance, technology and 
management. In the next section, these two issues, namely, finance and planning (priority 
setting) will be used to review the policy and regulatory framework for infrastructure 
development in Nigeria. 
 
4.6.3. Review of policy and regulatory frameworks for infrastructure development in Nigeria 
 
National Integrated Infrastructure Master Plan (NIIMP), is the principal policy document 
governing infrastructure development in Nigeria. Planning is crucial to infrastructure 
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development. It is mainly about deciding what project to undertake, why is it important, 
where is it most suitable to locate it, when and within what timeframe should be delivered as 
well as how to finance the project, ensure quality and to provide proper management till 
completion. Feasibility studies is necessary to determine not only viability but also that it 
serves development purpose and objectives. Accordingly, the master plan is to serve as a 
robust and comprehensive framework for infrastructure development, with fundamental 
objective to ensure that, right projects are prioritised for the right time, and enabling 
environment is created for private investors to participate. Further, the NIIMP is expected to 
achieve economic growth by efficiently allocating resources to projects with greater positive 
externalities.271 
 
This section will interrogate NIIMP‟s completeness with regards to priority setting and 
private financing framework. For industrial and overall economic development purpose, 
energy power generation, transport, and IT and communication are regarded as key priority 
sectors of infrastructure. As far as mining is concerned, these three sectors are necessary for 
efficient operation and widespread impact of the industry. It must be reiterated that, currently 
the productivity of the solid resource sector has been challenged by lack of reliable 
electricity, good road network, adequate air and sea port facilities to link up the rural mines in 
the country with international market.272 Improving human capital with minimum 
international threshold level of technology literacy is significant, because the ability of 
Nigeria to build its local content and absorb the transfer of technology to run its resource 
industry depends on it squarely.273 These and these infrastructures are costly and gap to close 
is wide, Nigeria will need $2.9 trillion from now till nearly the end of NIIMP‟s timeframe 
(2014-2043).274 One way to achieve this is to collaborate with private investors, promote 
innovative and pragmatic approaches to financing infrastructure development, to enable 
efforts through partnership with private actors. 
 
To cover all necessary grounds in the assessment of the framework, it is important that other 
relevant regulatory instruments are considered along with the NIIMP. Key institutional 
regulatory framework directly linked to specific infrastructure or economic sector referred to 
in this section would be relevant. In terms of electricity generation, it is inevitable to discuss 
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certain provisions of National Energy Regulation Commission (NERC) Act. Likewise, 
legislations governing transport and mining. Furthermore, connections between infrastructure 
development and aspects of investment including finance and company regulations, such 
legal instruments as NIPC Act, CAMA, CBN Act, Debt Management Office (DMO) Act as 
well as PPP framework are of significance to the entire discourse of this section.  
 
Mining and infrastructure have always been at the centre of Nigeria‟s development policy. 
Transformation Agenda (2011-2015) had these two sectors in addition to inclusive growth 
and job creation as priority. Likewise, the Nigeria‟s Vision 20: 2020. The key objective of the 
VN20:20 has been to drive development of adequate infrastructure necessary to reinvigorate 
all sectors critical to the nation‟s economy, including mining. Even though, the vision was 
formulated in 2010, four years earlier than IIMP (2014-2043), and to last for just ten years, 
there has been significant overlap in terms of their object and timeframe, signalling an 
effective synergistic approach to infrastructure development. Moreover, during NIIMP 
formation period technical inputs from mining, energy, transport and legal sectors were 
solicited for and eventually incorporated in the master plan. Thus, these sectors are not only 
prioritized, they are expected to work in synergy with the National Planning Commission as 
they all have a stake in the main purpose of the NIIMP, namely to address infrastructure 
challenges in Nigeria. 
 
4.6.4. The Energy Sector 
 
The main aim of power sector has been to achieve adequate supply of electricity for both 
social and industrial consumption to all parts of Nigeria. National Electric Power Authority 
(NEPA) was incepted in 1972 to regulate the entire sector. Given the continuous failure to 
meet the energy demand of the growing population over the decades, NEPA was scrapped in 
2005. Instead, the Electric Sector Reform Act (EPSRA) 2005 created Power Holding 
Company of Nigeria (PHCN) to which all NEPA‟s employees as well as assets and liabilities 
were transferred. It must be emphasised that, the principal reason behind dissolution of 
NEPA, was to eliminate state monopoly in the sector and to persuade private investment. 
Accordingly, EPSRA created eighteen new companies and three regulatory bodies to ensure 
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enhanced generation and distribution of power in the country.275 NERC emerged as main 
regulator, along with the other two agencies, namely  Nigerian Electricity management 
Company (NEMCO) and Nigerian Bulk Electricity Training Plc (NBET), were established to 
manage various activities of the sector which involves persuading private investment and 
collaboration with international bodies. 
 
From a planning perspective, regulatory agencies must work to facilitate NNMP aspirations 
in the sector. The master plan has set goal targets to be achieved in three time bound stages. 
Phase one, which is to last till 2020 aims to boost generation capacity to 40000MW to expand 
electricity access to 75% of the population, compare to current coverage of 30-35%. This 
rapid upgrade has been planned to generate from combined renewable and non-renewable 
sources of power generation in line with Nigeria‟s policy to gradually migrate onto renewable 
energy.276 By 2030, the second slot of the plan is to ensure distribution has reached 90% of 
the population and industrial supply significantly improved to drive strong and 
comprehensive growth. Overall, Nigeria aspires for complete close of any gap in power 
infrastructure before the year 2043 and to export energy to other African countries. This 
might not be too ambitious considering the abundant reserve of fossil fuel (oil, gas and coal), 
which has continued to be the dominant source of electric power generation in the country. 
However, increasing desire of the country to transform onto clean and green sources 
consistent with the global trend of sustainability and healthy environment, could delay 
realisation of those policy objectives. Although, Nigeria can also boast of huge resource of 
renewable energy sources such as biomass, solar and wind among other things, two 
challenges are real. “Lack of technological expertise and skilled labour for the 
implementation and running of the wind farms, thermal stations and energy facilities”.277 
Training and expanded literacy programme on renewable energy is crucial to building human 
capital, though it might take time.   
 
NERC has, so far, taken various initiatives to expedite NIIMP objectives. These efforts 
involve generating motivations for the private actors to invest in power-related projects but 
also accessing support from international financial institutions. A facility has been obtained 
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by the commission to finance the construction of ten thousand solar-grid stations with aim to 
supply social, educational and health-care facilities. The project is meant to contribute 
towards 2030 target to ensure 30% of total national generation comes from renewable energy 
as enshrine in the National Renewable Energy Action Plan (NREAP). This is an inter-
ministerial effort and in collaboration with several state agencies adopted (2015-2030) to 
improve power efficiency through renewable energy. Furthermore, to stimulate participation 
of non-state entities in green energy approach, NREAP launched a package of incentives to 
private providers of clean energy, which involves tax relief, access to financial facilities and 
guarantee to purchase their supply at a good price determined by the commission.278 
However, bureaucratic bias in favour of fossil fuel suppliers has delayed implementation of 
this persuasive policy.279  
 
Nonetheless, another window has been created in 2018 named Meter Asset Provider. 
Consistent with the name, this scheme allowed investors supply meters to energy consumers 
in the country, which was never the case before, as only e-meter could only be purchased 
from designated state agency. The most productive of all incentives was perhaps the N701 
billion payment assurance guarantee, which guarantees instant payment for suppliers once 
they delivered power stocks to distributors. This arrangement has yielded remarkable boost in 
the sector output by improving production volume up to 7000 (MW). However, this policy 
has been widely criticised for being unsustainable and does not fall within the intent of the 
sector reform Act.280 
 
In addition, there are two other initiatives that have, as well, recorded popularity in the sector. 
In order to tackle inadequate skills, which has the tendency to undermine Nigeria‟s policy on 
renewable energy, partnership with an oversee team of experts has been successfully 
concluded. This approach, which involves training Nigerians on technical skills, has led to 
construction of a facility that produce 20MW of clean energy thereby saving the country from 
20,744 tons of carbon emission. Further, Eligible Customer Regulation 2017 was also 
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launched to enhance energy supply to industries by allowing them to purchase directly from 
generating companies rather than distributors.281 
 
Despite all above, the regulatory and policy approach of the sector is not without controversy. 
Certain policy steps taken by some public sectors in the country conflict with and capable of 
eroding the overall efforts of energy regulating agencies, causing a sabotage to NIIMP, and 
signalling serious lack of a streamline regulatory instrument to coordinate actions of all 
stakeholders within the system. Recently in 2018, authorities of Nigeria‟s Custom and Excise 
announced imposition of 5-10% import duty on any solar component brought into the 
country. This kind of charges will increase the cost of importation and by extension the 
market price with ultimate effect being high cost of electricity for Nigerian consumers. This 
policy create disincentive to renewable energy suppliers. Similarly, resolution of Nigeria‟s 
mining sector to grant coal mining concession for power generating companies would 
promote power generation from coal which could have adverse impact on environment. In 
aggregate, this contradicts not only the grand policy to reduce generating power from 
unconventional sources, but also threatens the entire framework of infrastructure 
development in Nigeria. Finally, on this note, the policy formulation and implementation 
process of power regulatory agencies themselves needs to be reviewed. Public back lash 
generated by NERC resolve to raise energy tariff, which ended up in judicial pronouncement 
being made against the commission,282 highlights a gap in the policy cycle with respect to 
legitimacy of ideas underlying that policy.283  
 
4.6.5. The Transport Sector 
 
This sector is composed of four sub-sectors. Aviation which is regulated by t through Federal 
Airports Authority of Nigeria (FAAN), a parastatal under the ministry of aviation; and the 
other three, maritime, railway and road network come under the ministry of transport. 
However, each of these three is regulated by a separate body. Maritime is managed by 
Nigeria Maritime Safety Authority (NIMASA) and Nigeria Port Authority (NPA), railways 
are under Nigeria Railways Corporation (NRC), and roads are managed by Federal Roads 
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Management Authority (FERMA). Although, road network is the major concerned with 
regard to transport infrastructure urgently needed to facilitate development in Nigeria, other 
sub-sectors are important. Thus, NIIMP provided for a broad plan to expand the entire sector 
in order to meet the main objective of creating strong and inclusive growth by reviving 
economic industries through FDI and enhanced. infrastructure. The master plan provided for 
a three splits of target goals to be achieved over the period 2018-2043.284 
 
By 2018, the plan is to ensure that all economic centres in the country are connected, national 
highways rehabilitated, and Urban Traffic Control (UTC) system is not only developed but 
also effective maintenance facilities are put in place to ensure long term sustainability. At this 
stage four airport terminal would be constructed, and sea ports performance would be 
enhanced. Furthermore, roads linking economically strategic areas would be dualized by 
2023 to expand business volume and facilitating movement of goods and services across the 
country and beyond. Besides, the split target of 2023 would include rehabilitating about 70% 
of the roads in Nigeria. Ultimately, 100% of roads network will be made good by the end of 
2043.285 
Given the need to stimulate private investment in the transport sector, various incentives have 
evolved. Companies Income (Expansion of Profit) Order 2012 created Infrastructure Tax 
Relief (ITR), which allows companies that invested in the sector to claim back 30% of the 
total cost of their projects through a deduction from computation of their respective 
Companies Income Tax.  
 
Following the expiration of this scheme in 2017 as it was to last for only five years, another 
scheme was developed. The new package was named Road Transport Fund (RTF) 2017 and 
was later upgraded into Road Infrastructure Development and Refurbishment Scheme in 
2019. This scheme created a window that entitles investors to recover 100% cost of 
investment plus an uplift through tax credit mechanism. Furthermore, to encourage 
infrastructure development in rural areas a special incentive was generated. Investors that 
mobilise their capital into provision of vital infrastructure such as road, electricity and 
communication facilities will enjoy a motivational reward under section 34 of Companies 
                                                          
284 Nigeria‟s National Integrated Infrastructure Master Plan (NIIMP), PP. 35-50 
285 Ibid, PP. 35-50 
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Income Tax Act (CITA).286 However, some of these incentives have specific conditions. For 
example, the Road Infrastructure Development and Refurbishment Scheme in 2019 is not 
available to any company that pays petroleum income tax, and for any investor to benefit 
from the scheme, the project they undertake must satisfy eligibility requirement. Eligible 
projects are as designated by the president of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.287 
 
However, as noted earlier, infrastructure does not only refer to physical areas of investment 
and management but can also include legal and policy frameworks through which decisions 
are made and investments are governed. 
 
4.7. Inadequacy in law and inefficiency in governance in Nigeria 
 
The inadequacies of law in Nigeria has been well documented. In the Nigerian petroleum 
sector, it is a glaring fact that reveals itself through the main legislation. The principal 
legislation governing oil and gas sector is the Petroleum Act (1969). S.1 of the Act vested 
ownership of resources in the government of the Federation as did S. 44(3) of the 1999 
constitution; S. 2 empowered minister of petroleum resources to grant and revoke license 
which includes OEL (Oil Exploration License), OPL (Oil Prospecting License), and OML 
(Oil Mining Lease); and direct management of the oil and gas asset vested in the Nigeria 
National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC). Another core legislation is the Petroleum (Drilling 
and Production) Regulations (1969). As regards criminal acts of sabotage to oil industry by 
the community which tended to grossly undermine national economy, the Petroleum 
Production and Distribution Anti-Sabotage Act (1975) was enacted.  
 
To tackle any such activities detrimental to investment the Act classified such acts as crimes 
of high magnitudes and prescribed highest possible punishment of up to 21-year 
imprisonment or even death sentence for wilful saboteurs.288 Although some other subsidiary 
investment laws were reviewed, but not these core legislations. It has been theorised that, 
archaic and outdated legal framework which does not reflect modern reality is inadequate.289 
However, in the case of Nigeria, these key legislations have not been updated for decades. 
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The adverse effect of this inadequacy has been aptly observed by the Nigerian Extractive 
Industries Transparency Initiatives that:  
 
Nigeria‟s oil and gas sector has continued to deteriorate largely due to the fact that 
the laws that govern the petroleum industry are either not sufficient for effective 
regulation of the sector, or too outdated to be relevant in today‟s global energy 
environment. For instance, the Petroleum Act (1969) was enacted when the country‟s 
economy revolved less around oil and when the global oil market was less competitive 
than todays. Yet, the country has failed to enact laws to adapt to the changing 
realities in the sector locally and internationally.290 
 
The issue of the current framework is not just one of age, but beyond that, it allocates 
excessive discretion to the officials, contains imprecise rules and confusion between 
stakeholders‟ roles. Naturally, these factors generated second degree elements of inefficiency 
and uncertainty like corruption, lack of transparency and accountability.291 As stated from the 
outset of this study, any framework that fails to make clear and unambiguous rules must be 
amended so as to provide greater certainty for investors. For certainty is fundamental to any 
prudent investment decision. In fact, „rational investor prizes regulatory certainty above 
practically all else: clear, unambiguous rules, predictable policymaking and efficient 
regulation.‟292 And the best way to achieve certainty, according to the dominant theory of 
investment, is by making the law clear and accessible, limiting state discretion and reducing 
corruption.293 
 
These factors combined, necessitated a reform within the Nigerian petroleum sector and 
consequently the controversial Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB) was drafted in 2003 but yet has 
not been passed into law due largely to issues to do with governance and disagreement 
among stakeholders over some contentious provisions of the Bill. „These disagreements have 
cantered mostly around the regulatory framework, including power of the minister, 
ownership and control of the resources, host community benefits, environmental concerns, 
appropriate fiscal regime etc.‟294 The PIB has been stagnant for 16 years, and has cost the 
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country an estimated amount of $120 billion which is lost to investment withheld or diverted 
to other jurisdictions. Among the reasons advanced for this prolonged delay is are corruption 
and governance deficiencies. NEITI audit report of 2013 has revealed that, a cumulative 
amount of $10.4bn and N378.7bn was lost or unremitted. And from 1960 (just two years after 
production started) to 1999 the total amount of $400 billion is reported to have been stolen by 
the ruling class from the oil revenue.295  
 
Reference to corruption and lack of transparency would naturally highlight yet another issue 
that calls for urgent regulation within the legal framework. Ownership disclosure or revealing 
the actual actors behind the corporate veil is essential to the economy of developing countries 
like Nigeria. Because corporate names are often used anonymously „to deny countries of 
valuable revenues…; then, the shroud of secrecy around them is used not only to mask 
possible corrupt relationships with government officials but also to obscure probable links to 
money laundering, drug trafficking and terrorism financing‟296  
 
Report from international development organisations including OECD concludes that, not 
less than a trillion USD is lost annually by developing nations to the undisclosed corporate 
entities, and $2 for every $1 that comes in as development funds or as external investment 
capital.297 Thus, use of anonymous company presents serious threat to both the national 
economy and thereby hinders development. Real life situations have shown instances where 
politically exposed persons (PEPs) would hide behind the corporate veil and appropriate to 
themselves resources that may otherwise be used to provide development to the citizens and 
thereby leaving the citizens in abject poverty. One famous example is the controversial case 
of Malabu Oil Company, where a Nigerian minister of petroleum awarded the oil license to 
Malabu, a company wherein he owned significant interest which was cloaked under some 
fictitious names contained in the company papers. While the danger of dodgy companies can 
affect any country in the world but shown by panama revelations „the biggest victims of these 
practices are developing countries, or generally countries with relatively weak institutions of 
accountability and tax authorities.‟298 
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To provide an international framework, in 2016 the Extractive Industries Transparency 
Initiatives has set up a new standard of practice to all member states. S. 2.5 of the standard 
required participating countries to keep a register where details of all companies with 
investment in the industry shall be fully recorded including of course the actual identities of 
those who own them. The difficult question is given the current position of the investment 
framework can this initiative be implemented in Nigeria? Although, the ownership disclosure 
entails practical benefits as it might protect government‟s revenue and promote domestic 
enterprises‟ potentials of partnering with multinationals, there is no internal framework to 
provide necessary legal backings to the initiative. Rather the provisions of corporate law in 
Nigeria, appear to sharply contradict this standard. The combine effect of Sections 37 and 38 
is to give a corporate entity all transactional capacity and powers available to natural person 
which tends to resist any attempt to unveil it except within limited circumstances of which 
EITI standard is not one. Thus, this initiative will remain to be uneasy to implement unless 
the internal framework is reviewed. Some commentators viewed the establishment of 
Nigeria‟s financial intelligence Unit (NFIU) and the enactment of Money Laundering 
Prevention Act as a move in that direction. In effect the Act has mandated banks to and 
Designated Non-Financial Institutions (DNFIs) to dig out details of beneficial owners of 
companies. However, lack of professional intelligence background on part of bankers would 
hinder the success of this scheme.299 
 
Freedom of information Act is yet another avenue for checking anonymity of companies. The 
Act gives people the right to demand for information from any organisation. The only 
shortcoming of this law is that it covers only public sector. And public domain holds only 
formally disclosed data and no more. The fact that those legislations are not very clear on the 
issue they cannot take place of unambiguous policy and law. No doubt achieving 
transparency can reduce corruption, lower the risk of financial misconduct, and thereby create 
incentives for all stakeholders, the government, investors and host communities. 
 
On the flip side of the coin is the argument that, even where state uses the instrument of law 
to define the role of the private sector in development, language to be used should or should 
not be of command. Critics have cautioned against any use of law in traditional sense 
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“command followed by sanction”,300 as that is likely to be counterproductive. They cited two 
examples of Nigerian experience. A bill to institutionalise CSR in 2008 had been frustrated 
and eventually defeated by protectionist investors due to a provision mandating companies 
operating in the country to pay certain percentage of their annual profit towards community 
development.301 Again, similar reason was adduced for the long delay of the still awaited 
Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB).302 Moreover, the regulatory uncertainties surrounding the 
outcome of PIB, has been identified as the sole reason for massive divestment by 
International Oil Companies in the deep water projects of Nigeria‟s Oil and Gas Industry.303  
 
Many of such companies have now refused to undertake exploration at the new off-shore 
blogs despite of the deadline they had earlier signed. Furthermore, the same PIB alongside 
the prevailing social unrest targeting foreign investors and oil infrastructure in the Niger 
Delta region of Nigeria said to account for the recent shrink in crude production capacity of 
the country. Due to vulnerability of working in the on-shore and shallow waters, foreign oil 
companies felt compelled to transfer their equity to local companies304.   
 
On the other side of the spectrum are positivists, who are of the opinion that only mandatory 
legal rules would drive meaningful development through CSR. Even in the case of Nigerian 
Niger Delta, the scholars expressed confidence that legislation enforcing CSR can solve the 
long-standing crisis in the oil communities. One writer stated:305 
 
If the PIB is passed into law in Nigeria and the provisions on the Petroleum Host 
Communities Fund is retained in the legislation, it could have a significant effect on 
the percentage of oil spills caused by sabotage of oil facilities by disgruntled host 
communities, provided proper mechanisms and guideline are put in place to ensure 
that the funds are judiciously managed. 
 
A study suggests that, mandatory payment for CSR will cost resource companies far less than 
what they spend on security to protect their investment from social unrest. Samuel Diminas 
found that, Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC), spends on security in Nigeria an 
amount far more than it spends for same purpose in in Americas, Europe and Russia 
                                                          
300 Okoye, „Corporate Social Responsibility, Law and Development in an African Context‟ (2012), PP. 365-370 
301 Ibid 
302 Olubunmi, „The Impact of Oil Pollution on the Environment‟ (2014), PP. 18-20 
303 U.S. Energy Information, „Report on Nigeria‟ (May 2016) PP. 2-15  
304 Ibid, PP. 2-15 
305 Olubunmi, „The Impact of Oil Pollution on Environment‟ (2014), Pg. 21 
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combined.306 Also, a model of community/business relationship in which the host community 
is treated as partners, holds phenomenal incentives for all stakeholders, has been equally 
proved by Indorama Eleme Petrochemicals Ltd. This arrangement has seen Indorama paid 
four billion annually to the community and financed a project of Greenfield Urea Fertilizer 
Plant for $1.2 billion in the same community, all in exchange for smooth and uninterrupted 
operation, for which the company won a global award.307 Therefore, improving legal systems 
and governance mechanisms is vital to improving the confidence of investors in Nigeria‟s 
mining sector and the security and stability of their investment over time.  
 
From efficiency perspective, Ghana seems to have been ahead of Nigeria. It was Nigeria‟s 
move to reform the oil and gas industry through PIB that inspired Ghana to embark on a 
similar project, but the latter has successfully completed the process, while Nigeria is still on. 
Another aspect of efficiency that makes Ghana a competitive mining destination is the speedy 
process of documentation. It takes five days to register a company and obtain immigration 
permit, and within one month mining licensed is processed. This institutional efficiency wins 
investor confidence. In South Africa, again effective institutions that are vital for mining 
renders business relatively easier. Financial institutions are well-developed in addition to 
modern infrastructure. Although, mining in South Africa is facing some challenges due to 
technical issues with energy sector of the country, their infrastructure stock is far ahead of 
Nigeria as presented and discussed above in this chapter. 
 
Turning to predictability in the mining regime, still South Africa and Ghana appear to be 
more predictable. The life span of mining lease in both countries is 30 years and renewable 
for until the end of the economic life of the mine.308 In contrast, the longest license granted 
under the Nigeria‟s Minerals and Mining Act, 2007 is 25 years, renewable for another 25 
years upon stringent conditions. The longer a regime, the more the stability it gives to an 
investor, as mining is a time consuming project. Accordingly, potential investors looking at 
the mining laws will be able to establish certainty and investment predictability from the 
                                                          
306 Samuel Diminas, „An Analysis of the Nigerian Petroleum Industry Bill‟ (2013), PP. 5-8 available at: 
<http://www.wespaq.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/An-Analysis-of-the-Nigerian-Petroleum-Industry-Bill-
2012WESPA V1FINAL.pdf>        accessed 20th August 2019 
307 Ibid 
308 Deloitte Report, „State of Mining in Africa‟ (2017), available at: 
<https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/za/Documents/energy-
resources/za_state_of_mining_africa_09022015.pdf>  accessed 20th September, 2018; Also The minerals and 
Petroleum Development Act, 2013 (South Africa),  Minerals and Mining Act, 2006 (Ghana) and Minerals and 
mining Act, 2007 (Nigeria).    
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length of the mining lease. Thus, Nigeria needs to review its regime to improve predictability 
and compensate for the lack of adequate infrastructure that is limiting the efficiency of the 
mining sector. 
 
4.8. Conclusions on policy and legal frameworks for development through mining and 
infrastructure investment 
 
This chapter has discussed the strength and the weakness of the investment framework for 
Nigeria‟s extractive industries. Lack of up-to-date law has made petroleum industry in 
adequate and less productive. Imprecision in the rules, ambiguity and availability of large 
discretion to the bureaucrats has given birth to some more serious issues of governance such 
as widespread corruption, lack of transparency and accountability. The endemic effect of 
these factors is holding the new Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB) to ransom. The bill which is 
meant to address all inadequacy of the framework and bring it into speed with the modern 
realities of investment and development has been stagnating for more than one and half a 
decade in its draft form, mainly because stakeholders disagreed to agree on certain 
provisions. Unless PIB is successfully passed into law, the sector would continue to 
underperform, the state loses revenue and development pace continue to be even slower. 
NEITI has described the paradox of operating within outdated framework as: 
 
 
 
Relying on rules and methods that were crafted for the market as it was four decades 
ago is not only a wrong choice, it is a very costly one. Inevitably, the cost of failure of 
policy and regulation to adapt as the industry evolved has left a yawning gap between 
endowment and performance. Nigeria currently holds the largest gas reserve in 
Africa and the 9th largest reserve in the world. Yet it occupies only the 24th position 
among the world‟s producers. This contradiction is one of many illustrations of the 
paradox of a sector abundant in natural endowments but beset with avoidable, man-
made problems. Nigeria is the 12th largest producer of crude but has the lowest 
contribution of oil to GDP among OPEC countries. The commodity accounts for 93% 
of export earnings, 85% of government revenues but only 9% of GDP. This is on 
account of the absence of adequate “productive activities in the economy” related to 
oil. 
 
Failure to update laws governing the oil and gas sector has not only stagnated development 
but also created uncertainty for investors. Petroleum Act of 1960s must not be expected to 
reflect current priorities as the draftsmen could only have envisaged the realities of their time. 
This explains the yawning gap between the volume of crude produced and oil contribution to 
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GDP. While contribution to GDP is less than 10%, production is so huge that it accounts for 
85-90% of the total export, due to lack of industries and manufacturers. This neglect by the 
state to provide for industrial development means also lack of job and earning opportunity for 
the citizens, which manifest itself in widespread socio-economic problems. Consequently, 
this was the main drive for community up rise against the state in some oil producing areas, 
rendering those areas less-attractive to potential investors. 
 
Further, there has been no concrete regulations with reference to investor duty towards 
community. The practice in the oil communities has so far been based on memorandum of 
understanding, which is entirely voluntary, and thus not always accessible. All efforts to 
concretise CSR of oil companies by a binding legislation had always ended in deadlock 
between stakeholders. In contrast, Community Development Agreement (CDA) represents a 
mandatory legislation demanding investors to contribute in socio-economic development of 
affected mining communities. Although, this model has been widely lauded as concrete 
definition of rights and duties creating sufficient incentives to all stakeholders,309  yet, is not 
without controversy. Scholars have expressed mixed-feeling about real and potential success 
of using legal instrument to enforce CSR as it is the case with CDA, there is not enough 
evidence of practical experience within Nigeria to enable one draw conclusion either way. 
The possible reason for this situation in Nigeria is lack of serious investors in the mining 
sector. 
 
This chapter has also discussed linkages between infrastructure development and mining and 
investment. Infrastructure is crucial driver to growth in all economic sectors of the Nigeria, 
but it is particularly critical to mining industry. Nigeria needs to improve energy 
infrastructure as adequate electric power availability improves efficiency of industrial 
operations by reducing cost and thereby enhances production and profitability. The current 
4000 (MW) generation capacity of the country has not even been enough for social 
consumption as majority of the population lack access to electricity. Same can be said in the 
context of road infrastructure. As heighted in the chapter, 80% of Nigeria‟s land mass is 
unpaved, which generated adverse impact on the productivity of the mining and other vital 
economic sector. Given the significance of access to international market and facilitated 
movement of goods and services to resource industries, it is critical that Nigeria upgrades its 
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 Amanda, „Attractive Legal System‟ (2000), PP. 201-204 
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transportation system by expanding rad and railways coverage, and sea and airports 
performance. 
 
Further, this chapter has looked at Nigeria‟s framework for infrastructure development. There 
has been a set of policy initiatives all aiming at infrastructure enhancement. Nigeria Vision 
20:2020 (2010-2020); The federal government Transformation Agenda (2011-2015); and 
National Integrated Infrastructure Master Plan (NIIMP) (2014-2043). The master plan has set 
out an expanded plan and targets with aim to closing all gaps that exist in the country‟s 
infrastructure by 2043. In addition, a synergistic approach involving key economic sectors, 
namely power, transport and mining among others, has been developed. However, the chapter 
has revealed some challenges capable of undermining this collective effort to address 
infrastructure deficit in Nigeria. Mainly to do with governance and finance. From governance 
perspective, there is lack of single regulatory and policy framework to coordinate all policy 
actions that could have impact on infrastructure development. As a result, conflicting policies 
emerged from different sectors to hamper the overall objective of NIIMP. The need for 
private sector mobilisation to invest in infrastructure has been also discussed. Considering the 
gap is too wide and government alone cannot provide the funding, the framework 
acknowledges private participation. The NIIMP contains legal enablers providing a 
framework for Public Private Participation (PPP). However, this area is poorly developed. 
There is need to boost investor confidence through addressing the risk factor involve in 
giving the government too much rights in a contractual agreement. More so, there is need to 
incorporate other innovative investment schemes which have been globally recognised for 
infrastructure development such as Islamic bonds (Sukuk). Next chapter will provide greater 
detail and discuss Sukuk framework. 
 
Finally, and most importantly, to attract meaningful investment these frameworks need to 
incorporate the concept of economic freedom. This concept is about according private actors 
with unrestricted opportunity to conduct business, it creates compelling incentives to 
entrepreneurs. Essential components of this freedom include limiting the role of states into 
regulating the deals to ensure smooth transactions as well as creating certainty through a 
proper legal infrastructure to resort to in case of any default. Security of private property is 
crucial to investors, especially in Africa. In a situation where government is bestowed with so 
much powers to deal with the fate of the other party to contract, as it is the case with PPP, it 
is capable of eroding investors‟ confidence in the contract. Therefore, clear legal provisions 
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guaranteeing protection of private rights to property against any arbitrary use of state power, 
is necessary to induce private investment in both mining and infrastructure. Others are access 
to sound money, freedom to trade internationally and regulation of credit, labour and 
business. Availability of a well-regulated credit market is particularly significant as it 
provides liquidity support to both foreign and local investors. Thus, this chapter highlighted 
potentials of inclusive financing vehicles of Islamic finance to stimulate development of 
Nigeria‟s mining and infrastructure. The capital market with regards to Islamic bonds is 
poorly developed. Hence, the following chapters will elaborate discussion on Sukuk. 
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5. Chapter Five: Developing a framework for the use of Sukuk in theory and practice 
 
Introduction 
This chapter discusses the potential use of Sukuk (Islamic bonds) in extractive industries in 
Nigeria, as well as suitable types of Sukuk structures and factors that may facilitate or affect 
its smooth application. In effect, the chapter looks at ethical constituents of Sukuk from the 
perspective of Islamic law and how these legal principles are embedded in the contractual 
structure of Sukuk. Essentially the chapter seeks to investigate the roots of the contemporary 
arguments on the legality or otherwise of the conventional structuring. For this reason, 
various types of Islamic commercial contracts underlying Sukuk transactions are discussed in 
the chapter with the overall aim to ascertaining what is both ethically and pragmatically 
suitable for the Nigeria‟s mining sector. Ultimately, this chapter will propose a framework 
and contractual forms for the use of Sukuk in the Nigeria‟s mineral industries.  
 
5.1 Exploring the growing role of Sukuk in Islamic Finance 
 
5.1.1. The potential and expansion of Sukuk  
 
Sukuk has been and is being increasingly adopted as means of financing development by both 
governments and high-profile private entities. Its global reach and territorial coverage is not 
only remarkable but also unprecedented. From USD 1,172 million in 2001 total global 
issuance grew to USD 472.683 billion in 2013. Although, it is a classic term well documented 
and practiced by Muslim jurist in the past, Sukuk had its modern re-birth in Jeddah, Saudi 
Arabia 1988, when the Islamic Jurisprudence Council endorsed it as an acceptable investment 
vehicle from Islamic legal perspective.310 Ever since then, offerings started to go far and wide 
from East Asia, Malaysia and Indonesia, up to Singapore and China and into Middle East 
through to Pakistan and North Africa down to Europe and finally penetrated United States 
before landing in East and West Africa recently. In most of these countries, legal and policy 
changes have been adopted in order to provide a framework for uptake and smooth operation. 
 
Given the recent issuance within Africa, in Nigeria, Kenya and South Africa among others, 
this chapter seeks to examine the policy changes that have been or need to be made in order 
                                                          
310 Ayman H. Abdel-Khaleq and Christopher F. Richardson, „New Horizons for Islamic Securities: Emerging 
Trends in Sukuk Offerings‟ (2006-2007), Chicago Journal of International Law, Vol. 7, PP.409-425 
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to provide enabling environment for Sukuk investment. Especially, in the wake of new policy 
in some countries, like Nigeria, where government has resolved to direct sovereign 
investment authority to generate funds for mine development through securities.311 In 
particular, this chapter aims to explore the compatibility of Sukuk to and its viability for 
financing projects in mining sector within the existing policy and legal framework. First, the 
chapter will look at characteristics of Sukuk, and then Sukuk issuance, and thereafter legal 
framework for Sukuk in selected jurisdictions, and finally Sukuk for industry and 
infrastructure development followed by a conclusion. Ultimately, the contribution of this 
chapter together with others, would attempt to answer the second question of this research. 
How does state policy affect Sukuk investment in the context of minerals development?  
 
5.1.2. Character and structure of Sukuk  
 
Sukuk (Islamic bonds) is defined as investment certificate representing claim of ownership of 
a tangible asset.312 This definition underscore fundamental difference between Sukuk and 
conventional bonds, the terms „ownership‟ of tangible asset‟ highlight two structural 
underpinnings of this instrument, namely asset-backing and conferment of ownership thereof 
upon Sukuk holders. By implication, investors in Sukuk deals are basically considered 
partners in ownership of the asset as opposed to mere „creditors‟ in the case of conventional 
bonds. Also by virtue of being beneficial owners of the underlying asset therefore, whatever 
payments the Sukuk holders may receive are a profit accruing from their own asset not an 
interest. This distinction is crucial in order to bring the Sukuk transaction into conformity 
with the ethical principles of Shari‟ah law which is the core element of governance as far as 
Islamic finance is concerned. Fundamentally, while Islamic law views commodity as a 
tradable instrument which can be exchanged and rented out for a profit, it does not consider 
money as a commodity, but only a medium of transaction.313  
 
Accordingly, payment of rent on money used (interest on loan) as well as trading in 
instrument representing a loan is out rightly proscribed. Other important objectionable 
                                                          
311New Policy to shape Nigerian Mining Sector in 2017,  Nigeria‟s Mining News (16 January, 2017) available 
at:< http://www.miningne.ws/2017/01/16/key-policies-to-shape-nigerian-mining-sector-in-2017/# >                                          
312 Excerpt from the official definition given by Accounting and Auditing Organisation for Islamic Institutions 
(AAOFII), which defined Sukuk as “certificate of equal value representing undivided shares in the ownership of 
tangible assets, usufructs and services or (in the ownership of) the asset of particular projects or special 
investment activity.” 
313 Yahia, The Art of Islamic Banking and Finance (Wiley Finance: New York; 2010), PP. 84-128 
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elements that Shari‟ah seeks to eliminate from financial dealings are uncertainty and 
anything that is detrimental to public safety. In effect, these requirements operationally 
impose the condition that a valid Sukuk structure must be based on or backed by an asset, and 
the ownership thereof vested upon the holders.314 As already noted, the term Sukuk existed 
within the commercial dealings of the past Muslim generations, although the term as well as 
the context (investment) has remained the same, but the concept and the structure has 
changed due pragmatic reasons. While medieval Muslim traders knew and used Sak (singular 
of Sukuk) as a mere paper-evidence of financial obligation with no intrinsic value whatsoever, 
today it has graduated into an investment vehicle with sophisticated techniques. It is an 
amalgamation of sub-structure of traditional bond and a format of classic Islamic contract, 
with the latter substantially forming the basis of the structure and on top of that lies the layer 
of conventional approach. This modern structuring technique becomes necessary, in order 
that Islamic financial products achieve their business goal without losing their ethical 
characteristics.315 To guard against spoliation of any such character, Sukuk format is always 
based upon one of the basic Islamic commercial contracts: mudaraba, musharaka, murabaha, 
salam, istithna, ijara or wakala. These terms indicate varying types of transactions ranging 
respectively from partnership, sale, lease to agency contract.  
 
Accordingly, Sukuk could be Murabaha Sukuk, Salam Sukuk, Istithna Sukuk, Mudaraba 
Sukuk, Musharaka Sukuk, Ijara Sukuk or Wakala Sukuk. And whatever form Sukuk might 
take, presence of a tangible asset is essential for valid structuring of the contract, however 
Sukuk can be asset backed or asset based, and the difference between the two types is legally 
significant. This is because in the event of default, while asset-backed Sukuk holders can have 
direct recourse to the asset underlying the contract, such right will not be available to 
investors in asset-based Sukuk.316 Another important implication has to do with the market 
value of the instrument, because international rating agencies tend to rank asset-backed 
instrument higher due to the level of investor protection involved. The most serious draw-
back for asset-based Sukuk would, however, appear to be the controversial nature of its 
structure in the eyes of shari‟ah scholars, most scholars deem it impermissible to be traded in 
the secondary market, the reason being that it contains element of debt, as holders do not 
                                                          
314  Salah, A Legal Analysis of Nakheel Investment (2010), pp. 20-32 
315 Umar and Arshad, „Contractual Forms in Islamic Finance Law‟ (2003), PP. 150-194 
316 M Siraj Sait, Shari‟ah Compliant Sukuk: OJK In-House Training on Sukuk (2015), (document available with 
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have right of ownership in the asset.317 Also in practice, factors such as type of asset available 
to issuer, interest of investors and regulatory framework of a jurisdiction do dictate choice of 
a particular structure.318 
Table 1:5 Different types of Islamic contract underlying Sukuk 
Underlying Contract Classic Name            Description 
Sale Agreement Murabaha (Mark-up Sale)  
The proceeds of the sukuk are used to purchase commodities or other 
assets from a supplier. They are then on-sold at a deferred price, which 
includes a mark-up on the purchase price. The instalments from the on-
sale are then used to pay the periodic distribution amount due to investors 
under the sukuk 
Salam The proceeds are used as spot payment for future delivery of a 
commodity, which is then sold to pay back the sukuk holders. The 
commodity must be a standardized one, and its quality, quantity, place, 
date, and time of delivery must be well defined in advance. 
Istithna The proceeds from issuance are passed on to a contractor for future 
delivery of a manufactured or constructed asset, which is then to be on-
sold after delivery to pay back the investors. This is often combined with a 
forward-lease agreement for the asset, and the fees received from this 
advance rental are used for periodic payments. 
Partnership Agreement Mudaraba Proceeds of the sukuk issuance are used by the issuer as capital to finance 
a business in partnership with an entrepreneur, who contributes his labour 
and expertise. Profit generated from the business is distributed in pre-
defined proportions between the business entrepreneur and the issuer, who 
then uses them for periodic payments to the sukuk holders 
Musharaka Proceeds are utilized to finance a business, but on a joint-venture basis, 
where both parties contribute capital to the business. Periodic payments 
and payment at maturity are generated in a manner similar to those in a 
Mudaraba structure. 
Lease Agreement Ijara Sukuk is issued to finance the purchase of certain assets which are leased 
out to a lessee, whose rent payments are used for the periodic payments to 
the investors (sukuk holders). At maturity, the assets are repurchased by an 
obligor, and the proceeds of this sale are transferred to the investors 
Agency Agreement Wakala An appointed agent (the wakeel) uses the sukuk proceeds to invest in a 
pool of permissible investments or assets. Periodic payments to investors 
are made from the profits derived from the investment. 
Source: Emre Balibek 2017 
 
 
 
                                                          
317 Muhamed Zulkhibri, „A Synthesis of Theoretical and Empirical Research on Sukuk‟ (2015) Borsa Istanbul 
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accessed 15 March, 2019 
318 Sait, Shari‟ah Complaint Sukuk (2015 supra)  
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5.2.Sukuk Issuance 
5.2.1. Factors behind and impact of sukuk issuance 
As noted earlier, Sukuk issuance has become a world-wide phenomenon whereby 
governments and enterprises take to offering Islamic securities in order to diversify their 
source of funding. In the past few decades, this instrument has recorded remarkable growth 
and become so famous within the global financial landscape. Sukuk attracted a broad range of 
investors from different faith groups around the world, and the number of issuers has been 
progressively increasing. One of the probable reasons for this rise, as documented by many 
researchers, is the ethical characteristics of Sukuk which do not allow uncertainty or 
exploitation in trade. The empirically tested potentials of this instrument to provide 
diversification and thereby reduce risk in investment portfolio is yet another factor to explain 
the tremendous boost in the Islamic capital market.319 The first issuance of Sukuk ever was in 
1983 in Malaysia, and since then many countries and corporations followed suite.320 While 
Malaysia and Gulf countries remain the leading hubs for Sukuk in the world, and other 
countries like UK in the Europe and Singapore in the Far East have since become active 
players, African states are however just beginning to emerge. Inside Africa, countries like 
Nigeria, South Africa, Sudan, Senegal and Gambia have made offerings, while others like 
Morocco are preparing to catch up soon.321 
 
The table 5 (below) shows the wide coverage of Sukuk in terms of geographical location and 
diverse nature of the issuing countries. Malaysia has the highest number of issues (1388 
times) and monetary value (351,494) USD millions. Malaysia has been chosen to be one of 
the case studies in this research because of being the leading hub for issuance of Islamic 
finance products, but also for its legal history as well as regulatory infrastructure. Gambia has 
the second highest number of issuance (401), almost twice higher than Bahrain, one of the 
world leading jurisdictions in Sukuk and houses five important international bodies: AAOIFI, 
IIFM, CIBAFI, IIRA and LMC. However, the monetary value of the latter ($12,545 m) is 
about 65 times bigger than that of Gambia. 
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<http://www.mifc.com/index.php?ch=ch_contents_capital_markets&pg=pg_cm_global&ac=26432>  accessed 
11th June, 2018 
 122 
 
Table 2:5 A highlight of Sukuk Issuance from different Jurisdictions 
Country Number of Issuance Amount in $m 
Bahrain 226 12, 545 
Gambia 401 194 
Malaysia 1388 351,494 
Pakistan 17 7,669 
Brunei 113 6093 
Turkey 7 6900 
Hong Kong 1 1000 
Luxemburg 1 272 
Indonesia 65 21890 
South Africa 1 500 
Senegal 1 200 
United Kingdom 1 340 
Qatar 17 19655 
Nigeria 1 71 
Germany 1 123 
Singapore 5 193 
UAE 11 6855 
Yemen 2 250 
Sudan 26 2868 
Total 2263 370326 
Source: IIFM 2016 
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Factors affecting Sukuk impact includes the number of issuances, value, context and legal 
system of a jurisdiction, have informed the selection of candidate cases for the study. For 
example, U.K. with only „one issuance‟ of $340m is preferred to Pakistan and Turkey with 17 
and 7 issuances representing a value of $7,669m and $6,900m respectively. This position of 
U.K. was due to its legal system which is widely viewed as the leading jurisdiction for 
dispute resolution. Similarly, U.A.E. is selected because of its conservative approach to 
Sukuk distinct to Malaysia and other European and African nations, even though Indonesia 
has more attractive volume of issuance (65) and the amount of $21,890m. 
 
As highlighted in the table above, few African countries are emerging. In any jurisdiction- 
Africa, Asia or Europe-elements essential for the growth of Sukuk investment include 
amending their laws and capital market regulations to facilitate Sukuk issuance. As discussed 
in the subsequent paragraphs, a sound legal framework is necessary for hitch-free Sukuk 
investment. 
 
5.2.2. Legal Framework for Sukuk Issuance 
 
Legal framework refers to law that guides the procedure of issuing, trading, redemption 
Sukuk bonds and resolution of disputes arising therefrom. Generally, bond investment is a 
complex transaction which involves governments, huge enterprises and investors; hence it 
requires careful management regulated by the policy of the state of issuance.322 International 
financial regulations may as well apply where bonds are listed as international stocks. With 
Sukuk however, the need to comply with Shari‟ah law constitute a third layer of regulatory 
framework, which is necessary to cater for certain distinctive requirements of Sukuk as an 
Islamic investment vehicle. The regulatory demands of Sukuk are more complex compare to 
those of traditional bonds.323 In any case, “sound public debt policies and debt management 
practices require robust legal underpinnings”.324  
 
                                                          
322 Elsie Addo Awadzi, „Designing Legal Framework for Public Debt Management‟ (2015), PP. 2-56, IMF 
Working Paper, available at: 
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323 Ali Alshamrani, „Sukuk Issuance and its Regulatory Framework in Saudi Arabia‟ (2014) Journal of Islamic 
Banking and Finance, Vol. 2, No. 1, PP. 305-333 
324 Awadzi, „Designing Legal Framework for Public Debt Management‟ (2015), PP. 2-55 
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In some jurisdictions, distinct legislations are made for Sukuk, while some others would 
accommodate it within a framework of traditional bonds, without compromising its ethical 
characters. The first Sukuk issuance in Hong Kong (HKSAR) was made under an already 
existing program for conventional securities, preserving the requirement of conformity of the 
structure with Islamic legal principles.325 To achieve this conformity, generally, a legal 
framework needs to address certain elements critical for Sukuk investment. Given the fact 
that, asset is critical to the structure of this instrument, and ownership of asset as well as 
transfer of such ownership is likely to have some legal implications, legislations need to be 
clear on that. Among other things, the framework should address issues such as what 
constitutes the legal authority of an originator to employ a designated asset to back the Sukuk 
issuance, tax implication as well as what criteria an asset need to satisfy in order to qualify to 
be a subject-matter of the transaction, because the asset must not contravene the fundamentals 
of Islamic commercial law as noted above. Also, a provision for a setting up suitable SPV for 
Sukuk deals, with proven ability to structure effective Sukuk deals, through the application of 
sound understanding of Shari‟ah and in-depth familiarity with traditional financial concepts. 
This part of the framework shall, in addition to, stating out the power of SPV to issue 
certificates conferring ownership of the underlying asset onto holders, outline quality and 
qualifications of who can be an SPV. Another important aspect of the framework is a 
provision for investors‟ protection in the event of default or insolvency and bankruptcy.326 
The insolvency and bankruptcy element which guarantees investors‟ protection, combine 
with tax incentives are critical aspects of any investment framework seeking to attract, 
stimulate and enhance investment climate. “The framework for Sukuk issuance should be a 
consistent part of the overall public financial management legal framework.”327 To 
accommodate those concepts, many countries across the world have adopted necessary 
changes to their regulatory framework. 
 
In United Kingdom, when government envisioned Sukuk issuance did not simply rely on the 
existing Finance Act of 2008 only, but rather facilitated the issuance with a new regulation, 
Government Alternative Finance Regulations (GAFR) of 2014. The two have served as legal 
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framework for effective Sukuk issuance of 2014 in London.328 In the same year, authorities in 
Luxembourg made a specific law known as „Sukuk Law‟ wherein government was 
unequivocally authorised to set up a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) and transfer to it a 
landed property designated as an asset for Sukuk  to be structured according to the distinctive 
requirements of Islamic bond. In contrast, Turkey did not make separate law for Sukuk, all it 
did was amended its existing Public Finance and Debt Management Law to accommodate 
Islamic bonds and thereby provided legal basis for the debut Turkish Sukuk to hit both 
domestic and international market in 2012.329 The objective of surveying a set of contrasting 
approaches here is to make a point that, it is not necessary for Sukuk framework to be in a 
distinct codification, it is sufficient to amend an existing law, as did Turkey and HKSAR 
China. What can be of serious implication however, is failure to make any legal basis to 
accommodate fundamental and distinctive requirement of Islamic instrument, which might 
consequently result in the instrument being not only unethical but altogether objectionable in 
Shari‟ah. For example, in Saudi Arabia, Caravan maiden Sukuk issuance of 2014, generated a 
heated debate among Scholars in the Kingdom as to whether the issuance procedure was done 
in compliance with the principles of Islamic law because the regulations with regards to 
capital market in the country is did not make any specific provision for Sukuk.330 
 
The case of Saudi Arabia is particularly interesting, while the Royal Decree has declared 
Qur‟an and Hadith as the constitution of the land and basic law of governance, legal 
framework for managing securities does appear to support Sukuk issuance in accordance with 
the principles of Shari‟ah. Saudi Capital Market Law (CML) of 2003, created Capital Market 
Authority (CMA) whose resolutions constitute policies and guidelines to govern the conduct 
of financial market in the country. Accordingly, the CMA made two sets of regulations to 
form the legal framework for all issuance including Sukuk: Offer of Security Issuance 
Regulations and Listing Rules of 2004. Yet, there was no reference to Sukuk whatsoever in 
the entire framework, the definition of conventional bonds as “debt instrument” extends to 
Islamic bonds, and by implication, the bonds so issued are not tradable in the eyes of 
Shari‟ah and therefore may not attract ethical investors.331 In essence, this is an example of a 
case where relevant authorities need to make policies that are necessary to ensure smooth 
                                                          
328 Oseni and Hassan, „Regulating the Governing Law Clauses in Sukuk Transaction‟ (2015), PP. 220-249 
329 Hazine Mustesarligi, „Turkish Treasury‟ (2012), “Press Release” 2012/143, Sept. 18, Ankara, available at: 
<www.hazine.gov.tr>  accessed 12th August, 2019 
330 Alshamrani, „Sukuk Issuance and its Regulatory Framework in Saudi Arabia‟ (2014), PP. 305-333 
331 Abdullah Al Sheikh and Joseph Tanega, „Sukuk Structure and its Regulatory Environment in the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabi‟a‟ (2011), Law and Financial Market Review, No.5 (3), Pg. 194 
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issuance, trading and ultimate redemption of the investment.332 To achieve that in case of 
Saudi Kingdom, not only proper definition is required but also, among other things, a 
provision for purpose-made SPV competent to structure Islamic bonds in consonance with 
the law as it obtains in other countries such as UAE and Bahrain.  
 
In contrast, UAE which is probably the most active as well as the most regulated hub for 
Sukuk investment within the GCC countries, made provisions for Islamic securities. There are 
two distinct jurisdictions within the UAE, and each is regulated by a separate set of financial 
regulations. Dubai International Financial Centre (DIFC) which is one of the leading centre 
for commercial activities world-wide, represents a financial hub governed purely by English 
common law, and is regulated by Dubai Financial Services Authority (DFSA).333 For the rest 
of the Emirate, Emirates Securities and Commodities Authority (ESCA) serve as the 
governing body to regulate all commodities and securities including Sukuk transactions. This 
authority is empowered by the regime that created it to make laws and policies necessary for 
the smooth conduct of commercial activities involving securities and commodities throughout 
the Emirate with exception of DIFC. Accordingly, ESCA in Abu-Dhabi, for example, has 
developed a comprehensive regulatory framework for the issuance of Sukuk prospectus as 
well as for shari‟ah-compliant resolution of disputes arising out of such transactions. But 
where a transaction is between an entity registered for business within DIFC and a person or 
corporation from the other jurisdiction, the laws of the former will take precedence to 
regulate the relationship according to English law applicable in the English courts already 
established in Dubai or Arbitral Forum created under and by the DFSA.334 Recently, in the 
wake of Dana Sukuk controversy, the Securities and Commodities Authority (SCA) of UEA 
has made a resolution to make new regulations which shall provide for a comprehensive 
unified mechanism for settlement of disputes to do with Islamic bonds.335 With that it is 
hoped that a tribunal or a sophisticated forum similar to that of Malaysia may emerge in the 
Emirate. 
 
                                                          
332 Alshamrani, „Sukuk Issuance and its Regulatory Framework in Saudi Arabia‟ (2014), PP. 305-333 
333 Oseni and Hassan, „Regulating the Governing Law Clauses in Sukuk Transaction‟ (2015), PP. 220-249; 
Salah, „A Legal Analysis of Nakheel Sukuk‟ (2010), PP. 20-32 
334 Oseni and Hassan, „Regulating the Governing Law Clauses in Sukuk Transaction‟ (2015), PP. 220-249 
335 Malaysia International Islamic Finance Centre (MIFC) News (June 8, 2018) available at: 
<http://www.mifc.com/index.php?ch=ch_contents_capital_markets&pg=pg_cm_global&ac=26427>        
accessed 11th July, 2018. Dana Sukuk is an infamous case where the issuer defaulted on payment on the grounds 
that the arrangement was based on invalid law as it violates certain shari‟ah principles. This case highlights the 
significance of dispute resolution mechanism to Sukuk transactions. 
 127 
 
Malaysia has so far held itself out as the global centre for Shari‟ah-compliant investment in 
terms of the volume of Islamic financial activities as well legal framework to regulate those 
activities. As far as Sukuk is concerned, creation of SPV, issuance, structuring and 
management of periodical payments thereof, are all regulated by law in accordance with 
Shari‟ah. The 2011 amendment of Capital Market and Services Act (CMSA) has 
incorporated and addressed the needs of Islamic bonds. Although, it is the sole Act governing 
the entire spectrum of stock market in Malaysia including conventional bonds, CMSA 
contains specific provisions dedicated for Islamic Capital Market (ICM). By operation of the 
Act, Securities and Exchange Commission, the body statutorily charged with the 
administration of the CMSA, has formulated comprehensive guidelines known as “Sukuk 
guidelines of (2011)”. 336 In addition, Independent Shari‟ah Advisory Committee was set-up 
and made to exist as part of the Exchange Commission in order to ensure compliance of all 
Sukuk dealings with the principles of Islamic law. Another distinctive hallmark that has made 
Malaysia a unique jurisdiction within the global landscape of Sukuk investment is the 
existence of a robust framework for dispute resolution. 337 Elaborate discussion on dispute 
resolution will come under chapter five. 
 
On the other end of the spectrum, few African countries have followed in the footsteps of the 
foregoing nations to issue Sukuk, notably, Nigeria, South Africa, Kenya, and Morocco. In 
September 2017 Nigeria issued a road network infrastructure Sukuk of 100 billion naira. This 
offer which was first such issuance of its kind has revealed peoples‟ appetite to this 
instrument. Although, that offer has primarily expanded investor-base of the federal 
government and provided liquidity for realisation of (2017-2020) plan to achieve competitive 
economy through infrastructure development, it has also provided economic inclusion and 
investment avenue to large number of the citizens who are ethical investors.338 Given the 
oversubscription of that Sukuk, government is even more determined now to pursue 
development of other sectors, like mining, through securities investment.339 But the question 
is what is the policy change introduced so far to provide enabling environment for this 
investment to flourish. While, this investment is still at nascent stage and the process of 
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growth and changes will normally happen slowly, there are five incentives worthy of 
mention. 
Given the significance of tax issue in Sukuk transaction, because it involves multiple transfer 
of asset which means exorbitant tax to pay, tax-exemption was granted.340 However, it is not 
clear whether this is going to be backed by an Act of parliament or shall remain as regulatory 
guidelines made by the Securities and Exchange Commission. In South Africa, where Sukuk 
offer begun much earlier, legislation has come to concretize tax incentives for Islamic bonds 
since 2016 (four years after first issuance), and as a result, private enterprises felt persuaded 
to emulate the government and make corporate issuance.341 Second, the Central Bank of 
Nigeria conferred liquid asset status on the Sukuk certificates, thereby making it capable of 
being used as very reliable collateral and of being listed as well as traded on the floor of the 
Nigerian Stock Exchange. The appointment of two highly reputable companies to serve as 
SPV in the deal has also boosted investors‟ confidence. Lastly and most importantly, Debt 
Management Office would henceforth play a dual role in the capital market, while one has to 
do with traditional bonds and the other is to help in facilitating Sukuk arrangements for not 
only the government of the federation but also other tiers and agencies.342 What is remain to 
be seen is whether Nigeria is going to be driven and inspired by countries like Kenya who is 
pursuing rigorous legislative amendments to provide leading environment for Islamic finance 
in Africa,343 or is going to follow a slow trend.  
 
5.3.Sukuk for infrastructure and industrial development 
 
The use of Sukuk as investment vehicle for financing infrastructure development has become 
a focal point of the global Islamic financial industry. The growing need for capital in the 
mining sector as well as infrastructure globally and particularly in Africa, would prove the 
potential relevance of Sukuk beyond doubt. By the year 2030, according to OECD 
(Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development), the world would need about 
$71 trillion investment in order to finance basic infrastructure only, which includes water, 
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electricity, rail and road network as well as telecoms.344 The interdependence of mining 
industry and infrastructure development is well-documented. 345 Also, using revenue that 
accrued from mineral development to provide infrastructure for the well-being of the citizens 
and social welfare as a constitutional responsibility of a representative government is a 
common knowledge. However, using infrastructure development in a country to woo foreign 
investors into injecting their capital in the mining industry of the state, has received relatively 
less attention. One of the key factors often raised by mineral developers as basis of their 
decision not to invest in a particular jurisdiction has to do with poor state of infrastructure in 
the state.  
 
In Nigeria, for example, lack of good roads linking the minefield with major international 
outlets (sea and air ports) and poor electricity were frequently pointed out as major 
impediments to foreign investors.346 The reason for such decision is very simple: minerals 
investment is capital intensive by nature and characterized with huge risk, if in addition to 
that, investors will have to find a way of addressing such issues like lack of power supply and 
dilapidated road network, then it will be an act of imprudence in business to invest in that 
state, because the amount of capital required and the risk involved are most likely 
compounded. It is therefore an emerging trend in development that states would build 
infrastructure to create favourable environment for mining (less-costly) in order to persuade 
potential investors. S. 4 (1) (F) of the Nigerian Mining Act, 2007 provides that, government 
should “create an enabling environment for the private investors both foreign and domestic 
by providing adequate infrastructure for mining activities.” A question arises here as to 
whether Sukuk could serve as a liquid vehicle to deliver the much-needed infrastructure in the 
mining industry making it thereby both attractive and competitive. 
 
This new trend that advocates basic infrastructure, such as road and electricity, be provided 
by states as necessary ingredients of attractive business atmosphere, might seem to disagree 
with the approach emphasised by majority of the conventional legislations on community 
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development across mining jurisdictions in Africa.347 Eventually, regulations in resource-
wealthy countries tend to saddle investors rather than governments with the task of 
developing infrastructure within communities that dwell next to and directly affected by their 
activities. This concept is encapsulated in the famous provision for community development 
agreement of the respective mining Acts of various countries.348 While it is beyond the scope 
of this chapter to accommodate full expositions of community development as social 
responsibility of resource companies (as this is a topic of another chapter), the purpose here is 
to run a cursory look at some points so as to highlight the relevance of Sukuk for mining 
industry and development.  The point remains that, while presence of basic infrastructure 
makes an industry of a state more appealing to investors, it is also possible to achieve 
infrastructure development through responsible investment, thus, government and investors 
are partners in progress in within context of development.349 Whichever way one sees it, the 
underlying need for liquidity in both cases presents opportunity for Sukuk to enhance its 
relevance as a significant source of financing development in the industry. 
 
Generally, minerals are developed by government or private Mining Corporations. The 
primary source of finance in either case is the developer‟s own funds if they have sufficient 
liquidity to execute such projects, which has not always been the case. Most often, funds for 
purpose of such development are raised from international lending institutions such as 
investment banks or through issuance of securities to investors so as to pool adequate 
financial resources necessary for the projects concerned.350 Due to high cost of borrowing and 
some ethical issues associated with this conventional approach, governments and enterprises 
have seemed to welcome any alternative technique that could offer them opportunity to 
diversify their funding stream.351 The emergence of Islamic bonds was therefore viewed as a 
laudable development within the international investment landscape.352 Accordingly, the 
global capital market has, in the recent time, witnessed a widespread issuance of both 
sovereign and corporate Sukuk for various development projects, including in energy and 
natural resources. However, researchers have found that, given the inherent nature of Islamic 
bonds and centrality of asset to its structure, use of any asset regulated by a different legal 
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system may be prone to legal challenges that would require careful consideration. 353  More 
so, considering the intricacy associated with policies governing investment in mining 
industries across Africa, any Sukuk structuring is likely to involve a complex set of 
interactions between different legal concepts. In the context of minerals investment, the 
concept of “underlying asset” which is also central to Sukuk may provide an interesting nexus 
and a ground for compatibility between Islamic bonds and the industry, because this type of 
asset (land) will represent an ideal object for Sukuk transaction from Shari‟ah perspective.  
 
Nonetheless, careful consideration of some practical issues may raise some policy and legal 
concerns. At the intersect, is the issue of ownership, while all property in the “ownership” of 
the asset (land containing mineral resources) is constitutionally vested in the sovereign 
government to hold in trust for the benefit of the citizens,354 Sukuk arrangement 
fundamentally requires the issuer to transfer ownership of the underlying asset onto investors 
via investment certificate. This presupposes issuance of sovereign Sukuk only, where 
government as the custodian of title over the entire estate in the asset becomes the originator 
of the Sukuk and passes the ownership to a designated SPV under specific contract(long time 
mining lease), who will in turn raise the needed funds through issuance of Sukuk certificates 
conferring ownership (equitable and beneficial) of the said asset to investors under a separate 
arrangement(long time lease contract), and then pay the entire proceeds back to the originator 
(government in this case) for sole purpose of developing the asset (minerals) on yet another 
different terms of contract (short term lease-back).355  
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Figure 1:5 Sovereign Sukuk Structure  
This arrangement is structured as sovereign issuance with government agencies and 
sovereign investment authorities involved as stakeholders, which suggest government raising 
funds to pursue minerals development by itself. However, with most African states, including 
Nigeria, having adopted the international policy aiming at allowing private entities to take 
lead in mineral development and reducing the role of state to that of regulator only, the above 
structure may appear to contradict the prevailing policy.356 Furthermore, the combine effect 
of section 3(2) of South African Minerals and Petroleum Act, 2002357 and section 245 of 
Nigerian Investment Securities Act 2007358 can have serious legal implication on this 
structure. The Mineral Act, while authorises the government to transfer ownership in the 
minefield and oil-blocks to potential developers, it stated specific conditions to be fulfil by a 
beneficiary of that transfer. The beneficiary must have financial capability and technical 
know-how to undertake mineral development. 
                                                          
356 This policy has been promoted by mining legislation, s. 4(1 [d-f]) of the Nigerian Act, for example, provide 
that, the minister for soli minerals shall: 
(d) establish the procedure for monitoring developments in the solid minerals sector and encourage the private 
sector investment in mineral resources development; (e) ensure that in the exploitation of the mineral resources, 
an equitable balance is maintained between foreign an indigenous interest; and (f) create an enabling 
environment for the private investors, both foreign and domestic by providing adequate infrastructure for mining 
activities, and identify areas where Government intervention is desirable. in achieving policy goals and proper 
perspective in mineral resources development; 
357 Identical provision can be found in Nigeria, Ghana and all other Mining jurisdictions in Africa, Canada and 
Australia 
358 In fact, this is universal description of SPV within the purview of financial regulations and law on capital 
market globally 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mining Cadastre 
(originator) 
Holders 
Nigerian Mining Corporation (Technical 
Manager) 
Debt Management 
Office (SPV) 
Investors 
 
 133 
 
 
SPVs in the view of financial regulatory instruments are companies registered as trustee, 
banks or insurance companies, with expertise in financial dealings who act as a trustee for 
bond holders.359 It could be a subsidiary of the originator but should not have fiduciary 
relationship with or share liability of the originator in the event of insolvency. By implication, 
the legislation does not envisage SPV as a suitable candidate for mining lease as they are 
mere trustees with financial expertise and not mining corporations. In contrast, the amended 
Trustee Act, 2000 of the United Kingdom recognises the fact that a trustee could have special 
knowledge or skill of a business or profession beyond and above the objective baseline duty 
of care which every trustee must exercise. Such a trustee is to be held to a higher standard 
than a fairly trustee.360 Arguably, in this case an independent enterprise with requisite 
technical experience in the field of mining can serve as a special purpose entity (SPE) to 
raise, through Sukuk, the amount of capital governments needs to develop its natural 
resources. Having said all that, given the recent resolution of authorities in Nigerian to 
develop mining sector by raising $600 million through sovereign bonds,361 it is not unlikely 
for the government to adopt a policy change in this direction. Unless there is policy reverse 
concerning privatising management of mining activities, governments‟ role would largely 
remain as regulator to oversee and regulate activities of private companies. 
 
Besides sovereign issuance, private Mining Corporations can equally take advantage of Sukuk 
to finance projects in the industry. Literatures indicate that, while there has been substantial 
sovereign issuance by various governments globally, corporate Sukuk constitute the majority 
so far. Islamic bonds successfully issued by energy and natural resource companies from 
GCC to East Asia up to Singapore and down to US prove that, this instrument has the 
capacity to feed the great appetite for capital in the mining industry. The East Cameron Gas 
company Sukuk of 2006 was structured from an asset (oil well) created and regulated by 
American law, represents a phenomenal transaction in the history of Sukuk and provide a 
precedent to other jurisdictions.362 The hallmark of that sophisticated structure lies in the fact 
that, ownership of minerals granted pursuant to laws of non-Islamic jurisdiction fits into 
definition of “real asset ownership” legally transferable under Shari‟ah. A question now 
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arises as to whether the mining rights created and conveyed under the mining laws of African 
countries constitute real and transferable estate.  
 
Although, there might be some difference in mining legislations across different jurisdictions, 
the relevant legislative provisions in the case of Nigeria, Ghana, Kenya, Sierra Leone and 
South Africa are substantially identical. Relevant provisions of law in these jurisdictions 
empowered respective authorities to convey and pass onto the holder of “Mining Right” 
property in the minerals lying underneath a designated area by virtue of a lease specified in 
the Act. In Nigeria, for example, section 1(3) the Act stated, “The property in mineral 
resources shall pass from the government to the person by whom the mineral resources are 
lawfully won, upon their recovery in accordance with this Act.”363 Without prejudice to the 
owners of the surface land, the grant confers right of ownership in and over the resources 
extracted therefrom. Elaborating on the  
legal nature of this right, Section 5 of South African Act declares that, the mining right 
creates “exclusive right to carry out exploration, store, remove, process, transport and/or 
market the mineral products resulting from mining operations.”  
 
In effect, the nature of “ownership” that states confer upon holders of mining lease is for all 
purpose and intendment represents real “estate in the minerals” capable of true sale akin to 
the “property of oil well” in the Gulf of Mexico. In which case, private enterprises can 
lawfully employ their minefields and use them as pool of asset from which Sukuk can be 
structured. This right is not however straightforward across all states with mining sectors in 
Africa. In Ghana and Kenya no transfer or assignment or even change of holding and control 
within the company is valid unless written consent of the government is sought and obtained. 
Figure below demonstrates Sukuk structure based on above analysis. 
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Figure 2:5 A proposed corporate Sukuk structure for the mining sector 
 
5.4.Sukuk for the Oil and Gas sector  
 
Unlike solid minerals, the policy in petroleum industry favours involvement of government, 
and therefore direct issuance of Sukuk by government might be smoother compare to hard 
minerals. As far as governing law and policy are concerned, in most countries, oil and gas or 
liquid minerals is a separate entity from solid minerals, although both come under Extractive 
Industries Initiative Act. In Nigerian context for example, while Minerals Act, 2007 applies 
to solid minerals industry, petroleum industry is mainly regulated by the Nigerian Petroleum 
Act, 1969.364 And as noted in chapter one of this thesis, it is the Nigerian National Petroleum 
Corporation (NNPC) that spearheads development of oil and gas mainly in partnership with 
multinational enterprises.365 Generally, presence and character of asset in mineral industry, 
facilitates Sukuk arrangement. While natural resource extraction is a physical investment and 
capital intensive, Sukuk on the other hand is an investment arrangement structured on tangible 
asset for generating much needed liquidity.366 As noted above, the element of “asset” 
comfortably binds Sukuk with the energy sector. Also, the tendency of Islamic bonds to have 
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longer maturity compare to traditional one would make this compatibility even more solid, 
because mineral investment is naturally time-consuming.  
 
Furthermore, going by all energy Sukuk that have been issued in so far, the nature of the 
transaction suggest that issuer cannot pass physical asset(land) but the product thereof,367 and 
this fits well into nature of mining rights which emphasise that only the state can have legal 
ownership. Section 16 of the 1999 Constitution of the federal Republic of Nigeria, for 
example vested the ownership of all oil minerals in the government of the federation to hold 
in trust for the citizens of Nigeria. As already stated, NNPC, a state-owned company, together 
with several its subsidiaries are responsible for oil and gas development for and on behalf of 
the government. With all this in mind, the ideal structure for Sukuk in the oil mineral sector is 
given as below: 
 
Figure 3:5 Proposed sovereign sukuk based on Musharaka (JVA) 
 
Above figure represent a proposed sukuk structure based on Musharaka (Joint Venture) 
contract, where the NNPC as originator, relinquishes certain percentage of the entire estate in 
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the asset (oilfield) from which the Sukuk is structured, and investors contribute funds required 
to develop the resource by purchasing beneficial ownership  over the estate of minerals 
already relinquished by the NNPC and which is also represented by the Sukuk certificates to 
be issued by independent body, SPV, Nigeria Petroleum Development Company (NPDC), 
which is a subsidiary of NNPC with independent juristic personality. The SPV manages the 
business for and on behalf of the investors pursuant to an agency agreement called “Wakala” 
which also contained profit sharing arrangement, based on which periodic returns are 
distributed to Sukuk holders. Proceeds of Sukuk are paid to Nigerian Downstream Investment 
Management Company (NDMC) yet another subsidiary of the originator who is responsible 
for development of the asset and management of a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) to which 
all of SPV, originator and host community are parties.  
 
Under the JVA, returns are distributed periodically to the respective stakeholders in 
accordance with the sharing formula enshrined in the JVA otherwise referred to as 
“Musharaka”. The Sukuk certificate shall have endorsed on it a guarantee of redemption 
upon maturity for market value by the originator on behalf of the government of 
federation.368 This arrangement would not be as smooth in hard minerals given the current 
policy governing the sector.  
 
In Nigeria, the 2009 National Policy on Minerals and Metals which operationalize the 
Mineral and Mining Act, 2007 has introduced a change to investment policy in the sector. 
Essentially, it aimed at reducing state involvement to merely regulatory function and 
allowing private hands to take lead in mining operation.369 Although this policy could have 
some implications on Sukuk issuance, the government can play an effective role through its 
administrative and regulatory powers, by creating enabling environment for private 
companies both domestic and foreign to develop the abundant mineral resources lying 
underneath its land. 
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As already noted, the mining legislations provide that, the minister of mines and steel shall 
have powers to administer the provisions of the Act to achieve development of the sector, and 
that Mining Cadastre Office shall have power to grant permit and license to applicants. The 
Cadastre Office may grant to successful applicants a lease for a term ranging from 5years for 
quarry lease to 25 years for mining lease. Leaseholders in each case would have beneficial 
ownership of the land covered by the lease, which legally entitles them to pass equitable 
ownership to others while the legal ownership is retained by the government of the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria, to whom the asset would revolve back after the expiration of the head 
lease. Now, during the pendency of the mineral concession, a resource company beneficiary 
of the concession can validly raise funds from other investment partners through Sukuk for 
purpose of efficient and speedy development of the mineral resources, in which case, the 
original lessee becomes the originator of the Sukuk. 
 
 As preceded, one important characteristic of energy Sukuk as per legislation of many 
jurisdictions in the world (including Nigeria), is that Energy Company cannot transfer any 
physical part of the land; however, there ownership of the underlying asset (minerals) is 
absolute, as ownership in law is characterized by the right to usus-fructus-abuses (right to 
use, explore and dispose), and it all exist to the holders of mining right. Thus, any issuance of 
Sukuk can validly confer upon Sukuk holder the ownership of the usufruct (i.e. the product of 
the asset) of the land, extracting and selling of the minerals in this case.  
 
One of the ideal structures for such arrangements is “Wakala” or Ijara model, which means 
product management contract.  In Turkey Energy Sukuk of 2015, where a Sukuk certificate of 
TRY 100 million was issued, the originator, Zorlu Energy could only transfer to the investor, 
Turkey Participation Bank, mere energy (electricity) production and sale rather than any 
physical asset. Moreover, due to technical know-how of the business, the former acted as an 
agent for the latter under “Wakala” (management agency) contract.370 With the foregoing in 
mind, the ideal structure for Nigeria‟s extractive industry is either Sukuk Manfa‟a-Ijarah or 
Wakala. The figure below is a proposed corporate Sukuk structured on Ijara model: 
 
                                                          
370Deloitte, „Corporate Sukuk: Building the Ecosystem to finance Sustainable Infrastructure‟(2016), Deloitte 
Islamic Finance Insight Services,  PP. 21-23 
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Figure 4:5 Proposed Corporate Sukuk in the Solid Mineral sector 
 
Above sukuk is structured on Ijara model (leasehold). Multinational Corporation, a private 
enterprise and a holder of mining right over a mineral fields in Africa, is the originator, based 
on a lease agreement (lease no. 1) which is normally long (say 20 years) passes the beneficial 
ownership of the designated resource area to the SPV, which is the issuer of the Sukuk, the 
issuer then issues out certificates of equal value each  representing undivided beneficial 
ownership in the investment asset (mineral resources) to investors in exchange for indexed 
price which put together equivalent to total amount required for developing the resource land 
concerned. The SPV will collect and collate the proceeds of the Sukuk issuance in a pool of 
investment fund designed for that purpose and then transfer them to the multinational 
corporation in accordance with terms of a lease (Ijara) contract already concluded between 
the two, and the asset is now in the custody of the SPV holding it in trust for the Sukuk 
holders.  
 
By way of a lease-back arrangement (shorter than the lease no.1 say 5 years), the SPV will 
now release the asset to the originator company, the latter being independent legal entity with 
technical expertise in resource development, shall use the funds to undertake operations on 
the field; extract and sale minerals so extracted, and pay rent on the lease to the SPV, who 
will then distribute to the respective investors (Sukuk holders) according to periodic profit 
percentage stated in the Sukuk contract and endorsed on the certificate thereof. Upon 
expiration of lease no. 2 which is also referred to as “maturity of the Sukuk”, the originator 
shall, according to guarantee agreement furnished by the issuing authority at the issuance, 
terminate the main contract (lease no. 1) and redeem the asset by paying the original price 
paid by the sukuk holders. Under normal circumstances, the originator executes a guarantee 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Multinational Corporation 
(Originator) 
 
Commercial 
Bank of 
Industries 
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agreement assuring the SPV of redeeming the Sukuk upon maturity. Consequent upon this, 
the issuer signs a guarantee to pay back in favour of the Sukuk holders. The guarantee serves 
as investor protection in addition to right of recourse to the underlying asset in the event of 
insolvency. Below is the hierarchical structure of how the guarantee looks like. 
 
 
Figure 5:5 Proposed guarantees structure for sukuk in the mining sector  
 
5.5. Conclusions on the potential structure of sukuk for the mining sector in Nigeria 
 
This chapter has explored the ethical principles that underpin Sukuk investment alongside the 
potentials of Islamic bonds for mining and development. The chapter highlighted that, apart 
from being alternative source of finance for funding infrastructure and natural resource 
development, Sukuk creates opportunities for inclusion as it is a multi-stakeholder 
instrument. However, the use of this instrument in a country characterised with legal diversity 
like Nigeria, requires a comprehensive regulatory framework. The framework must combine 
between Shari‟ah governance (ethical considerations) and conventional financial and 
investment requirements. Although, the chapter has shown that, such a framework can be 
standing alone or a part of an existing one, yet it is important to that, legislative effort is made 
to ensure the ethical principles of Sukuk are preserved.  
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Fundamental ethics of Islamic finance necessary to consider in the framework have been 
highlighted in this chapter. Prohibition on riba dictates that Sukuk transaction must be based 
on the principles of loss and profit sharing and devoid of interest. Hence, the investment 
arrangement must consider Sukuk holders as co-owners of the subject-matter(asset) and not 
merely lenders. Thus, the framework must stipulate requirement of an asset. Furthermore, as 
regards extractive industry, no company shall be qualified to issue Sukuk until and unless 
they have reached a threshold of certainty as to availability of the source in commercial 
quantity. Therefore, corporations holding reconnaissance permit might not be eligible for 
Sukuk due to uncertainty associated with the asset they hold, regardless of results of the 
seismic analysis, as it is not always a conclusive proof. In addition, there must be provisions 
for Shari‟ah committee and technical SPV in the framework. 
 
The frameworks developed as part of this chapter reflect the reality that innovations in ethical 
and Islamic finance are challenging assumptions about how Sukuk should operate. A key 
emphasis of the model is creating an asset-backed structure through which investors are 
effectively co-owners of capital assets utilised in the production of profits. In the case of the 
mining sector this is the mine itself, which gives investors recourse through of land titles, and 
thereby through which land rights which can be exchanged in the event of default on 
agreements by the investment company. In contrast to the asset-based investments, where 
investors have no access to ownership of physical assets and therefore little security in the 
event of a default by the investment company. As a result, this can undermine investment and 
even create greater risk.  
 
Alongside ethical principles of Sukuk, an ideal framework must reflect certain elements 
essential for conventional business environment. This include tax relief, ease of 
documentation and dispute resolution mechanism. Some legal and practical issues that could 
hinder smooth issuance of Sukuk discussed ware limitation of trustees; requirement to obtain 
written consent before valid transfer of any title; and lack of judicial infrastructure. Even 
though, Nigeria has recorded one issuance, yet, the legal infrastructure is not fully developed 
as to support smooth subsequent issuances of higher volume, particularly in the corporate 
sector like mining. Graphical example of corporate Sukuk structure for extractive companies, 
which will require robust legal frameworks have been discussed in this chapter. In the next 
chapter, some three more developed jurisdictions would be studied to provide example of 
best international practices that Nigeria can follow.                                                    
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6. Chapter Six: Case Studies on sukuk issuance, policy and regulation from Malaysia, 
the United Arab Emirates and the United Kingdom 
 
Introduction 
This chapter looks at the legal approaches adopted by Malaysia, that of the UAE and that of 
the UK to facilitate Sukuk investment. These three distinct countries have achieved 
considerable progress in their practices, albeit with varying legal history and trajectories. This 
chapter would discuss each of the approaches and the legal system underlying it, with the 
overall aim to evaluating which could be the most suitable for Nigeria to adopt. While 
Malaysia is a pluralistic country with a long standing connection with both Islamic and 
English law, UAE is an Arab country with a legal system historically dominated by 
traditional Islamic law, which came to embrace secular commercial law in the wake of the 
modern economic exigencies. In contrast, UK provides an example of secular state based on 
pure common law jurisdiction that creates a space for Islamic financial practices for 
inclusion. Beyond finance, UK model of mining law provides some lessons for Nigeria. 
 
6.1.  Malaysian as Pluralistic Islamic Sukuk model 
 
The objective of this chapter is to explore Malaysia‟s investment approach from legal point of 
view; specifically; its approach to Sukuk investment, what legal instruments and government 
bodies regulate ethical bonds and the conduct of the financial market as well as impact of all 
this on development. Given the strong presence of pluralism in its legal system couple with 
Malaysia‟s classic value as the leading hub for Islamic finance globally, an inspiring model 
has to emerge therefrom. 
 
6.1.1. Regulatory Framework 
 
In Malaysia, Sukuk transactions are mainly regulated by three statutory bodies. Securities 
Commission (SC) is the patriarch of all financial instruments including both Sukuk and 
traditional bonds, the body is charged with overall supervision of Sukuk transaction to ensure 
compliance with Shari‟ah standard as well as Malaysian laws and other international 
regulations. Accordingly, it produces guidelines to provide necessary description and 
prescription of what the Islamic bonds needs to abide by. The Guidelines on the Offering of 
Asset-backed Securities, 2004 was issued in this regard. Bursa Malaysia provides national 
and international platform for marketing the products, it is one of the most vibrant capital 
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markets for Islamic securities world-wide.371 Yet, strong objection has been raised in 
reference to certain transactions floated on this platform for being incongruous with Islamic 
legal principles. The subject matter of this controversy includes trading murabaha receivables 
on the secondary market, which is illegal by many scholars from outside Malaysia.372 The last 
but not the least of the governing bodies is the Labuan Offshore Financial Services Authority 
(LOFSA). Capital Market Service Act (CMSA), 2007 is the principal statute governing the 
conduct of all financial stock operations in Malaysia. This approach suggests active official 
participation in the regulation of Sukuk affairs in Malaysia, where authorities provide formal 
safeguard to not only state laws but also ethical principles governing Sukuk-bonds, so much 
so that any significant infraction is checked by the Shari‟ah Advisory Council (SAC), a unit 
under the SC.373 
 
In addition to the domestic regulatory framework, there is a set of international financial 
regulations that also apply to Sukuk transaction in Malaysia. Although, some of these 
regulatory standards were adopted voluntarily to consolidate the locally provided ethical 
standard, yet others are mandatory international standard proceeded from the World Bank. 
These regulations include, inter alia, the International Islamic Financial Market (IIFM) 
Standards (the World Bank). Objectives and principles of the International Organisation of 
Securities Commission (IOSC) as well as the guidelines of the International Financial 
Services Board (IFSB) were incorporated into national guidelines for effective governance 
and smooth conduct of financial market generally. With regards to Islamic bonds specifically 
however, the Shari‟ah standards for Sukuk issued by Accounting and Auditing Organisation 
of Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI) has been substantially used in shaping the 
domestic guidelines. This smooth convergence of laws to govern a subject-matter of the same 
transaction has been attributed to pluralistic nature of Malaysian approach. 
 
 
 
                                                          
371
 Asma Hakimah A and Ruzian Markom, „Sukuk Murabaha Under Malaysian Plural Legal System‟ (2018), 
Earth and Environmental Science 175 PP. 1-6 
372
 ND Miller, J Challoner, A. Atta, „UK Welcomes the Sukuk-How the UK Finance Bill should Stimulate 
Islamic Finance in London, Much to the Delight of the City‟s Banks‟ (2007) International Financial Law 
Review, Vol. 26 PP. 24-25 
373
 Zulkifli Hasan, „Regulatory Framework of Shari‟ah Governance System in Malaysia, GCC Countries and the 
UK‟ (3-2 March-2010), Kyota Bulletin of Islamic Area Studies, PP.82-115 at PP. 103-104 
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6.1.2. Pluralism and the Position of Islamic Law within the Malaysian Legal System 
 
According to documented literature, presence of Islamic law in the South East Asian 
peninsula, which includes Malaysia, dated back to late 12th century, a period characterized by 
active commercial relationship between Muslim Arab traders and the people living on the 
coastal cities of the area. By 13th century, Islam was firmly established (in the area to become 
Malaysia) with Malay Sultans presiding over administration of justice substantially in 
accordance with the Shari‟ah. From then on, local norms and Shari‟ah continued to be the 
only source of law for over three hundred years that followed. By the arrival of European 
merchants in 15th -16th century and consequent prevalence of British influence however, 
common law was made to govern major affairs of the state, the case is not different even with 
regards to some parts of present Malaysia where the colonial power had ruled indirectly 
through the Sultanates as they were allowed to establish Islamic courts with jurisdictions 
limited to Muslim personal matters only.374  
 
Although, the English law penetrated significant part of the colony, it did relatively recognize 
the relevance of other legal system, in a restricted sphere though. Even though it is true that, 
the British Enactment of 1918 aimed at systematic displacement and relegation of the Islamic 
and Malaysian Customary law, nonetheless it is equally plausible to argue that, that 
arrangement is itself an obvious mark of legal pluralism. The colonial legislation famously 
known a “Court Enactment of 1918” created six grades of courts: The Supreme Court, 
Magistrate 1st class and 2nd class, Qadi Court and Assistant Qadi Court, and Penghulu 
(village Islamic head) Court. This pluralist feature continued to characterize the state of 
Malay, and of course all issues arising out of matters that constituted British interest such as 
commercial disputes had always fallen within the jurisdiction of common law throughout the 
colonial era.375 
 
Although, by 1963 the entire area of Malay under colonial subjugation and present-day 
Singapore had become fully self-governed and together formed the state of Malaysia,376 the 
                                                          
374 Farid S. Shuaib, „The Islamic Legal System in Malaysia‟ (2012), Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal, Vol. 21, 
No.1, PP. 86-113   
375
 Ibid 
376 By 1957 only eleven out of thirteen states of today‟s Malaysia had gained independence. Sabah and Sarawak 
as well as to become Singapore were not released from European domination until 1963. Singapore broke out 
Later on in 1965. The remaining units of Malay formed the present-day Malaysia with thirteen distinct states 
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legal system remained the same pretty much as before in terms of pluralism. No doubt that, 
upon independence a new federated state had emerged. Essentially, the structure comprised 
of thirteen states and federal territories. Even though, the common law oriented federal courts 
in the central territories have nation-wide jurisdiction, the constitution accorded each state 
with the legislative freedom to make divergent substantive laws and to establish courts for 
administration of justice as they deem suitable for their respective areas.  
 
Furthermore, the appellate powers of the federal courts over the decisions of states‟ courts, 
which was originally created by the British imperialist in order to provide judicial checks 
against any possible interpretation of Islamic and Malay customary law that might run 
contrary to English concept of justice, was retained intact. In effect, efforts made by the state 
assemblies to broaden the application of Islamic law within their respective borders, had been 
severely hampered by the powers of the federal courts to interfere judicially. However, the 
law reform of 1988 has dismantled the appellate powers of the federal courts over shari‟ah 
courts of the states, and thereby accorded some sort of judicial autonomy to the states,377 a 
situation akin to what obtains in the United States of America.378  
 
It is expedient to note here that, even though various states may make laws-including Islamic 
and Malay Customary law (adat)- distinct from one another for good governance of their 
respective domains, that must be exercised in keeping with the powers of state to make law as 
determined and allocated within the purview of the legislative list provided under the 
constitution. For example, legislation on matters of national interest meant to have 
nationwide uniform application, such as investment, banking and finance, lies with only the 
federal government as this fall under “exclusive legislative list”. Flowing organically from 
this position is that, as noted herein above, federal laws are dominated by English common 
law and statutes, in fact, Malaysia‟s federal law is often described as “secular law”, and 
therefore law governing financial transactions are eventually “secular”. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
and three federal territories, namely: Kuala Lumpur, Putrajaya and Labuan. Later on, this became the capital 
city with twelve territories (not states) directly administered by the federal government.   
377 Farid S. Shuaib, „The Islamic Legal System in Malaysia‟ (2012), PP. 86-113 
378 In the USA, the federalism arrangement allowed some states to have their own constitution, supreme court 
and resource control. Thus, arguably, they are autonomous economic, judicial and political entities within 
America. 
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6.1.3. Legal Framework for Islamic Finance 
 
Given the growth of Islamic finance industry globally and the critical role of Malaysia as a 
country, Islamic finance has come to be seen as a “national interest” and hence the national 
government felt the need to regulate it. Accordingly, Federal Courts begun to interpret and 
administer statutes that pertain to, and any disputes arising from financial as well as 
investment transaction in the spirit of Islamic law. It is possible to argue that, this has further 
consolidated the presence of legal pluralism in financial law at federal level. At any rate, this 
pluralism offers opportunity in the system for „exploring a myriad of ways that overlap legal 
systems to interact with each other, and at time creates opening for contestation, resistance 
and creative adoption. This is the creativity for the regulator in a country to create a positive 
interaction between the legal systems to facilitate the transaction process.‟379 
 
Among other possible factors, the presence of advanced regulatory infrastructure has made 
Malaysia to be the most vibrant global hub for Islamic securities. Seven out of the fourteen 
Sukuk standards and structures approved by AAOIFI, have been repeatedly structured, issued 
and traded in Malaysia with a ground-breaking success. Those that have not been tested yet in 
Malaysia include salam and istithna among others. Reasons advanced for shunning this kind 
of Sukuk were to do with their structure which render them impermissible to be traded in the 
secondary market and therefore business-wise counterproductive to engage in issuing them. 
This is again the same reason for which murabaha Sukuk has become controversial. 
Although, Malaysian scholars used to promote its legality based on maslaha (public interest), 
which is to facilitate the growth of Malaysian capital market that position seems to have been 
vacated, as evidence shows that, presence of murabaha-base receivables on Malaysian Bursa, 
has been on drastic decline.380  
 
The basis upon which Malaysia allowed the practice of trading the so-called unorthodox 
Sukuk is rooted in their scholarly argument that has run contrary to the opinion and viewpoint 
of other Islamic jurists from the mainstream Sukuk jurisdictions like GCC. The pros and cons 
of this debate has already been discussed in chapter four. What needs to be highlighted here 
is however that, the decline in issuance and trading of instruments structured on debt-bearing 
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contracts in Malaysia, is not to be taken to mean a sudden compromise of legal opinion by 
Malay jurists; but rather it is a juristic concession arising out of general consensus of the key 
global Sukuk players under the auspices of the Islamic International Financial Market(IIFM). 
The fundamental objective of IIFM has been to bridge the existing gap between various 
markets by providing a platform to trade instruments acceptable to all members.381  
 
The emergence of these two international institutions is an unequivocal acknowledgment of 
the need to globalise the activities of Islamic finance industry, provide an international 
umbrella with legal mandate to issue guidelines and set up standards for all markets, thereby 
bringing the practice of Sukuk structuring, issuing and trading into global uniformity. One 
could glean this from the principal objectives of the bodies. The governor of Negara once 
summed up IFSB‟s objective as „To set prudential standard for Islamic Financial Institutions, 
and to bring harmonization of these standards across countries to ensure the soundness, 
stability, integrity and confidence in the Islamic financial institutions‟ 382.  
 
Given the fact that, controversy within the industry is mostly generated by failure to comply 
with the principles of Shari‟ah that are supposed to govern the ethical nature of its 
transactions, the question here is whether IIFM and world bank‟s IFSB would be concerned 
with issues to do with compliance in this regard. This question is important because if the duo 
is not concerned with issue of ethical governance, which is the main point of divergence 
between markets, how then it is possible or the agenda of converging the global Sukuk 
transactions within the remit of one single market to succeed. The paradox of this is that, in 
this case, it will be very much unlikely for those agencies to achieve their fundamental 
objectives, the very essence of their creation i.e. to bridge the gap between markets by 
remove controversies.  
In addition, if the answer to the question turns out to be otherwise affirmative, then the 
functions of these institutions could give rise to a similar controversial scenario if not worst. 
Because the sovereign powers of states to regulate financial activities through their respective 
central banks will be eventually, tempered with by international agencies. The implication of 
this scenario on the future of the industry could be enormous, as perhaps participating states 
                                                          
381 Asiamoney, Interview with Abdul Rais Abdul Majid,  the CEO of IIFM (August, 2002), Pg. 5. As of this 
date, the CEO confirmed that, only five countries: Malaysia, Brunei, Indonesia, Bahrain and Sudan were 
members. Alongside these states, some institutions including Islamic Development Bank, Kuwait Finance 
House, Islamic Bank of Abu Dhabi among others have subscribed to the IIFM. 
382 Anonymous, How Malaysia Approaches Islamic Finance, Asiamoney: London, Vol. 13, Issue 7 (Aug 2002), 
Pg. 4 
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may not see it as a precursor to a conflict of law situation only but might also operate to 
discourage active jurisdictions from subscribing to the membership of those institutions. This 
potential danger has been the reason behind the decision of other multinational organisations 
with even more robust mandate not to engage in making conflating regulations with member 
states. For example, WTO has declined to regulate environmental issues associated with trade 
due to fear of backlash that could result from it, especially when states get to perceive that 
their sovereignty is somehow threatened.  Obviously, answer to this question is either way 
paradoxical, even though it is more problematic in the second scenario.  
 
Accordingly, both IIFM and IFSB have made it clear that, issues pertaining to compliance 
either concerning conventional regulations or ethical governance do not form part of IIFM 
and IFSB mandate, international bodies recognised those issues as a matter that falls within 
the regulatory powers of individual state. Nevertheless, beyond the theoretical and practical 
challenges characterizing the task of international standard setters, this position ultimately 
indicates how crucial it is for the states to provide for effective regulatory framework in order 
to achieve compliance, a necessary ingredient for harmony and growth, both at local and 
global levels. 
 
Furthermore, situating both IIFM and IFSB in Malaysia would buttress the point made earlier 
that, the robust regulatory infrastructure created by the state has rendered this jurisdiction so 
attractive to the modern Islamic capital market, so much, so that it is possible to argue that, 
Malaysia is the de facto global headquarters. Having said that, it is worthwhile to look at the 
structural composition of Malaysian legal framework for Islamic investment instruments. 
 
6.1.4. Regulatory bodies 
 
The strength of Malaysian regulatory structure lies in the presence of multi-layer team of 
Shari‟ah experts in order to ensure thorough compliance with ethical requirements of Sukuk. 
A department of Shari‟ah committee has been created within both the Central Bank, Negara, 
and the Securities Commission. The practical implication of this is that, any sovereign sukuk 
structured by the Debt Management Office must be scrutinized by the Shari‟ah committee 
unit of the central bank to ensure compliance and then be investigated once again by the 
panel of jurists at the commission. In case of corporate issuance, the Shari‟ah committee 
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within SPV shall oversee the structure before it goes to Securities Commission for yet 
another legal search before listing. Whether structured as sovereign or corporate, Islamic 
securities would have to be checked at least twice by Shari‟ah committee.383 This multi-scaler 
legal check-up create investor confidence in the system. In addition, there is specific 
legislation or guidelines directed to each of the strategic regulators to administer. Below 
diagram shows each body with the relevant legislation(s) and guidelines.    
 
Figure 1:6 Institutional regulation of Islamic finance in Malaysia  
As far back as 1958, legislations in Malaysia have laid foundation for regulating financial and 
commercial transactions based on Islamic principles. Section 16B (1) of the Central Bank Act 
1958 provides: 
 
The Bank may establish a Syariah Advisory Council, which shall be the authority for 
the ascertainment of Islamic law for the purposes of Islamic banking business, takaful 
business, Islamic financial business, Islamic development financial business, or any 
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 This remarkable arrangement of building the legal mechanism within the financial system of the state hardly 
obtained elsewhere throughout the countries of the world where Islamic commercial practices exist. In fact, one 
of the warnings issued by the famous Bahrain based standard setter, AAIOFI, was that, Shari‟ah Supervisory 
Boards should expand their oversight function to cover not only the stage of structuring and issuance but also 
the way funds are invested must be Shari‟ah compliant. For more on this point, see Faisal Hijazi, Global Sukuk 
Issuance: 2008 Slowdown Mainly Due to Credit Crisis, But Some Impact from Shari‟ah Compliance Issues 
(2009) Special Report of International Structured Finance (21st January, 2009).  
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other business, which is based on Syariah principles and is supervised and regulated 
by the Bank. 
 
Under subsections 4-7 of the same section of the Act, functions of the Shari‟ah Advisory 
Council have been spelled out to include ascertaining the position of Islamic law pertaining to 
any matter referred to it by the central bank itself or any other financial body in the country. 
Additionally, in cases to do with commercial transaction, courts of law may seek expert 
opinion from the council and deciding such disputes the court is bound to take into 
consideration any written opinion of the council. The Central Bank Act 1958 has therefore 
been the first legislation to govern Islamic financial activities in Malaysia. From the general 
wordings of s. 16B one can confidently gather that, Shari‟ah oriented financial bodies such as 
takaful and banking have been in existence, to some extent, since 1958. The Act was however 
amended in 2009 to expand and accord more weight and authority to the functions of the 
Shari‟ah Advisory Council.  
 
By section 58 of the Act (as amended), ruling of the council shall prevail any ruling or 
opinion on Islamic tractions made by other bodies within or outside the country. In 1983 
however, full fledge Islamic banking was introduced by the Islamic Banking Act of 1983. 
Although, the Act has established the Islamic Bank of Malaysia and subsequently many other 
similar banks, there was no separate Shari‟ah Advisory Council created. Rather, section 13A 
of the Act directed all Islamic financial institutions and other conventional bodies with kind 
of Islamic window to resort to the main Advisory council already established under section 
16B of the Central Bank Act. Furthermore, any advice rendered by the council is binding on 
any such institution that sought for it.  
 
Besides setting up full-blown Islamic financial authority in Malaysia, the main distinction of 
the Islamic Banking Act 1983 is bringing the key legislations of the country into recognising 
Islamic financial institution as distinct legal entities. Instances of this are found in amendment 
to section 59 of the Banking Act 1973 and section 4 of the Companies Act 1965. Yet, as far 
as Sukuk is concerned, the first comprehensive enactment in Malaysia was the Capital 
Market and Services Act 2007 (Act 671). Division 6 of the Act was dedicated to Islamic 
securities. Section 316 (1) states to whom the division applies. It states, „This Division 
applies to a person who proposes to make available, offer for subscription or purchase, or 
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issue an invitation to subscribe for or purchase, Islamic securities.‟ Thus, it regulates both 
private and sovereign issuance.  
 
Under section 377, the Act empowered Malaysian Security Commission to make guidelines 
for the conduct of Sukuk transaction, and accordingly, a comprehensive guideline containing 
rights and duties of all parties to Islamic bond has been issued out in 2007. Although, there is 
Shari‟ah Advisory Council established under the central bank, the Capital Market Act has 
created another well-composed Shari‟ah Advisory Council, with authority to regulate the 
conduct of business on the platform of Bursa Malaysia. In order to appreciate how 
comprehensive is the function of this council, section 316B is provided hereunder: 
 
The Shariah Advisory Council shall have the following functions: 
 
(a) to ascertain the application of Shariah principles on any matter pertaining to 
Islamic capital market business or transaction and issue a ruling upon reference 
made to it in accordance with this Division; 
 
(b) to advise the Commission on any Shariah issue relating to Islamic capital market 
business or transaction; 
 
(c) to provide advice to any person on any Shariah issue relating to Islamic capital 
market business or transaction; and 
 
(d) such other functions as may be prescribed by the Minister. 
 
6.1.5. Dispute Resolution Mechanism 
 
The main objective of a legal framework is to promote investment by creating certainty for 
investor through minimising room for defaults. Default, which is violation of any contractual 
obligation by either party, mainly failure of the Sukuk issuer to meet their payment 
obligations, has the tendency of undermining market‟s confidence on Sukuk investment in 
the jurisdiction where it occurs frequently.384 Hence, to boost investor confidence and attract 
more investment countries must devise comprehensive legal regime that creates greater 
certainty for both issuer and investor by upholding sanctity of contractual commitments in 
                                                          
384 Hafiz Ab Majid, Shahida Shahimi and Mohd Hafizuddin Syah Bangaan Abdullah, „Sukuk Defaults and its 
Implication: A Case Study of Malaysian Capital Market‟(2011), a conference paper presented at the 8th 
International Conference on Islamic Economics and Finance hosted by the Centre for Islamic Economics and 
Finance, Qatar Faculty of Islamic Studies, Qatar Foundation (paper in file with the author) Pg. 1 
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Islamic commercial transactions.385 This kind of legal infrastructure generates confidence as 
it provides for well-defined rights and duties of the parties with clarity aiming to reduce legal 
issues that could potentially degenerate into court cases.  
 
Furthermore, to produce greater protection for the investor a framework must contain clear 
provisions covering the parties in default cases. “Certainty with regard to the post-default 
process in Sukuk transaction is necessary because the risk for a default exist in all types of 
transactions. Even the most prudently structured products can fail due to circumstances 
outside investors‟ control.” 386 For example, in Malaysia (one of the most developed and 
sophisticated jurisdictions), data from empirical study indicates that, between the period of 
1997-2009 there was at least one case of default in almost every single year.387 Similarly, 
there were defaults elsewhere. What is important however is to understand the factors 
underlying failure in those commercial transactions? In addition, even more important from 
investors‟ perspective, what forums are there to provide remedy in such a circumstance?  The 
default in Sukuk transactions across the Islamic finance industry highlights the need for a 
robust legal framework that addresses both questions.  
 
In Malaysia, the mainstream courts, which decide conventional financial disputes, determine 
cases arising from Islamic commercial transactions. The problem with this approach is that, 
both the judges and the rules governing the proceedings are of English legal orientation, 
while maters on Islamic finance require some acquaintance with Islamic commercial law as 
essential elements of Islamic finance products originate from the ethical principles of 
Shari‟ah. The result of this incompatibility challenge would be a failure to have coherent 
judicial outcome, parties might obtain varying judgements even where their cases bear 
similar facts. Situation as such raises alarm of uncertainty and weakness in investors‟ 
protection mechanism of a state. For example, in the case Arab Malaysian Merchants Bank 
Berhad v Silver Concept, the claimant brought a case of default to fulfil payment obligation 
arising out of contract of purchase with deferred payment, otherwise known as Bay Bithaman 
Ajil (BBA) before a high court in Malaysia, asking for an order of foreclosure. Upholding 
validity of the said contract, the court granted the relief sought. However, in Bank Islam 
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Malaysia v Lim Kok, yet another case of breach of BBA contract asking for same relief 
before a different high court in Malaysia, the court rejected the claim on the grounds that, the 
contract (BBA) itself was structurally invalid under Islamic law and therefore 
unenforceable.388 Inconsistent outcome of judicial proceedings makes up negative 
perceptions of the framework and has the tendency to undermine investors‟ confidence. 
 
To address the issue of conflicting judicial pronouncements on matters relating to Islamic 
finance, Malaysia made some reforms to its existing framework. IFSA 2013 provided for a 
central authority with powers to make final verdicts on Legality or otherwise of any aspect of 
Islamic finance. Section 16B of the Act declares that, opinion of Shari‟ah Advisory Council 
(SAC) of the Central Bank of Malaysia on Islamic finance is not only a final say but has a 
legal force binding upon all institutions including courts of law. By implication, no judicial 
authority has the power to contradict a verdict of SAC with reference to permissibility or 
proscription of a product or structure of any transaction to do with Islamic finance in 
Malaysia. In effect, court decision such as that of Bank Islam Malaysia v Lim Kok H and 
Others would be a nullity if the court were to make them after the reform of 2013. Scholars 
celebrated IFSA widely for the broad and remarkable change it has brought into Malaysia‟s 
finance industry: it has unified Malaysia‟s position on substantive principles of Shari‟ah 
governing the industry thereby saving the country from albeit fragmented juristic views. 
 
However, IFSA does not solve all the problems as it only relates to substantive Islamic 
financial law and not rules of procedure. SAC would make guidelines on what is valid in 
terms of form and substance of commercial transaction such as murabaha, BBA and the like, 
but it does not provide for technical issues such as rules of court. There is growing concern 
that, relieves granted by common law courts in Malaysia are not compatible with Islamic 
finance.389 Relieves such as order of foreclosure, rebate and award of interest on judgement 
debt all originated from European law and therefore not suitable for Islamic finance. Yet, the 
courts have always rejected this contention and held that grant of those relieves were justified 
by the circumstances of the cases, that particulars of those cases have satisfied all grounds 
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warranting the grant of those relieves under section 256 of National Land Code (NLC) of 
Malaysia as well as O. 83 of the High Court Rules 1980.390 
 
It emerges from the position of the court that, to tackle the friction between the judicial 
approach and the Islamic financial products in Malaysia, there is need for reform beyond 
section 16 B of IFSA 2013. A reform that aims to create a dispute resolution mechanism 
compatible with Islamic finance in both substantive and adjectival law. There are two ways to 
achieve his objective in Malaysia. Having already created a national legal instrument for 
unification of opinion on substantive Islamic principles recognized by conventional courts, 
the country could simply make some amendment to the rules of court where necessary to 
bring it into conformity with Islamic finance. The alternative is to create a separate forum 
dedicated for resolution of Islamic finance dispute.  
 
However, literature indicates that, Malaysia seems to have tilted towards the first option. 
Efforts evolve to harmonise civil rules of court and Islamic law. The first such effort being 
the amendment of O. 2 R. 12(a) 2012, which allows for award of “ta‟awidh” in matters 
related to Islamic finance instead of “interest” awarded in conventional finance on judgement 
debt to compensate for loss that might have been incurred by the judgement creditor due to 
passage of time.391 Despite absence of ideal judicial infrastructure dedicated to Islamic 
finance wholesale, Malaysian system remains to be one of the most developed and enviable 
in the global Islamic financial landscape for two reasons. The conflict and fast-evolving 
relationship between its conventional court system and Islamic finance industry is one, and 
remarkable characteristics of the framework aiming at forestalling minor issues before they 
geminate into commercial chaos. 
 
Rating of bond issuer has been a credible tool used internationally as a precautionary measure 
that helps to perceive a potential default in the timeline of a deal before it becomes a reality. 
Strong framework for Sukuk must contain a requirement for rating to provide enough 
information for investors with view to protecting them against a creeping default. Regulations 
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in Malaysia always requires rating of all debt securities including Sukuk issues by approved 
rating agencies.392 
 
In addition, the bunch of coherent substantive principles of Islamic law substantially 
presented in forms of guidelines and legislations with nation-wide application would 
strengthen the knowledge base of the public and promote credibility of the system. The fact 
that, “issuers have to abide by similar standards, guidelines and laws that govern both Sukuk 
and conventional bonds increases investor confidence.”393 Although there were cases of 
default in Malaysia‟s Islamic capital market, that does not affect it considerably at local level. 
Because fatwa has been centralised to SAC, there is strict supervision to minimise events of 
non-compliance and importantly presence of centralised juristic opinion on Islamic finance 
ensures consistency and predictability in the domestic market.394 In contrast, the issue of 
Shari‟ah non-compliance has been identified as one of the principal factors underpinning 
default in Sukuk market of other leading jurisdictions of the GGC countries as may be seen in 
the next case study. 
 
6.2. United Arab Emirate (UAE): Traditionalist Islamic Sukuk Model 
 
UAE395 is a member of Gulf Corporation Council (GCC), a bloc regarded as the engine room 
and birth place of Islamic finance. GCC is consist of leading countries like Bahrain where 
strategic international regulators such as AAOIFI are based, and Saudi Arabia, the 
acknowledged mother of Islamic finance. However, UAE occupies an equally important 
position in Islamic finance industry, the capital market in particular. Sukuk represent 16.7% 
of the total Islamic financial assets in the emirate as compare to 11.4% in Saudi Arabia.396 
Dubai financial centre provides international platform for Sukuk transaction in the region. 
Reports of International Islamic Financial Market (IIFM) indicates that, UAE accounts for 
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8.09% of the total international issuance.397 Thus, UAE is the leading hub for Islamic bonds 
within the GCC.  
 
The formation of UAE was largely driven by economic reason. Although, since pre-modern 
history of Arabia, there had always been common factors to do with familial connection, 
culture and religion that kept their social fabric together, that has given way in the face of 
political tensions. The structure of leadership was purely based upon tribal arrangement 
rather than a defined system. “Initially the UAE represented a tribal hierarchy with the 
political structure subject to the authority of ruling sheikhs.” Each emirate was (and still is) 
headed by a chief, and consequently strife and hostility, typical of rural area, characterized 
the relationship among the emirates till nineteenth century. However, following the discovery 
of oil minerals and gas resources all over the emirates in 1960s, the need for the Trucial states 
to form a united and formidable federation with progressive investment policy became 
critical. Accordingly, a conglomerate of seven emirates gave birth to a federal state under 
UAE Constitution of 1971. Further, given the experience of financial crisis of 1970s and the 
growing uncertainty in the global oil market, Dubai lunched an investment policy in 1980 
with the central objective being to reduce dependence on the natural resources.398 
 
Of all the seven emirates that constitute UAE, Dubai appears to be the commercial centre, 
even though Abu Dhabi is the de facto capital city of the federation. Indeed, recent ambitious 
investment approaches of Dubai have achieved for the city a position above its regional and 
even global competitors. The 2019 ranking of global financial cities of the world had the 
Arabian emirate as number 12 out of 102 selected countries, putting above Paris and many 
more cities in the developed nations. Profile wise, Dubai and Abu Dhabi have been rated as 
global, while Boston, Geneva and Melbourne as well as Kuala Lumpur were grouped as 
international. As for other regional competitors like Tel Aviv, Bahrain, Kuwait and Riyadh, 
they were simply graded local.399  
 
Moreover, the international business arena of Dubai presents a distinctive regulatory 
framework seen as a model of attractive market in the modern time. Because, the existence of 
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Dubai global investment hub inside the emirates couple with the smooth functioning of its 
judicial structures within the overall UAE system is an innovative structure indicative of 
successful co-existence of multiple legal systems within a nation state. 
 
6.2.1.UAE Legal System and Dualism in Dubai 
 
Owing to geographical proximity of UAE to Saudi Arabia (immediate neighbour of UAE to 
the west), the early spread of Islam to cities within and around the Arab peninsula did not 
spare the areas that came to be known later as emirates of Southern Coast of Gulf, which was 
then part of Sultanate of Oman. Article 6 of UAE Constitution reiterated this by saying, “The 
Union shall be part of the Great Arab Nation, to which it is bound by the ties of religion, 
language, history and common destiny.” 400 The great Arab Nation here refers to GCC 
countries. Hence, it is no surprise that Islamic law forms the foundation of UAE legal system. 
The 1971 Federal Constitution of the emirates provided for its legal system, although 
theoretically the constitution presupposes uniformity of judicial practice in all the emirates, 
local legislations and regulations of individual emirates practically differ from one another.401 
Nevertheless, recognition of Islam as state religion and Islamic Shari‟a as the source of law is 
rooted in both the federal constitution and judicial practice of the Arab emirates. Article 7 of 
the UAE Constitution provides: “Islam shall be the official religion of the Union. The Islamic 
Shari‟ah shall be a principal source of legislation in the Union.” While, there may be other 
sources of law in the emirates, Islamic law shall have substantial influence in shaping the 
legal system. The phrase “a principal source of legislation” hinted to the supremacy of 
Shari‟ah, but, at the same time, did also uphold the authority of other sources albeit 
implicitly.  
 
The use of indefinite article in the phrase „a principal source of legislation‟, rendered the 
provision of Article 7 of the constitution somewhat controversial. The main controversy 
generated by this hazy framing has been whether, under the UAE legal system as provided by 
the constitution, legislations based upon Shari‟ah were meant to have equal legal status with 
those emanating from other sources of law such as custom and foreign legal principles. The 
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implication of this question is to ascertain whether legal pluralism is envisaged by the 
constitution. This is debatable. Consequently, this provision of the Constitution has divided 
legal scholars in their opinions into two groups. More so, even judicial approaches to the 
issue of supremacy of Shari‟ah varied across different levels of courts within the emirates.402 
One such example was Junatta Bank case, in which the plaintiff bank brought an action to a 
local court in Abu Dhabi asking for repayment of a loan plus interest. The bank pleaded for 
the payment of interest based on articles 61 and 62 of Abu Dhabi Local Law No. 3/1970. Yet, 
the local court rejected the plea for interest on the grounds that, it contradicts the tenets of the 
shari‟ah, which is the main source of law as enshrined under article 7 of the constitution. On 
appeal to the Federal Court of Appeal Abu Dhabi branch, the appeal was dismissed 
upholding the decision of the lower court. This decision was referred to the Supreme Court 
for interpretation.403 
Legal system in the UAE mandated the Supreme Court in exercise of its jurisdiction to 
review decisions of lower courts to comply with Article 75 of the Federal Law No. 10/1973. 
Article 75 provides that, the supreme court shall apply  
The provisions of Islamic Shari‟a, Federal Laws, and other laws in force in the 
member emirates of the federation conforming to the Islamic Shari‟a. Likewise, it 
shall apply those rules of custom and those principles of natural and comparative law 
which do not conflict with the principles of the Shari‟a404 
 
The above provision has been interpreted to mean that, the apex court should check that 
judgements passed by the courts below do not conflict with the principles of Shari‟ah. This is 
because, by mentioning Shari‟a first in order before the other sources and conditioning them 
upon agreement with its principles, Article 75 has envisaged the primacy of Shari‟a over any 
other source of law in the UEA. Another important feature of the legal system in the emirates 
is that, although courts are not so much bound by previous decisions of superior courts in 
contrast to the principle of case law and the doctrine of stare decisis widely applied in 
common law jurisdictions, the supreme court of the UAE has exclusive jurisdiction to resolve 
any question on constitutional interpretation and powers of cassation to review decisions of 
the lower court. Hence, based on these grounds, the case of Junatta Bank among others were 
referred to the Federal Supreme Court for interpretation. The outcome was a resolution of the 
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all legal controversies surrounding Article 7 of the UAE Constitution and other related 
legislative provision. 405  In effect the Supreme Court aptly formulated 3 principles as 
follows: 
 
 (1) That promulgation of laws is the duty of the legislature and at Article 150 of the 
Constitution directed the federal legislature to issue laws to replace legislation which existed 
before the federation, and to regulate matters in detail in accordance with the Constitution's 
purposes and orders;44 that Article 7 of the Constitution is a direction from the Constitution 
to the federal legislature to issue laws and regulations and to have the Islamic Shari'a as a 
main source of such legislation. The speed and the form of such federal legislation especially 
regarding Islamic Shari‟a rules, is a matter of policy which is not for the judiciary to decide. 
 (2) That the laws, regulations, orders and other measures in force at i.e. time when the 
Constitution commenced its operation are saved from application of Article 15145 because of 
the protection extended to them by Article 148 It was obvious from Article 148 and the 
following articles, that the framers of the Constitution have differentiated between two 
categories of legislation. Under the first category comes legislation in force at the time of 
coming into force of the Constitution. This category is granted extension of authority and 
continuation of application by Article 148. The second category encompasses all legislation 
issued subsequent to the coming into force of the Constitution. This category is regulated by 
Articles 149 and 150. The hierarchy of this second category is established by Article 151. 
This second category is subject to review by the Supreme Court to ensure observation of the 
order established by Article 151. Accordingly, all measures of legislations preceding the 
coming into force of the Constitution remain in force and acquire authority from the 
provisions of the Constitution so far as they are not amended or abolished expressly.  
 
There is no excuse for any authority in the country to refrain from observing legislation 
preceding the operation of the Constitution, as they stand, under the cover that some of these 
laws do not conform with the provisions of the Constitution. The reason for the continuation 
of the operation of such legislation is that the Constitution expressly ordered their observation 
and saved them from application of Article 151. Indeed, any abandonment of the application 
of these measures would amount to abandonment of constitutional orders prohibited by 
Article 145. Because of the foregoing, Articles 61 and 62 of the Civil Procedure Code of Abu 
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Dhabi are parts of a law which came into force before commencement of the operation of the 
Constitution, therefore, these two Articles are constitutional according to Article 148 of the 
Constitution. Nothing in Article 8 of Law No. 6/1978 or 75 of Law No. 10/ 1973 - which 
provide for the application of Shari‟ah - affects or removes the constitutional authority 
extended to the two Articles of the Abu Dhabi Law by the Constitution. 
 
 (3) That the purpose of the language used in Article 62 of the Abu Dhabi Civil Procedure 
Code is to establish the maximum allowable rates of interest. Nothing in this or Article 61 
authorises the judges to refrain from enforcing the interest rate agreed by the parties or 
abandon the payment of interest in their judgment. The purpose of establishing maximum 
rates of interest is the protection of debtors from exploitation. Therefore, exceeded in their 
agreements the prescribed limits, it becomes the duty of the judges to decrease the rate of 
interest to conform to the maximum limit prescribed by the Code.406 
 
Above decision of the highest judicial body in the emirates has established certain 
fundamental principles of the UAE legal system. That, the Constitution is supreme, and it is 
above any law and any authority in the state.  This is akin to the notion of the supremacy of 
the Constitution in many modern democratic states, which, many observers viewed as 
conflicting with the tenets of Shari‟a.407 Besides, the interesting part of these principles is 
that, it upholds the provisions of Articles 61 and 62 of Abu Dhabi local legislations, which 
allow payment of interest on debts. This is interesting because it goes to underpin a unique 
feature in UAE legal system. In commercial transactions, UAE compromises a lot of Shari‟ah 
principles in favour of economic freedom, invoking the Islamic principle „necessity dictates 
exception‟ as a legal justification. However, this is not without critics. Critics would question 
the appropriateness of applying such a restricted principle of Islamic law to suspend explicit 
proscription of interest (riba) merely due to present day commercial exigencies. The basis for 
UAE compromise on riba is the need to attract diverse range of investors to create national 
wealth and prosperity.408 Furthermore, the position of the Supreme Court regarding interest 
has been eventually consolidated by subsequent legislations.  
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Federal Law of 1987 removed commercial activities from the class of civil matters to which 
interest was not applicable. Moreover, in 1992 by virtue of the Federal Law No. 11 all 
restrictions on the payment of interest were abolished. Now, pursuant to Law No. 18 of 1993, 
charging interest on commercial loan has become a right of the lender enforceable at law. 
This position could have serious implications on practice of Islamic finance and Sukuk in the 
UEA. Because, payment or receive of interest otherwise known as riba infringes the core of 
ethical principles governing Islamic commercial activities.409 This practice originated from 
conventional finance whose governance framework is rooted in common law, which has 
continued to have incredible influences on the legal system of countries that were once under 
British rule. 
 
Historically, the Trucial state, which later became UAE was never colonised by any foreign 
entity. Nevertheless, there was a long-standing treaty relationship between the central 
command of British colonial administration in Bombay and the Arab rulers of the emirates. 
In 1802, the British and the Arab rulers in charge of commercial routes leading to India via 
the red sea had entered into a truce to guarantee the safety of British interest on transit.410 
Although, the object of the treaty was not to, and did not actually interfere with the internal 
politics of the emirates,411 it is possible to argue that, certain English legal principles 
enshrined in the peace document might have passively found their way into the mainstream 
custom of the area which continued to remain till today. Yet, another reason to suggest this 
possibility somewhat more strongly is the continued presence of Indian merchants with 
English orientation on the coastal city of Dubai since eighteenth century, and usual 
consequence of commercial interactions among diverse groups would include dilution of 
norms and culture. Additionally, the influence of common law on the UAE legal system has 
grown more conspicuously in the aftermath of oil discovery in the emirates in the 1960, 
British and America have ever since then, become the main business partners of the UAE.412  
 
Further, the foregoing might have somehow had influence on the UAE Federal Constitution 
of 1971. Because looking at the general sprit of the constitution, one can presume that, the 
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union intends that, in addition to Islamic law, other legal traditions would form part of its 
overall regulatory framework as may be dictated by economic reality of the modern world. 
The preamble to the constitution states that, the rulers of the seven emirates and their people 
are: 
 
Desiring also to lay the foundations of Union Law in the coming years on a sound 
basis, corresponding with the realities and the capacities of the Emirates at the 
present time, enabling the Union, so far as possible, freely to achieve its goals, 
sustaining the identity of its members where this is not inconsistent with those goals 
and preparing the people of the Union at the same time for a noble and free 
constitutional life, progressing by steps towards a comprehensive, representative, 
democratic regime in an Islamic and Arab society free from fear and anxiety413 
 
Present time reality of the emirates appears to include the need to pursue ambitious projects 
designed by the emirates aiming at building economy, infrastructure and prosperity for the 
citizen. Thus, to realise these national development goals, the sovereign bloc might need to 
open up for the using various legal concepts necessary for wealth creation. Keeping with this 
goal therefore, in addition to custom and economic union ensuring free movement of people 
good and services across the borders of seven member emirates, such concepts of World 
Trade Organisation as the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) treatment as well as other key 
liberal investment policies of the modern time were adopted. The objective is to make 
attractive and competitive not only the oil mineral sector, which has been the main source of 
revenue for the emirates, but also to transform the country into a global hub for investment in 
multidimensional sense. 
 
One such dimension was to make Dubai, the second city of UAE, a financial centre capable 
of competing with top capital markets in the world, namely New York, London and 
Singapore. Consequently, Dubai International Financial Centre (DIFC) was created to 
provide a platform for international capital transactions. The international character of this 
facility is epitomized in two things. First, DIFC is an economic free zone. It is a business-
friendly environment, with less restriction and broad opportunity, aimed at giving economic 
freedom to its members. Economic freedom is the foundation of wealth creation. Second, the 
legal infrastructure of the centre is substantially based on the English common law. This is, 
partially, because of the global reputation of English judicial system, and the fact that, most 
of the world‟s leading capital markets are located in countries with a legal system based on 
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the common law.414 Although, in terms of conventional finance, Dubai is yet seen as a rising 
market, its fortunes and potentials with regards to Islamic finance is even higher and more 
promising, as it is unanimously considered to be one of the two leading jurisdictions of 
Islamic bonds in the world.415 
 
6.2.2. Law and the Practice of Sukuk in the Emirates 
 
As regards legal framework for Islamic finance in the UAE, the principal instrument to derive 
authority from is the constitution. Declaring Shari‟ah as a source of law, the constitution has 
provided for a legal foundation that Islamic commercial activities in the emirates be regulated 
in accordance with the tenets of Shari‟ah. Accordingly, article 714 of the Federal Law No. 5 
of 1985 prohibited all kind of riba (interest), even though this prohibition has since been 
restricted by both judicial and legislative authorities that followed this period. However, this 
restriction did not hinder the authority already granted to Islamic institutions and investment 
entities that choose to operate in accordance with the Islamic financial principles throughout 
the emirates. Nevertheless, Law No. 6 of the same 1985 has required that, such entities must 
maintain a document containing the detail nature of their business.416 
 
In the wake of economic transformation of the UEA represented in creation of several 
investment free zones, there has been enhanced legal regulatory framework for Islamic 
financial practices in the emirates. The most famous economic free zones are Jebel Ali and 
Dubai International Financial Centre (DIFC). These zones are legally autonomous, their 
regulatory and judicial system being separate from the UAE mainstream legal system. 
Financial transactions concluded within the parameters of DIFC are subject to and governed 
by DIFC legal system, which is predominantly composed of commercial principles based on 
British legal orientation, whereas anything outside the zone constitute a subject matter for 
pure UAE legal permutations.417 Nonetheless, regulations to ensure Shari‟ah compliance for 
Islamic investment outlets are available in both jurisdictions, to different extent though.  
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Higher Shari‟ah Authority (HAS) is the body centrally charged with the supervision of all 
Islamic financial institutions in the UAE. This body is a highly authoritative and draws its 
membership from the ministries of justice and Islamic Affairs to ensure competence in both 
common law and Shari‟ah. Besides, there is an independent Shari‟ah Committee consist of 
erudite Muslim jurists who volunteered to complement the efforts of the state committee. In 
addition, to provide checks on for day-to-day transactions the law requires every institution to 
have internal Supervisory committee of no less than 3 members assessed for competency and 
approved for appointment by the HAS. Details of the committee members including terms of 
reference and remuneration must be stated out in the memorandum and articles of association 
of the company. 418 
 
Likewise, financial institutions with ethical orientation run under the auspices of DIFC are 
governed by two enactments: DIFC Law No. 13 of 2004 and DIFC Services Authority 
(DFSA) Rulebook on Islamic Financial Business Module. Further, it is mandatory for all 
DIFC registered institution to adopt AAOIFI standards in both structuring, issuance and 
marketing Islamic financial products. This requirement of law is effective in creating both 
consistence and compliance in the Sukuk market. Similarly, DFSA regulations requires each 
financial institution to constitute 3 member Shari‟ah board, and publish their functions, duty, 
allowances as well as their terms of engagement and disengagement. This requirement is 
meant to inject transparency into the system. In addition, to ensure accountability the law 
mandated that, record of supervisory activities of the board shall be kept for the period of 6 
consecutive years to allow for effective auditing.419 The robust investment regulation along 
with several other business incentives made DIFC and, with it, the UAE to be one of the 
outstanding hubs for investment in the world. It is particularly so in respect to Sukuk as 
shown in the table below. 
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  Table 1:6 A highlight of Sukuk issuance in the UAE 
GCC 
Countries     
Number of Issues     Amount in USD 
M    
% of Total Value 
 
Bahrain 
Jordan 
Kuwait 
Oman 
Qatar 
Saudi Arabia 
UAE 
Yemen 
 
 
392 
3   
18 
7 
30 
122 
110 
2 
 
 
27,720   
272 
3,658   
3,523   
25,851   
95,215   
71,895  
253 
 
2.83%   
0.03%   
0.37%   
0.36%   
2.64%   
9.72%   
7.34%  
 0.03% 
Total 684 
 
228, 387 23.3% 
  Source: IIFM 2017 Report        
The table above represents total Sukuk transaction for six years (2001-2007) across the states 
of GCC and Middle East. It highlights how vibrant UAE capital market has been as it has 
recorded 110 issuances over this period, valued at USD 71,895 Million. This amount 
represents 7.34% of the global issuance within the period under consideration. In terms of 
volume, regionally UAE is second to only Saudi Arabia, whose total transaction represents 
9.72% of the world. Yet, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has been able to record higher volume 
than UAE in 2017 due to its recent huge sovereign issuance of USD 9 billion this year. 
Otherwise, the emirates had always been ahead. Even in the present report, corporate 
issuance in the emirates has beaten all records in the region. This success has been linked to 
innovative investment framework of UAE in form of DIFC. 
 
6.2.3. Economic Freedom in the UAE and the Success of DIFC 
 
DIFC is a form of economic free zone, where entrepreneurs would operate with minimal 
restrictions. Scholars have theorised that, “economic freedom is the foundation of wealth 
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creation”.420 According to the same theory, there is link between economic freedom and 
prosperity. Countries that allow more freedom to private investors are more attractive to 
business and thus wealthier.421 Economic freedom is assessed upon five indicators. These 
indicators include sound investment regulatory framework, reduced state involvement, access 
to sound money and freedom to transact internationally as well as security of property rights. 
Fraser 2018 index declared United Arab Emirates and Bahrain as the most economically-free 
states in the Arab world.422  
 
The approach adopted in the UAE provides broad opportunity to investors and removes 
restrictions on business. Corporate entities registered under DIFC are allowed to have 100% 
foreign ownership, while emirates‟ investment regime stipulates that no company shall be 
licensed for operation within the country unless 51% of its shareholding are Emiratis. In 
addition, income and profit taxes are completely waived, profit can be held in sound and 
stable currency and can be repatriated or moved in and out to any part of the world without 
restriction except for internationally recognised due process of dealing with finances such as 
that of Anti-Laundering laws.423 Furthermore, the centre created greater certainty for 
investors through provision of robust legal protection for their contractual obligations. 
Excessive regulations and too many bureaucratic obstacles have been identified as symbol of 
oppressive restriction on investment,424 hence DIFC maintained simple but effective 
regulatory structure. The centre is governed by three bodies only: DIFC Financial Authority, 
Services Authority and Judicial Authority. Owing to universal acceptance of English 
common law by investors, DIFC Courts are manned by British judges well-experienced in 
English commercial law. Creation of DIFC made Dubai and UAE attractive to investors 
worldwide. 
 
Literature shows that, in two years DIFC attracted 750 companies who put together brought 
in investment capital of about USD 18 billion into infrastructure alone. One study estimated 
the amount of FDI flow into UAE in 4 years equates that of entire sub-Saharan countries of 
Africa put together. Moreover, the emirate‟s GDP per capita was once rated by the US as the 
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fifth highest in the world.425  This success is attributable to the economic freedom provided 
through investment free zones such as DIFC, because studies have shown that, there is link 
between economic freedom and rise in GDP of a country.426 Furthermore, there is argument 
that, the hallmark of UAE economic transformation and financial success was the British 
legal structure transplanted in the DIFC. Because literature show that, countries with British 
common law as major legal system tend to outperform others, because the common law 
framework has, over the time, earned great reputation among investors globally.427 Thus, 
existence of credible dispute resolution mechanism in a state is important element to 
demonstrate investment protection in the event of defaults. The cases of Nakheel Sukuk and 
Dana Sukuk among many others indeed highlighted the fact that disputes resolution 
mechanism is crucial. 
 
 6.2.4 Dispute Resolution Mechanism in UAE 
 
Generally, in the Arab states of GCC of which UEA is a member, matters to do with 
commercial disputes fall within adjudicatory powers of regular courts. Alternative methods of 
settling investment cases such as arbitration and mediations were not popular. As a result, 
Arab countries were reluctant to submit to arbitration, and they only abide by that route 
where it becomes part of a transaction involving a foreign entity.428 However, this notion of 
inclining towards national judicial system is a recent development, a natural consequence of 
codifications of law in the modern Arab nation state. Otherwise arbitration and mediation are 
well rooted in the Islamic tradition. Further, due to oil discovery in the Middle East, which 
brought Western multinational companies into investment relationship with the Arab world, 
business trend of those transnationals including contracts with arbitration clause was 
reintroduced to Arab countries. Hence, unlike many other Arab states, Saudi Arabia and UAE 
recognise the validity of arbitral clause and, more so, they even accept strict concept of 
irrevocability of appointment of arbitrators, which is central to independence of the 
arbitrators and thus the fairness of the process.429 This is a credible concession given the 
tendency of those countries to have full control of the system including power to hire and fire 
arbitrators at will. That said, one restriction is still in force in both countries. Although both 
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Saudi Arabia and UAE do acknowledge the concept of international arbitration, yet their 
attitude towards implementing arbitral awards is not straightforward. Arbitral award is not 
binding until same has been endorsed by their domestic courts.430 With regards to UAE 
however, the current trajectories of the shift towards economic freedom has introduced some 
changes. 
 
Given the new trend of transformation, three layers of disputes resolution mechanisms 
appeared to have evolved in the present UAE, namely national, international and arbitration 
mechanism. Regular courts in all the emirates retained their jurisdiction over commercial 
disputes. By virtue of section 235 of the UAE Civil Procedure Law, these courts are 
conferred with a wide jurisdiction concerning commercial disputes. As they apply national 
laws to resolve disputes arising from investments, they represent national or domestic dispute 
resolution mechanism, hence are famous and popular among the locals. However, legal 
controversy ensues in matters arising from investment deals that tend to be international by 
nature like Sukuk, where parties might prefer their disputes resolved by a foreign judicial 
system. This is controversial because judicial practice within the emirates indicates that, UAE 
mainstream courts would assume jurisdiction over almost all matters regardless of any 
stipulations in the contractual document invoking the jurisdiction of a foreign court, except 
for arbitration.431 Consequently, where such cases are heard by external courts, judgements 
obtained therefrom are not recognised in the emirates and therefore unenforceable. 
  
In this regard, UAE legal system seems to reject the notion of any foreign judicial body 
should have adjudicatory powers over transactions entered into within its territory, except for 
subject matters not specifically covered by section 235 cited above. The section has given out 
a lengthy list of subject matters over which the domestic courts shall have jurisdiction, one 
writer commented on the practical implication of the list saying: “The above list certainly 
enumerates almost every case that could come to mind, and thus, indeed limits the scope for 
executing a foreign judgement in the UAE.”432 Because, foreign judgements need to obtain 
approval by local courts before they can be validly executed in the emirates. In fact, this was 
the basis for another judicial approach in the UAE, which, perhaps, is even more 
controversial. For purpose of enforcement, the legal system empowers local courts to reassess 
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foreign judgement to ascertain not only that the subject matter of the case has satisfied local 
criteria for execution but also that the proceedings before the court abroad was judiciously 
fair and credible.433 This is tantamount to empowering the UAE judicial authority to exercise 
appellate jurisdiction over other courts on the face of earth.  
 
Observers have maintained that, no effective remedy to this legal anomaly except the creation 
of internationally accepted umpire within the emirates, Samir writes: “The Arab states 
themselves must pave the way for the adoption of international arbitration on their territories. 
In order to do this, they should show legal maturity and recognize that international 
arbitration enjoys some measure of autonomy” 434 And that is, exactly, what the DIFC 
appears to stand for. The innovative economic structure of the DIFC provides for two dispute 
resolution mechanisms. Arbitration centre and a common law court. All transactions 
concluded within DIFC are subject to the arbitration facility of the centre.435 Pursuant to the 
law that established the zone, natural or legal entities registered with the centre, whether local 
or foreign would have the right to subscribe to the legal jurisdiction of the DIFC.  
 
Although, given the use of English as the language of proceedings and adoption of British 
legal tradition as well, the judicial infrastructure of the DIFC is supposed to be international, 
yet the centre does not appear seen to have attained international threshold due to certain 
challenges. One of these challenges is that, the panel of legal experts in the centre does not 
demonstrate diverse nature of an international mechanism, as only UAE personnel and 
British judges have dominated it.436 In addition, there is need to incorporate international 
standards set out in internationally reputable instruments such as International Centre for 
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). 
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6.3.   The U.K. Approach: A Secularist Islamic Sukuk Model 
 
As far as financial market and minerals investment are concerned, U.K. is one of the leading 
jurisdictions of the world. There is accumulation of multidimensional factors that made 
Britain so critical in this regard. Historical and contemporary as well as internal and external 
factors. United Kingdom is the colonial mother of most of the common law-oriented systems 
in the world including Nigeria. Moreover, its financial market was famous even before the 
colonial era. As far back as 1801, London transformed the so-called subscription room and 
Capel Court into a regulated “Stock Exchange” in the country, and since then continued to 
grow gradually into a robust and sustained financial city. The subscription room and Capel 
Court later metamorphosed into the present London Stock Exchange (LSE). As regards 
mining, UK provides an international trading platform for industrial metals, London Metal 
Exchange (LME). This successful non-precious metal market originated from the 1570s 
Royal Exchange. Besides, it is in the city of London that, the world‟s biggest marketing 
house for gold and silver is situated.  The estimated amount of daily transaction at London 
Bullion Market (LBM) is about 18 million ounces of gold and 108 million of silver. These 
three key institutions with the Bank of England on top constitute London International 
Financial Services (LIFS), one of the most prominent financial markets of the world.  
 
However, beyond London the afore-mentioned factors, the current prominent position of the 
UK in the global financial landscape has been attributed to the reputation of its powerful 
regulations internally, and the effect of certain external elements. These foreign factors 
include the fact that, every key international investment and financial body in the world has 
an office carrying out business in the city. In addition, the confidence reposed by different 
nationals of the world in the English judicial system, as there has been an established 
tendency of investors (including Sukuk investors) of differing legal background to endorse 
English courts as the chosen forum for determination of any dispute arising out of their 
transactions. 
 
As will be highlighted in this chapter, contrary to many other states, U.K. approach to natural 
resources and development accords private titles to land a unique legal protection. Individual 
ownership of the land surface is extended to include deep subsoil strata and the wealth lying 
underneath, with exception of only few minerals. The chapter seeks to also examine the 
symbiotic impact of mining and development on each other, and finally investigates how the 
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U.K. investment framework broadened up its legal mechanisms to facilitate development 
through alternative investment vehicles of Sukuk. On the other hand, Malaysia and UAE 
represent the most advanced jurisdictions of the world as relates to Islamic finance products 
including Sukuk and do provide differing approaches through which tremendous successes 
have been recorded. 
 
6.3.1 Mining and Law in the UK 
 
In contrast to many other resource-rich jurisdictions, there is no single regulatory regime 
applicable to all minerals in the United Kingdom; rather different laws govern different kind 
of minerals. For this purpose, minerals are classified into five categories: Coal, gold and 
silver, oil and gas, and all other minerals. Generally, ownership of minerals in the UK is 
based predominantly on the common law concept which recognises private ownership based 
on the postulation of the ancient Roman law. In effect the Roman law attributes to the surface 
owner all that which exist underneath the land down to the centre of the earth. Thus, minerals 
found on the private land belong to the owner of the land and freedom to exploit such 
minerals lies with the same person. Thus, the owner has undisputable right to extract the 
minerals or grant another person (natural or judicial) such a right through a contract for 
absolute sale or lease. Nonetheless, compliance with certain regulatory framework is 
necessary. The role of government in this circumstance would be limited to registration of 
titles and regulating the conduct of the exploration activities in order to ensure safe and 
sustainable mining.437 This general rule is not however applicable to the first four out of the 
five categories mentioned earlier.  
 
Coal minerals are regulated by the Coal Industry Act, which is a statute administered by the 
Coal Authority, an executive unit under the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial 
Strategy. By virtue of this statute, ownership of coal vests with the Authority, and it is 
consequently responsible for grant of license of mining operations in the U.K and to 
administer claims for any damage caused by mining subsidence. With regards to gold and 
silver mines, their ownership has since nineteenth century been vested in the Crown by 
common law doctrine, and hence they constitute “Mines Royal”, the permission of Crown 
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estate is essential for lawful extraction of these precious minerals from any part of the U.K. 
The permits are obtained from the Wardell Armstrong, the Crown Estate Mineral Agent. Yet, 
even under this category, access permission from the owner of the surface is indispensable.  
 
Pursuant to the Petroleum Act, 1998 and the Continental Shelf Act, 1964 oil and gas in the 
U.K. (both onshore and in territorial waters and the U.K. continental shelf) also vest with the 
Crown. Recently (in 2015), Oil and Gas Authority (“OGA”) was created as an agency to 
regulate oil and gas operations in the country. Shortly thereafter (in 2016) same “OGA” was 
formed into a state company limited with shares with the secretary for the Department for 
Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy as the sole shareholder. This company has become 
the body responsible for all onshore and offshore oil and gas operation in the UK, including 
licensing, exploration and production, and oil and gas infrastructure.438 By implication, the 
company has the power to issue and grant exclusive right to bore for and extract oil and gas 
throughout the country. However, the right so granted does not obviate the requirement to 
seek for and obtain right of access from the landowner, nor does it account for approval by 
Mineral Planning Authority either. These two requirements seem to have same legal weight 
as the main license sanctioning the mining operation itself, and they arguably represent the 
most distinctive character of the British mining regime. To this extent, the right of the owner 
of the surface of land at common law is no difference from the ancient French concept of 
accessory theory, which holds that subsoil belongs to the surface owner.439 While France has 
since 1789 dropped any traces of the concept from its system, this is not the case in the U.K. 
 
Eventually, the sanctity of this concept has been retained at English common law with 
obvious passion. Even where the minerals are those that totally vest with the state, any 
license granted to exploit such resources does not carry permission to use the under-surface 
area of the natural occurrence of the minerals. In this case, ownership of the minerals viewed 
separate from the ownership of the subsoil strata that contains the minerals. The surface 
owner has the right to bring action in trespass against a licensed miner for tempering with the 
sub-surface because of mining activities necessary to extract minerals therefrom, even though 
it might not interfere, in anyway, with the owners‟ apparent enjoyment of the surface. This is 
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the point made by the supreme court of England in Bocardo S.A. v Star Energy UK Onshore 
Ltd as would be considered later in detail. 
 
6.3.2. Role of Local Planning Authority (CLG) 
 
Who regulates the mining industry? Local Planning Authority plays a key role in mines 
regulation in the UK. Both at regional and project specific level. Marine Management 
Organisation (“MMO”), a subsidiary of the Department for Environment, Food and Rural 
Affairs (“DEFRA”) along with an independent environmental regulator specific for the 
region concerned provide environmental regulations while Health and Safety Executive 
(“HSE”) is charged with enforcement of health and safety standard throughout UK except in 
Northern Ireland where similar body operates. With effect from 6th April 2015, the by 
operation of the Mines Regulations, 2014 has replaced all other laws relating to health and 
safety. 
 
A question arises as to who is eligible for mining right in the UK and whether title can be 
used as a security to raise finance? It is noteworthy that in UK there is no any restriction as to 
who is eligible to obtain and hold a mineral right, whether the right drives from the Crown or 
private owner, and whether the applicant is human or legal entity, indigenous or foreign is 
altogether immaterial. Whosoever appears to have satisfied the necessary requirement for a 
specific mineral being applied for as well as general conditions requiring planning, 
environmental, health and safety as well as access right in case of private land, can obtain the 
license. However, the only limitation is the one relating to age, a minor cannot acquire 
interest in land.  
 
A question which then follows is whether a holder of mining rights is allowed to transfer it to 
a third party by way of outright sale or lease or mortgage or otherwise secure it to raise 
finances? Although, mining or exploration rights are unconditionally bondable in some 
mining jurisdictions like South Africa, any transfer of such rights may trigger some 
regulatory conditions in the UK depending on the type of the mineral and the nature of the 
right being held though. While the owner of freehold interest may transfer his title including 
of course the right to exploit minerals contained smoothly, right held through a state grant 
would have to follow a general formal procedure for transferring the license to a new holder. 
In fact, this is a statutory requirement in the UK. But so far as the transfer is temporary by 
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reason of mortgage or bond, it is generally permissible depending again on the terms of each 
grant. Where the rights conferred by the instrument comprise an interest capable of being 
mortgaged and bondable as well, then it is transferable without recourse to any statute, and 
otherwise it is not. Yet, in any case the law requires that any change to the details of holders 
of mining rights, including change of name or address, to be reported to HSE within a period 
of no more than 28 days from the date of effecting the change. This range of regulatory 
restrictions might have some implications on the use of Sukuk bonds to raise funds by mining 
companies. This point would be considered later. 
 
6.3.3. Land Acquisition by the State 
 
Given the sanctity of private ownership under the UK regime as noted above, one may be 
curious to know if the state has got any power under the law to expropriate land for mining 
purpose, especially where the holder refuses to grant the right of access. The answer is yes, 
but within a limited context of development meant to serve a collective public interest, and 
subject to stringent conditions aimed at protecting the private title against arbitrary use of 
state powers. The inclination to safeguard titles to land is evident not only in limiting the 
purpose of acquisition but also in many other regulatory schemes. The Mines (Working 
Facilities Support) Act of 1966, for example, has provided for compulsory acquisition of land 
for mining purpose in England and Wales, but does not seem to include freehold interest in 
land, it rather envisages mere right over land. And even in the appropriate cases, the Act laid 
down a rather lengthy and complex procedure that it is only the central government can bring 
the action for the acquisition. Thus, any mining company involved would have to make 
application to the appropriate government department requesting it to trigger the proceedings. 
And in any event courts in UK are reluctant to grant the order unless it is well established that 
the grant is “expedient in the national interest” The only circumstance where land can be 
acquired without recourse to court is perhaps in the case of local planning authority. 
 
Local Authority is also empowered to acquire land compulsorily where such acquisition is to 
facilitate real development and is likely to promote economic, social and environmental 
wellbeing of the area. Yet, the authority has a duty to satisfy itself that the land in question 
may not be obtained by any means other than expropriation. In any case, land owners whose 
lands were taken for development reason (mining is also considered as development) must be 
adequately compensated. Right to such a compensation has since 1952 been accorded a status 
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of human right throughout European Union (EU) by virtue of Article 1 of the First Protocol 
to the European Convention on Human Rights. The Article provides that, “No one shall be 
deprived of his possession except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided 
for by law and by the general principles of the international law.” Basically, this is referring 
to the standard of compensation originally espoused under Lex Mercatoria, which came to 
form part of customary international law relating to “alien treatment”.  
 
The postulation of this principle requires that, compensation must be adequate, prompt and 
effective.440 This provision of ECHR has been operationalise in the UK, by statute and been 
emphasised through judicial authorities. In Howard v UK (1985)441 it was held that, 
assessment of compensation in expropriation cases shall include, in addition to the market 
value of the property, a disturbance allowance and home loss payment. The code must be 
adequate and in compliance with Article 8 and Article 1 of the First Protocol to the ECHR. 
Furthermore, in contrast to what obtains in some African states, land owner in the UK can 
challenge the quantum of the compensation if he feels that his interest acquisitioned by the 
compulsory purchase order has not been adequately compensated. A special tribunal exist for 
assessment of such compensation. Not only that, private landowners are even empowered by 
statute law to question the validity of the very decision to take over their property where they 
believe that the powers were used in error. 
 
According to section 23 (1) of the Land Acquisition Act 1981, if any person aggrieved by a 
compulsory acquisition order desires to question its validity on the grounds that, the 
authorisation of the order is not empowered by the Act or any other enactment, may make an 
application to the High Court. The section further provides that:  
 
And if the court is satisfied that: 
a. The authorisation granted by the order is not empowered under the Act of 1981 Act or 
(inter alia) the 1991 Act or any enactment, or 
b. The interest of the applicant is substantially prejudiced by any relevant requirement of 
law not having been complied with 
The court may quash the order either generally or in so far as it affects any property of the 
applicant. 
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This position of law was judicially tested in the case of Pasco v. First Secretary of State 
(2006).442 Pursuant to the section 23(1) cited above, the claimant brought the action 
challenging the validity of the Urban Regeneration (Edge Lane West, Liverpool) compulsory 
purchase order 2005. In fact, the order was challenged on three grounds: that the property did 
not fit the conditions described by the statute; that the code of compensation was inadequate; 
and that, there was no equality of arms provided by government at the inquiry session. The 
order in question was made by a legitimate body, the Urban Regeneration Agency, which was 
established under section 158 of the Leasehold Reform, Housing and Urban Regeneration 
Reform Act of 1993 (formerly Urban Development Act, 1993), and purportedly acting within 
the powers conferred by s. 159 of the same Act. Yet, the challenge succeeded substantially, 
and the order was eventually quashed. This is a confirmation that, UK approach to 
development has community at heart and does not discount community rights in favour of 
economic development. This also is the case with mineral investment, where mining does not 
automatically take precedence over private ownership of land even though it could be for 
national interest. 
 
6.3.4.UK Approach to community development within the context of investment 
 
At the centre of the debate on mining and development is land issue. Generally, land 
represents a valuable resource of significance to all stakeholders-government, investors and 
locals-throughout human history. The multidimensional benefits of land-social, economic and 
cultural-explains why it has always been held so strategic by both the private and public 
institutions. It is not a surprise therefore that, issues relating to land tenure and holder‟s right 
occupy key position in all investment as well as development framework of modern states. 
More so, in mineral investment, clarity of legislation on the rights of, and resolution of 
conflicting titles to land constitute a cardinal element of good business environment, which 
provides assurance of security for both indigenes and investors, and ultimately increases the 
flow of capital into the relevant jurisdiction.443 Thus, states might differ in the way they 
utilise this aspect in order to, not only, attract investment but also to foster development. 
 
In contrast to many other jurisdictions of the world, a person with legal ownership to land in 
the UK owns the surface and the strata beneath the land deep down to 300 meters below the 
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see level and any minerals that were to be found therein as long as it has not been alienated 
by way of conveyance at common law, or statute (sections 43-48 Infrastructure Act 2015).444 
Effectually, if any land that is originally owned by the community or any member thereof has 
subsequently become a subject of minerals development, the owner is entitle to a share of the 
proceeds of the resources so extracted from underneath his land even though the exploration 
activities might not have interfered with the owner‟s use and enjoyment of the surface land.  
 
In Bocardo S.A. v Star Energy UK Onshore Ltd, the supreme court held that, „The owner of 
the subsurface was entitled to say that his land was being interfered with when it was bored 
into by someone else. His right to object was inherent in his right of ownership of the land, 
and it was irrelevant that he was not making any use of it.‟445 In this case,  the defendant, Star 
Energy UK Onshore Ltd (Star Energy), who, by virtue of the holder of a petroleum 
production licence (the Licence) issued in 1980 under the Petroleum Act 1934 , was 
authorised to search, bore for and get petroleum in an oilfield called “Palmers Wood 
Oilfield”, had constructed some oil wells that passed under the substrata of, penetrated into 
and terminated beneath  a land known as “Oxted Estate”, which belonged to Bocardo and 
located immediately next to the drilling site of the defendant. Upon an action for trespass 
brought by the land owner (Bocardo), the court found that, the landowner, „was entitled to 
damages assessed at 9 per cent of the income received by Star Energy which appeared to be 
£6,902,000 between July 22, 2000 and December 31, 2007‟ not only the past but also entitle 
„to damages assessed at 9 per cent of all future income from that date until the oil and gas 
extraction was exhausted.‟446 This case has made abundantly clear the current approach in the 
UK which recognises the legitimate interest of landowner to subsoil and the valuable asset 
lying underneath such as oil or hard minerals, and more importantly their right to be 
contacted for negotiation before tempering with the land and to damages in tort of trespass 
when extraction is undertaken before way-leave is sought for from the owner and obtained.   
 
Similarly, where investment relates to development of physical infrastructure such as housing 
units, malls and roads, due consideration has been allocated to the right of UK citizens and 
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especially communities living near-by the concerned amenities. In addition to provisions for 
matters of public interest and safety like consumer protection, environmental concern, green 
investment and climate change, among other things that are meant to tackle broad range of 
issues to do which overall corporate social responsibility of all businesses; certain basic 
community needs are tailored and incorporated into specific legislations.  Typical example of 
this is section 106 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990.447  Under the legislation, a 
local authority can enter into agreement with a developer to mitigate the effects of any 
development. Thus, for instance, a developer might be required to provide some affordable 
housing in a block of flats, or provide the public with leisure facilities, such as a park or a 
library.  However, these legislative arrangements popularly nicknamed as “106 agreements” 
have been criticised and are not without controversy - they can get rather complicated.  There 
is also the question of whether developers should be able to negotiate any contribution that 
they make to the local economy.  This necessarily benefits the developers with the most 
resources and it may not be in the interests of the local community.  Similarly, cash-starved 
local authorities may end up agreeing to unwise developments to get the planning money 
etc.   
 
There is also the Community Infrastructure Levy (CIL).  This is a much more recent 
innovation and effectively, it operates as a tax on new developments that are larger than 100 
metres squared - there are some exemptions for social housing and so on.  Usually, the CIL is 
collected by local authorities and is for infrastructure development in the local area (i.e. 
roads, public spaces among others).448 
Mining and development  
 
U.K. has been one of the leading mining jurisdictions of the world renowned for both 
production and processing minerals. The country is endowed with 12 kinds of construction 
minerals that are critical for infrastructure development of any nation, including rocks and 
varying stones (aggregate), cement and Magnesian limestone suitable for industrial dolomite. 
Furthermore, it produces industrial minerals such as silica sand, ball clay and kaolin, 
fluorspar, salt, peat, barites and potash. Basically, this industry is critical to socio-economic 
and industrial growth of the U.K., because most if not all of manufacture companies depend 
                                                          
447 UK Town and Country Planning Act, 1990 available at:                                   
<https://www.local.gov.uk/pas/pastopics/infrastructure/s106obligatiooverview>   accessed 4th December, 2018 
448 Available at: <https://www.gov.uk/guidance/community-infrastructure-levy> accessed  4th December, 2018 
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on the mining sector for their vital raw materials, without which they may not function. 
Accordingly, being industrially developed country, the smooth operation of industries down 
the supply chain creates jobs and earning opportunities for the populace and maximises 
revenue base for the state. Recent reports indicate that, extraction alone generates a turnover 
of £15 billion, and £ billion in Gross Value Added (GVA) tax per annum. This figure 
dramatically goes up to £235 billion when product manufactured and direct markets are 
added. Jobwise, the upstream industry standing alone has a workforce of 34,000 people, 
while by extension it supports 4.3 million jobs through its supply chain.449 
 
However, the prospects of mining industry in the U.K. are not without hitches. Recent studies 
have shown that, production has been on decline over the few years. In 2013, there was 
domestic production of 25 million tonnes of industrial minerals, yet the country had to import 
minerals raw materials to feed its industrial demands, with £62 million worth importation 
representing the trade deficit of just one year. The imported minerals included metallic ores 
(not included precious metal), import of which alone has consumed £2 million due to shrink 
in local production. Quantitative literature which compared 10 years of mineral production in 
the U.K. suggested that, capacity has increasingly been on decrease since 2003. The highest 
being in 2003 when, for example, about 12m tonnes of limestone was produced, down to 
2009 when it had the worst of its downswings with only 6m tonnes production. Although it 
has gradually gone up again through the following years, but not higher than 11m tonnes 
recorded in the year 2013. Similarly, production of metal that comprises tin, lead and iron 
ores has moved retrogressively down to almost naught in 2013 from 2.5 million tonnes 
recorded in 1997. This decline in production is widespread and does not spare any category 
be it industrial or construction minerals, not even the most famous and common mineral in 
the U.K. i.e. the coal.  
 
Back in 1950s, despite the substantial reliance of the country upon coal minerals, the 
domestic consumption needed only 70% of the entire production (about 90 million tonnes), 
while the remaining 30% was exported. However, at present U.K. annually imports 33 
million tonnes (this figure represents 2013 data) to be used mainly by electricity generators. 
The amount of coal imported in the year 2013 tripled the actual domestic production of the 
                                                          
449
 CBI Report (2016) on UK Mineral Extraction Industry, available at: < http://www.cbi.org.uk/news/minerals-
critical-to-the-uk-economy/cbi-report-the-uk-mineral-extraction-industry/> accessed 15th January, 2019 
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same year, which 13 million tonnes.450 This dramatic switch from being a net exporter of coal 
to a net importer of the same product, explains the extent of the challenge in the U.K. mining 
industry. One major reason for the swift decline of coal industry in the UK is the solid 
determination of the country to reduce its coal production and consequently consumption in 
response to genuine calls from both local and international quarters to uphold the global 
sustainability agenda.451  
 
6.3.5. Sustainability 
 
Other perspectives of this challenge are, inter alia, to do with environmental hazards 
associated with mining, both during and after operations. „Mining activities typically cause 
impacts on land, water, the climate and the flora, fauna and people that depend on these 
resources.452 In particular, land has been significantly affected, because mining by nature 
requires access to land, which may be used for dwelling, agriculture and other social and 
economic objectives. Thus, all stakeholders (states, community, investors, civil society 
organisations and international development agencies) focus on reducing the negative impact 
of mining on the environment. This effort is collectively pursued through the global agenda 
to achieve sustainable development goals by 2030, which states, including UK, have 
internalised. For example, the National Planning Policy Framework (NPPF) 2018 for 
England is focused on how to achieve sustainable development.453 The central point of 
sustainability being that, while seeking to actualise economic interest out of resources, 
stakeholders must not lose sight of the potential dangers that might cause to both society and 
environment. Thus, sustainability dictates the need to down-size production of minerals that 
are used in a manner ecologically harmful. Example of such practices is coal-fired power 
generation, producing carbon emissions, which causes air pollution.454  
 
                                                          
450 CBI Report (2016) on UK Mineral Extraction Industry (supra) 
451 The Coal Authority (TCA) has noted in its most recent annual report (2018) that, in its effort to become a 
global lead in sustainable practice, it has adopted a “swiftly declining industry” approach  
452 Mapping Mining to the Sustainable Development Goals: An Atlas, a white paper submitted to the World 
Economic Forum, Pg. 4 
453 S. 7 of the 2018 National Development Policy Framework for England states, „The purpose of the planning 
system is to contribute to the achievement of sustainable development.‟ 
454 A.T. Kearney, „Mining Takes on the Sustainability Challenges‟(2016) , PP. 4-10 available at: 
<https://www.atkearney.com/metals-mining/article?/a/mining-takes-on-the-sustainability-challenge>  accessed 
10th January, 2019 
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Coal mine is also associated with water pollution ultimately affecting human consumption 
and farming in general. „Acid mine water is a mines biggest contingent liability. For mine 
with a positive water balance, water rich in sulphates and heavy metals will run for decades 
and potentially centuries after a mine closes.‟455 This long-time impact is evident in the U.K. 
where the urgent need for development triggered by rapid urbanization informed the planning 
decision to construct housing infrastructure on colliery. While this approach might be lauded 
as one that brought about not only the apparent safe closure of the mines but also replaced 
them with a housing infrastructure development, yet the potential outcome could defeat the 
immediate success. Out of seven million properties built on coalfields in the country, The 
Coal Authority (TCA) said, “1.5 million of those properties are sitting on shallow workings – 
the most susceptible to risk.”456 The potential dangers to the residents of such areas is said to 
range from possible escape of poisonous gas from cracks underneath the buildings due to 
improper closure of the old mine and mixture of mine water with water bodies meant for 
domestic consumption.  
More sustainable alternative might be the one adopted by Germany, where dirty collieries 
were turned into green areas. Solar power stations made to replace dirty coal mines leading to 
the provision of clean energy infrastructure as well as socio-economic benefits through job 
creation.457 These practical and sustainable benefits are probably the basis for determination 
by the government of Germany to make 80% of its electricity generation from renewable 
energy sources (solar, windmill, hydropower and biomass) by 2050, which accounts for less 
than 20% at the moment. Importantly, Sukuk is one of the innovative investment vehicles 
being used in Germany to achieve this sustainable development. In 2015 a corporate Sukuk 
issued by ABC group generated USD 100 million, which was successfully invested in 
renewable energy.458 Below is description of that transaction: 
 
 
                                                          
455 A.T. Kearney, „Mining Takes on the Sustainability Challenges‟(2016) , PP. 6 and 7 
456 The Coal Authority Tailored Review Report (2017), published by the Department for Business, Energy & 
Industrial Strategy, available at: 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/670785/coal-
authority-tailored-review.pdf (accessed 12/1/19) 
457
 Mining Takes on the Sustainability Challenges, A.T. Kearney(Article on Mining and Metal), pg. 4 available at: 
https://www.atkearney.com/metals-mining/article?/a/mining-takes-on-the-sustainability-challenge (accessed 
10/1/19) 
458 Corporate Sukuk in Europe: Alternative Financing for Investment Projects, Deloite Research Paper, pg. 25 
available at: https://www2.deloitte.com/ly/en/pages/financial-services/articles/corporate-sukuk-in-europe.html 
(accessed 10/1/19) 
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Table 2:6 Renewable energy Sukuk in the Germany based on istisna contract 
Transaction Type Corporate Sukuk Bonds 
Issue Price USD 100 Million 
Sukuk Tenure 3 Years 
Coupon Period/Rate 6 Monthly 
Underlying Asset Windmill 
Governing Law German Law 
Source: Deloitte  
Sukuk (Islamic bond) investment vehicle has been in practice now for over a decade in the 
UK. Records show that, more than three dozen of Sukuk bond transactions have so far been 
listed on the UK Alternative Investment Market (AIM), a platform provided by the London 
Stock Exchange (LSE) for innovative investment products like Sukuk. Although, the 
remarkable reputation of LSE as one of the World‟s largest hubs for financial services plus 
the relatively cheap cost of listing did and continue to attract stocks (including Islamic bonds) 
to LSE from outside of the UK, Sukuk was adopted domestically for internal development 
benefits. The initial trigger for sovereign issuance was the need for innovative modes to fund 
the ever –growing demand for infrastructure in the UK. 
 
It became obvious that, potentially banks would be financially unable to provide enough 
funding for infrastructure development, hence government intervention was essential. 
Accordingly, sovereign Sukuk was considered by HM Treasury and UK Debt Management 
Office in 2007. Before this date, no Sukuk transaction could be conducted in the UK because 
of multiple tax regimes that might defeat its financial essence. With broad reform of Finance 
Act, 2007, removing double taxation on Islamic financial products, bringing Sukuk within the 
ambit of alternative financial product, the scene was set for Islamic bonds to take off in the 
country.459 Eventually,  the comprehensive amendment of the Finance Act has generally 
provided legal framework for Islamic securities in Britain,460 while the sovereign issuance 
that followed have served as catalyst for private companies to join the go, and since then 
                                                          
459  Miller, Challoner, Atta, „UK Welcomes the Sukuk‟ (2007), PP. 24-25 
460 Oseni, Umar A. and Hassan M. Kabir, „Regulating the Governing Law Clauses in Sukuk Transaction‟ (2015) 
Journal of Banking Regulations, 16.3, PP. 220-249 
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Sukuk has been employed for differing investment and development purposes. One such 
corporate issuance was that of 2014 by ABC group, to finance, develop, build and maintain 
complex infrastructure including transportation, power, and utility system for social and 
commercial structures in the country. Arguably, both issuers and investors generated 
motivation from the government plan to finance 69% of UK infrastructure through the private 
sector.461 Below is the description of the transaction: 
 
Table 3:6 Sukuk issuance in the UK 
Transaction Type Corporate Sukuk Bonds 
Issue Price USD 100 Million 
Sukuk Tenure Till Project Completion 
Coupon Period/Rate 6 Monthly 
Governing Law English or French Law 
Source: Deloitte  
Question may now arise as to whether mining companies can employ Sukuk for financing 
their mines project? The answer is yes, because Sukuk is a flexible financial instrument 
similar to (not same as) conventional bonds, it serves substantially whatever purpose the 
latter stands for and even more, the only difference between the two being the ethical 
characteristics. As noted earlier, the ethical requirements require that, Sukuk must be asset 
backed, and the nature of the asset must not be such that contravenes Islamic legal principles. 
Once these conditions are satisfied, Islamic bonds can be effectively used in different 
dimensions, including corporate finance for mineral projects in England. In U.S. about 
USD300 million was raised in corporate Sukuk bonds, using an oil well as the asset to back 
the transaction.462 Thus, given the fact that, the investment climate in the UK is more 
favourable to Islamic commercial dealings than that of Americas, theoretically one can safely 
conclude that, Sukuk may be used more effectively in the Britain to generate corporate 
finance for mining projects. 
 
                                                          
461 Deloitte, „Corporate Sukuk in Europe: Alternative Financing for Investment Projects‟, Deloitte Research 
Paper, Pg. 28 available at: https://www2.deloitte.com/ly/en/pages/financial-services/articles/corporate-sukuk-in-
europe.html  accessed 10th January, 2019  
462 Ayman and Christopher, „New Horizons for Islamic Securities‟ (2006-2007), PP.409-425 
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Even though, the existence of Islamic financial services in Britain can, arguably, be traced 
back to the brief presence of Albarakah Bank in 1980s, there can be little doubt that, the 
formal and proper operations never existed any time before 2004, when Islamic bank of 
Britain was licenced to function in the UK as financial institution ethically oriented along 
Islamic principles. Yet, the UK approach to shari‟ah governance differs markedly from those 
of countries like Malaysia. 
 
6.3.6. UK Approach to Islamic Financial Products 
 
It has been near consensus among the scholars within the academic community that, the 
expanded reform of financial regimes in 2003 through to 2007 has produced necessary legal 
framework required for Islamic financial products and services to operate. Finance Act 
(2000) saw amends in 2003 which removed double taxations on, and extended tax relief to 
shari‟ah-compliant financing of real estate, thereby investors from GCC and Asian countries 
were attracted into UK property market through Islamic banks and other banks with Islamic 
financial windows. In 2005, the Act was further amended to remove stamp duty and land tax 
in order to provide smooth grounds for murabaha and mudarabah products to flourish, 
similar tax treatment was extended to diminishing partnership and agency contract (wakala) 
by virtue of Finance Act (2005), and subsequent amends came to accommodate Sukuk within 
the financial landscape of UK.463  
 
6.3.7. Legal framework for Sukuk 
 
Legal framework for Sukuk investment emerged in 2008 pursuant to with the UK‟s policy on 
Islamic finance. The key policy on Islamic finance reiterates government commitment to 
ensure inclusive financial platform that offers all British citizens with opportunity to 
participate regardless of their faith. Further, with respect to Sukuk in particular, UK has been 
determined to maintain and possibly improve the status of London as one of leading financial 
hubs globally, in addition to diversifying its investor base by offering products of interest to 
investors from GCC countries. Accordingly, the first UK Sterling Sukuk of 2014 attracted a 
wide range of investors across the world. An instrument intended to generate £200 million, 
                                                          
463 Oseni, Umar and Hassan M. Kabir, „Regulating the Governing Law Clauses in Sukuk Transaction‟ (2015) 
PP. 220-249 at PP. 9-10 
 185 
 
received an order totalling £2.3 billion,464 oversubscribed twenty times of its value. 
Nevertheless, the main policy objective behind this sovereign issuance as well as setting up a 
legal framework for Sukuk, has been to encourage corporate issuance as noted by Osborne 
the chancellor of exchequer, when he said: “We have seen very strong demand for the Sukuk, 
resulting in a price that delivers good value for money for the taxpayer. I hope that the 
success of this government issuance will encourage further private sector issuances of Sukuk 
in the UK.”465 
 
The legal instrument the cement above policy is the amendment to section 151 of the Finance 
Bill. The section empowered HM Treasury to make provision for raising money through 
alternative finance arrangement. Alternative finance arrangement has been interpreted to 
mean any arrangement which in the opinion of the treasury will yield same result as other 
similar interest-bearing instruments but structured to function devoid of interest. These 
legislative and administrative efforts made UK to be not only the first sovereign Sukuk issuer 
outside the traditional Islamic finance enclave but earned it a status of leading destination for 
Islamic finance in the West. 
 
However, UK model has been criticised for lack of institutional regulation. Unlike Malaysia 
and the UAE, there are no institutional mechanisms to ensure that Islamic financial practices 
are conducted according to the spirit of shari‟ah. The reason for this is clear. UK is a secular 
country with one legal system, which provides for compliance with conventional financial 
regulations only. Observance of Islamic commercial injunctions are left to the parties 
involved. Accordingly, Islamic banks in the country have each set up and maintained 
“Shari‟ah Board”, at least to reassure customers. Furthermore, although the law does indeed 
encourage institutions to set up advisory body for guidance and supervision, but again any 
directives emanating from such a body must be considered to be only recommendatory, not 
mandatory.466 While, the wisdom behind adoption of this approach in the UK might be clear, 
but the practical implication might not be all immediately clear.  
 
 
                                                          
464 HM Treasury: Government issues first bond (2014), available at: 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/news/government-issues-first-islamic-bond> accessed 20th February, 2019 
465 Ibid 
466  Hasan, „Regulatory Framework of Shari‟ah Governance System in Malaysia, GCC Countries and the UK‟, 
3-2 (March-2010), PP.82-115 at PP. 103-104 
 186 
 
6.4. Conclusions: Learning from Malaysia, the United Arab Emirates and the United 
Kingdom 
 
This chapter has looked at three case studies, namely Malaysia, the UAE and the UK. Legal 
system that prevails in each of these countries has been highlighted. Sukuk and other Islamic 
financial practices of each jurisdiction as well as regulations and institutions are discussed 
with view to identifying which one could the most appropriate model for Nigeria to adopt. 
Although, all the three have some nearly common legal systems with respect to strong 
influence of English common law in all, they vary significantly from one another with regard 
to their approaches to Islamic financial transactions and sukuk, for which looking at them 
separately is important. 
 
Malaysia was an English colony, and Islamic law was prominent prior to colonialism, and 
currently they practice plural legal system. Presence of customary law in the country 
indicates that, this pluralism is due not only to Islam and British imperialism, but Malay 
society is inherently diverse in nature being multi-ethnic and multi-cultural. In this regard, 
Malaysia bears striking similarities to Nigeria, based on which a general assumption can be 
made that, any legal and economic innovations that succeed in the former is likely to suite the 
latter. More so, given the socio-economic diversity of their society, they share same tendency 
to accept any legal practice introduced to them within specific prescription as espoused by 
socio-legal theory.  
 
From Islamic finance perspective, Malaysia is well-advanced, with a vibrant Islamic capital 
market and considered to one of the leading hubs globally. However, it‟s approach to Sukuk 
is highly pragmatic in nature as it tends to favour innovation over jurisprudential rigidity and 
allows for various types of sukuk instruments to be structured and marketed on its national 
and internal financial platforms. Nevertheless, this flexibility is not without controversy. 
Shari‟ah experts, particularly from other Jurisdictions including GCC countries, have 
expressed concern, that Malaysian version of Sukuk is exposed to a legal risk as it violates an 
important ethical requirement. Although, it is not an outright trade off with the Shari‟ah 
component of Islamic bond, the Malaysian interpretation and therefore application of Islamic 
injunction with respect to sukuk starkly differ from the dominant perception in the Middle 
East. Thus, the economic effect of this model for a country willing to attract investors from 
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oversee can be enormous. Investors from gulf countries might not consider products based on 
Malaysian prescription as ethical or otherwise attractive.  
 
Turning to the second case study, UAE is a prominent GCC member with vibrant Islamic 
capital market considered to be one of the global hubs of Sukuk. UAE has a legal system 
dominantly based on Islamic law in contrast to Nigeria. Yet, the strong presence of economic 
freedom which allow investors to choose which system of law to govern their transactions, 
has made UAE very popular destination for investment. Furthermore, it has recently 
established more free economic zones from which Nigeria might desire to learn. The prospect 
of Dubai International Financial Centre has changed the landscape of UAE in terms of 
investment. The strength of DIFC lies in three things, namely, regulations, freedom ad 
dispute resolution mechanism. By virtue of the law that sets up the centre, DIFC has a distinct 
regulation compare to the mainstream law as it operates as a common law zone. More so, 
investors registered with the centre will have choice to make as to what law to govern their 
transaction. Finally, there is arbitration centre in addition to investment courts all functioning 
in accordance with British common law. However, about Sukuk structure and market, in 
contrast to Malaysia UAE favours classic interpretation of Islamic law.  
 
From historical point of view, UK is a mother to Nigeria, and still commonwealth is keeping 
them together. These two key factors are likely to make Nigeria naturally emulate UK. More 
so, the case study of UK present additional vital data to do with coal mining and 
sustainability approach that might be of interest for Nigeria to adopt. However, the practice of 
Islamic finance in UK has not been well developed in terms of regulatory framework and 
institutions. Yet, it presents a viable model for a secular state with interest to deliver 
inclusiveness. Besides, there is a point to take in terms of policy objective underpinning UK 
issuance. Government should provide for effective regulatory frameworks to allow for greater 
participation. It is obvious that each of the three jurisdictions studied has something for 
Nigeria to adopt in order to build a vibrant market for Sukuk investment. 
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7 Chapter Seven: Towards a Framework for Investment and Sukuk 
 
Nigeria has endeavoured to shift its focus onto solid minerals to reduce its dependence on oil 
and gas and to diversify its economy through a series of reforms aimed at repositioning the 
industry to make it attractive to investors. This thesis critiques the current investment 
framework to examine the extent of its effectiveness in stimulating investment and business 
climate to embrace innovative investment tools to improve growth as well as development.  
 
In evaluating economic effectiveness, the study deployed three generally acknowledged 
components of an attractive investment regime, namely “efficiency”, “predictability” and 
“flexibility, to assess the strength and depth of Nigeria‟s mining industry performance or 
attractiveness. The assessment of these elements indicates that Nigeria‟s framework is weak 
compare to other mining jurisdictions, like South Africa and Ghana. Thus, there is a need to 
reconsider what innovative tools and far reaching reforms are needed to maximise the 
potential Nigerian mining industry and foster infrastructure development through sustainable 
measures.  
 
The shortcomings in the Nigerian strategy associated with conventional methods has failed to 
stimulate investors or respond to the bottlenecks, prompting Nigeria to rethink how it‟s 
mining sector could incorporate new approaches to investment such as Sukuk or Islamic 
bonds. Flexibility in the investment framework has been conditioned through the mechanisms 
of legal pluralism, financial inclusion and economic freedom. The study found that the 
pluralistic nature of Nigeria‟s system, highlighted in chapter 3, the flexibility of its overall 
investment policy and law chapter 4 as well the dynamism of Islamic finance on the other 
hand from chapter 5, rendered Sukuk investment worthy of consideration within the 
investment framework for mining. However, chapter 2 reinforced that legal and 
administrative infrastructure required for Sukuk instrument is less developed in Nigeria 
compared to other countries like Malaysia, UAE and the UK where Sukuk has been 
successfully deployed. Each of these experiences, examined as comparative case studies in 
chapter 6, offered lessons and comparative perspectives to point to innovative approaches and 
sustainable approaches that could contribute to Nigerian investment diversification toward a 
more robust and competitive mining industry. While there is traditionalist, pluralist and 
secularist mechanisms for absorbing Sukuk in investment strategies, Nigeria is a unique case 
with its distinctive socio-political history that allows it to develop its own bespoke model of 
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Sukuk and conventional hybrid investment model that meets its economic, ethical and 
regulatory demands.    
 
More broadly, the thesis argues, through chapter 4, that the objectives of mining law should 
be based on community participation, corporate social responsibility and improved 
governance through constitutional guarantees of individual rights to access equitable benefits 
of sustainable development through mining and infrastructure development. This thesis 
recognises the imperative of economic growth but not as an end in itself. It argues that rather 
than a sterile legal framework or a selective investment pitch, Nigeria can render its mining 
industry as a stepping stone to socio-economic development rather than merely profit which 
exacerbates the poverty gap or the North South divide in Nigeria. In adopting the three-
pronged lens – spatial, legal and economic analysis – the thesis queries the holistic model of 
development in Nigeria that cannot avoid seeking systemic reforms while pursing 
incremental or specific changes.  
 
This study is among the first academic attempts to incorporate Islamic financial instrument 
into investment framework of Nigeria‟s extractive industry to supplement conventional 
approaches. This chapter outlines the findings, reflections and conclusion of this thesis 
through five sections. The first section highlights and discusses issues raised by the thesis in 
connection with the main research questions. The second proposes workable investment 
models for Nigeria‟s mining sector. The third section explores and posits an appropriate 
framework for Sukuk investment in Nigeria. Section four discusses the challenges associated 
with practical implementation of the outcome of this research and the limitations of the 
thesis, while section five concludes the chapter and makes recommendation for further 
research. 
 
7.1. Introduction: Framing the Study 
 
This study identified key issues and contexts related to the investment framework of the 
mining sector in Nigeria. Rather than legal frameworks or economic packages, the starting 
point is how to engage with key stakeholders towards achieving viable exploration of the 
mineral resources for equitable and sustainable development. Rather than top-down economic 
policy or bilateral deals with select corporate mining agents, understanding the dynamics and 
purposes of mining as public interest requires placing good governance at the centre of the 
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narrative. Therefore, adequacy of law is accompanied by the outcomes of laws for all 
stakeholders. Citizenry and communities who are normally intended to be the central 
beneficiary of the revenue generated from the wealth of the country, need to be included in 
the process. In practice, communities are not only deprived of the primary benefits of mining 
frustrating equitable socio-economic development but also result in social unrest, injustice 
and insecurity. This deprivation common to both solid and oil minerals communities in 
Nigeria needs to be addressed in reorienting policy objectives and implementation methods as 
well as monitoring and evaluation criteria.  
 
For example, the oil-rich Niger Delta (South-South) communities have, for decades, 
encountered armed hostility between government forces and militant members of the 
communities rebelling against the historical injustices by both multinational oil companies 
and the state. In the gold mines of the North-West axis (Zamfara and other states) internal 
and external illegal resource-extractors took advantage of a weak regulatory framework and 
to by-pass rules and local authorities. Armed bandits allegedly hired by the rentier elites have 
taken over the region, unleashing a range of crimes-namely kidnapping, theft, killing, rape 
among other things-on the innocent communities so as to create instability to pre-occupy both 
the government and mining communities, thereby providing safe atmosphere for illegal 
miners. The fundamental observation is that mining industry should be brought under the rule 
of law and human rights, not subject to political expediency or opportunism or at the mercy 
of the mining mafia. However, the thesis recognises that the legal and policy framework 
cannot be constructed merely to stop abuse but that it should also stimulate innovation, 
growth and development in line with national priorities and international development 
standards and goals such as the SDGs and the New Urban Agenda.  
 
Mining is the responsibility of both the government and the private actor to improve the 
living conditions of the community, in other words, to provide development. This thesis has 
shown that, this objective has largely been unfulfilled owing to both inefficient strategies and 
insufficient protection from waste and abuse. In spite of the Nigerian constitution that clearly 
states the role of the state authorities to harness the resources on behalf of the citizens to 
upgrade socio-economic condition of Nigeria‟s populace, successive governments have failed 
to create that prosperity and equitable development in Nigeria despite the opportunity through 
the mining industry. Although, a number of local and international factors have contributed to 
this unfortunate situation, this study focuses on one fundamental factor for underperformance 
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of government in Nigeria. This is due to basic socio-economic rights of the citizens being 
unenforceable at law thereby undermining any potential effort by Nigerians to hold their 
leadership accountable to the task of creating equitable and sustainable development. This 
executive impunity and collapse of rule of law, has been reflected in poor infrastructure as 
road and electricity, which are critical for mining industry. Similarly, widespread lack of 
human development is represented in high rate of illiteracy, unemployment and poverty, 
which is a recipe for a rise in crime and insecurity as well as a narrow skills and talent pool. 
The lack of consistent good governance thus, consequence dissuade potential investors 
through a lack of business supportive environment. 
 
Failure of extractive companies to make any significant contribution to the society means that 
the mining industry is alienated from community led support and engagement. Not just 
government, corporate social responsibility (CSR) in business and development contexts 
demand that private sector reinvests a proportion of their profit in socio-economic 
development projects aimed at enhancing the living condition of the host community. CSR 
initiative should ordinarily contribute to poverty eradication, improving literacy and good 
health through job creation, schools‟ construction and provision of health care facilities. 
However, this study has shown that, in spite of decades of profitable mining in Nigeria, there 
has been no real change to the socio-economic status of the communities. While there could 
be many possible factors to account for this imbalance, this study has focused on the lack of 
concrete legal framework for the CSR, as it has always remained an act of charity exercised 
by the resource companies at will. Further, these companies have maintained strong 
opposition to any move seeking to enforce CSR by way of legislation. Thus, it has been 
difficult to obtain adequate legal backing for mandatory CSR in Nigeria, at least in the oil 
sector. In contrast, Community Development Agreements (CDA) has since become a 
mandatory provision in the mining legislations of many African states including Nigeria. 
These provisions are potentially transformative but remain largely untested due to lack of 
serious investors in the sector. The Nigerian law and policy framework for mining and 
infrastructure development thus is opaque and resistant to bottom up participative ethos. To 
improve transparency and participative governance, it would need to have as its pillars 
constitutional guarantees or human rights, corporate social responsibility or accountability 
and CDA or recognise communities as stakeholders and ultimate beneficiaries of mining 
within national growth.     
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The decline of interest in the hard-mineral sector of the country on the part of serious foreign 
investors is a cause for concern. Unlike in the 1960s when Nigeria was the major mining 
jurisdiction, currently investors would prefer to invest in other destinations within Africa 
even though they are perhaps holding less mineral reserve than Nigeria. This is indicative of 
the fact that, the business environment in Nigeria is not persuasive compared to other 
competitors. States generate attractive investment climate through their regulatory framework 
by providing for key entry points for entrepreneurs to assess and leverage productivity in a 
mining jurisdiction. This study has highlighted that, the investment framework of the largest 
African economy did not only fall short of stability expectations for potential investors by 
ensuring peaceful mining communities, but also lacked other key features of a comprehensive 
legal regime. These elements consist of reliable and predictable fiscal regime in terms of 
royalties, taxes and charges on investments. Furthermore, investors need to be satisfied about 
robust legal protection more than anything else. Legal protection of private property against 
oppressive restrictions or arbitrary use of state apparatus are major essentials of economic 
freedom, as is access to finance. Ultimately, the mining industry has to not only be attractive 
but attract investment funds. 
 
Capital and liquidity are critical to all investment, and particularly so to mineral investment 
that is capital intensive. Multinational corporations are dissuaded from country where 
investors‟ access to funds is limited. The five elements that constitute economic freedom in a 
jurisdiction determine the response of investors. Protection of private property, unrestricted 
access to international market, regulated capital market and significant freedom to raise, use 
and move capital internationally without unnecessary restrictions, are determinant of investor 
confidence. Existence of functional and well-developed capital market encourages both large 
and small enterprises through reliable sources for investment funds. Thus, this study focused 
on expanding the revenue streams and opportunities, using the vehicle of Islamic finance 
capital market for mining sector, in addition to the already existing conventional stock 
exchange in Nigeria. 
 
The study found that Sukuk or Islamic bonds is particularly relevant for financing mining 
projects in Nigeria for several reasons. Sukuk is structurally a multi-stakeholder 
mechanism/structure for investment; it therefore has the potential to bring together the 
company, government and the mining community as partners in the resource management. 
This is likely to address the issue of community participation in the natural wealth 
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development as well as management. Another distinctive characteristic of this instrument has 
been the tendency to persuade investors at both local and global scale owing to its ethical 
characters, thereby creating opportunity for financial inclusion of a significant portion of 
Muslim and non-Muslim population of ethical investors in Nigeria.  
However, for Sukuk to operate properly in Nigeria, there must be a robust regulatory 
framework supporting its application. Being an investment instrument formulated along 
Islamic oriented legal principles, it requires appropriate legal framework in addition to the 
overall framework that regulates traditional capital market in Nigeria. In view of the 
foregoing issues, it is the thesis of this study that, creating an investment framework for 
Nigeria‟s mining sector is crucial for stimulating FDI into the country. In addition, a 
regulatory framework for Sukuk investment that reflects all necessary requirements of 
Islamic bonds is equally critical to provide source of investment funds for both the large and 
small corporations in the field of mining. 
 
7.2. A Framework for Investment in the Mining Sector 
 
The Nigerian framework for mineral investment is contained in the constitution and four 
distinct but connected legislation, namely, Nigerian Investment Promotion Commission Act 
(NIPC Act) 1995; Mining Act 2007; Company and Allied Matters Act 1990 and Investment 
and Securities Act 2007. Even though, other legislation regulating specific sectors of the 
economy do exist, NIPC Act is the centrepiece for investment in Nigeria. While the Mining 
Act is specific to legal regimes pertaining to extraction of solid resources, the Investment 
Promotion Act is the embodiment of all necessary incentives available to enterprises willing 
to invest in Nigeria. In particular, it mandates the Investment Promotion Commission to 
collate and disseminate information on potentials of the country as well as on the sources of 
investment capital and any such data likely to attract investors. Companies Act regulates the 
authority of enterprises be it foreign or local to conduct business. Investment to do with 
companies‟ securities and bonds is regulated by ISA. 
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Figure no. 1:7 Proposed Ideal investment framework for Nigeria 
An ideal investment framework for Nigeria‟s mining sector shall incorporate four elements 
identified and defined in this study as the essential components of attractive framework. 
These elements are economic freedom of investors; sustainable development; legal protection 
for the investment through the existence robust dispute resolution mechanism; and reliable as 
well as pragmatic source of finance. 
 
To achieve sustainable development, Nigeria needs to amend its 1999 constitution. The 
provision of chapter two shall be either reframed or expunged altogether from the 
constitution. In case it is to be reframed, the wording shall, not only uphold those economic 
and social rights as simply justiciable but shall also bring it into conformity with African 
Charter on Human and People‟s Rights, ratified by Nigeria. This would recognise socio-
economic development as fundamental human rights of the citizens, as do countries like 
South Africa in the region. The positive impact of this constitutional amendment on the 
governance and development as well as the mining sector could be significant. Existence of a 
legal window within the constitution allowing citizens to challenge the performance of the 
political class, alongside a functional judicial system would mean active pursuit of the rule of 
law. This would eventually serve as a watchdog to provide checks on the officialdom against 
uneven redistribution of resource revenue, because government is held accountable to its 
citizens. In essence, this situation creates pressure for government to use the wealth of the 
country as belonging to the people in executing socio-economic projects and national 
development.   
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Naturally, development attracts investors and hence promotes economy. Where a country 
improves its essential infrastructure, namely, road, electricity, clean water, schools and 
hospitals, would be able to breed healthy, peaceful and productive society. Local availability 
of skilled manpower and necessary infrastructure would reduce the cost of production and, of 
course, increase profitability of business, which eventually attracts investors. On the other 
side, increasing presence of enterprises and business entities, translates into creation of more 
jobs and earning opportunities for the community. Thus, there is symbiotic relationship 
between development and investment, a likely outcome of the proposed constitutional 
amendment. 
 
Dispute resolution mechanism or functional judicial system is key to investment. 
Comprehensive provision for dispute settlement within the investment regime of a state 
constitutes a cornerstone of ideal framework. Investors are attracted to a stable jurisdiction 
that provides greater certainty and protection for their capital. Specifically, four components 
must exist in order to produce a credible dispute resolution mechanism necessary to enhance 
the confidence of potential investors. One is adequacy. Substantial law on investment must be 
clear and up-to-date in terms of rights and obligations of all parties as well as remedies 
obtainable in case of breach of any such rights and obligations. Currently, there is a yawning 
gap between investment policy and the law in Nigeria, legislation did not fully reflect some 
area areas of investment which the policy has already envisaged. One such area relevant to 
this thesis is Sukuk investment. The extent of inadequacy would be discussed under 
economic freedom and framework for Sukuk. 
 
Another key feature of a credible and predictable dispute resolution mechanism is existence 
of a well-equipped judicial infrastructure. Although, physical existence of purpose-built court 
rooms within access are an important element of this infrastructure, qualified personnel 
possessing relevant legal expertise and ensuring decent remuneration for all staffs bottom-to-
top is more essential. Lack of adequate compensation for non-judges‟ member staffs and poor 
pay for lower courts‟ judges has generated incentives for corruption in Nigeria‟s judiciary. 
Gradually this scourge of corruption has permeated the entire judicial system and infected 
even the well-paid judges of the higher courts of records. Politicians driven by self-interest 
would use already compromised registry staff to reach out to benchers with juicy offers or 
threat of removal from office, a kind of which only a saint can resist. Ultimately, the result of 
this ill-equipped judicial infrastructure was inconsistency in rulings and out right subversion 
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of justice, in some occasion. This is conclusive feature of unpredictable system. Thus, rather 
than mining laws, it is the legal system itself that needs reform. 
 
Third component of an ideal investment dispute resolution framework is independence. 
Generally, judicial independence entails lack of or being free from interference with the 
course of justice, however, for Nigeria‟s purpose, independence of judiciary shall require a 
next level definition. Thus, the system must be free from any avenue for interference with the 
way and manner courts of law discharge its constitutional duties. Again, this definition would 
mean, no external party, not even the executive could take undue advantage of its legitimate 
powers towards tempting judicial staffs by use of favour or fear. This arrangement would 
appear to suggest a watertight separation of power, which is impracticable in the 
representative democracy, given the requirement of check and balance between the three 
arms of government. Nevertheless, what sought to be achieved here is not absolute 
independence but rather near-absolute. Constitutional power of executive to temporarily 
suspend or permanently remove a judicial officer should be reviewed, stringent conditions 
including a requirement for endorsement by both national and state assemblies be 
incorporated. Also, fiscal allocation of judiciary should be a fixed percentage of the revenue 
akin to that of states, which is to be determined by the National Revenue and Fiscal 
Allocation and Formula Derivation Commission. Finally, on this note, to guard against any 
abuse of such a system severe punishment must be provide against any attempt to 
compromise official duty by a judicial officer or external party or by both. 
 
Last of the four components of a comprehensive dispute resolution mechanism is availability 
of alternatives to litigation. Investors would usually prefer to get investment disputes resolved 
by means other than normal court room proceedings, due to several reasons. Some of the 
reasons include publicity, delay, future reference and the most common is technicalities 
involved. Nonetheless, proper judicial system with the characters mentioned above represents 
a trademark of friendly business environment, even though investors would prefer other 
settlement process like arbitration. Essentially, investment framework should be inclusive 
one, incorporating national and international as well as ethical ways of settling investment 
differences. By and large, recognition of other alternative dispute resolution mechanism is a 
feature of attractive investment framework.  
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In Nigeria, both the Mining Act and Investment and Securities Act provided for alternative 
resolution, but also missed to reflect mechanism relevant to Sukuk investment. Although, 
Islamic judicial principles have an established presence within the Nigerian legal system,467 
dispute resolution mechanism based on this legal system is missing from the investment 
framework. Hence, a mechanism like that of either Malaysia or UAE has been proposed as 
would be discussed hereunder. Both countries have been studied quite extensively in this 
thesis, yet due to their distinctive nature, historical backgrounds as well as varying benefits 
and challenges for investment, one can hardly conclude which is more suitable for Nigeria. 
Hence both sides have been argued. 
 
7.3. Framework for Sukuk Investment in Nigeria 
 
It has been established in this thesis that, Sukuk investment has potential to facilitate 
development of the mining sector in Nigeria. Given the capacity of this instrument to spur 
infrastructure development and to provide liquidity for investment, it can thus create enabling 
environment for mining investors. Countries like Indonesia, Malaysia and GCC have made 
remarkable development through Sukuk. 
 
Smooth application of Sukuk instrument in Nigeria would require adoption of framework like 
those of the leading jurisdictions. Even though, issuance of Sukuk is not new to Nigeria‟s 
investment hub, legal and administrative structures needed for large scale and sustainable use 
of it is less developed compare to countries like Malaysia, UAE and even UK. Chapter six 
shows that, in each of these destinations there have been essential facilities in place, that 
make the use of Sukuk both practical and productive for the government and the private 
investors. Fundamentally, two elements are critical to functional Sukuk market. One is the 
governance aspect relating to the ethical nature of the Islamic bonds and second is economic 
freedom necessary to support investors. 
 
Chapter five argued that, Sukuk or Islamic bond is substantially dissimilar to conventional 
bonds, although there are certain features that are common to both. The main point of 
departure is that Sukuk being a financing instrument formulated along Islamic legal 
principles, is not allowed to operate as a debt instrument, rather it must be an undivided 
                                                          
467
 Chapter 3 of this thesis is partially dedicated for this aspect  
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beneficial ownership of the investment asset. Thus, there is a host of legal principles set to 
ensure compliance with this ethical inhibition in strict sense. A comprehensive framework 
must reflect these legal principles and develop sophisticated protection mechanism against 
breach of any of them.  
 
In Malaysia, the approach taken to address the ethical character of Sukuk was twofold: 
legislative and institutional. Widespread legislative reforms were made to provide legal basis 
for the existence of Islamic commercial principles in the national investment framework. In 
this regard, key legislations to do with Finance-Central Bank Act, Securities Commission Act 
as well as Capital Market Services Act have been accordingly amended. Secondly, 
institutions empowered by the reform to regulate Sukuk, mainly Bank Negara and Securities 
Commission developed institutional unit with Islamic bond in focus and produced 
comprehensive guidelines to ensure ethical governance and compliance. In addition, 
international financial regulations and standards have been incorporated into Malaysia‟s 
national framework to consolidate locally provided ethical standard. Therefore, Malaysian 
approach is distinct for being pluralistic as it is evident from convergence of laws to govern a 
subject matter, and it is also state-regulated. 
 
Nigeria should seek to create robust framework on Malaysia‟s model to transform its Sukuk 
market into international investment hub. In order to achieve this transformation, extensive 
law reform aiming at creating a consolidated national Sukuk investment structure is critical. 
This would mean amending Nigeria‟s key investment legislations, including but not limited 
to Investment Securities Act, Central Bank Act, Investment Promotion Commission Act, 
Mining Act and Companies and Allied Matters Act. To brace up the strength of this 
framework, key financial market and investment regulatory institutions such as Securities and 
Exchange Commission along with Central Bank should come up with some comprehensive 
national guidelines for Sukuk reflecting the national framework as well as important 
international regulations meant for safeguarding ethical and international financial standards. 
This should include International Islamic Financial Market (IIFM) standards (World Bank); 
Accounting and Auditing of Islamic Organisations and Financial Institution (AAIOFI) 
standards on Sukuk; and International Organisation of Securities Commission (IOSC) 
objectives and principles. A comprehensive and pluralistic framework as such is required to 
ensure effective governance and persuade smooth conduct of Sukuk investment both local 
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and global levels. This proposed sophisticated framework should assume regulatory 
institutional structure given below. 
 
 
Figure no. 2:7 Proposed comprehensive frameworks for Sukuk 
 
Above structure demonstrate triple checks mechanism imbedded in the framework to provide 
safeguard against any potential risk of Shari‟ah governance which is the most essential 
character of Sukuk instrument. Presence of committee of legal experts in three institutions 
would provide great certainty for investors as to strict compliance with the ethical principles 
underlying Islamic bonds at all crucial stages of transaction. Any Sukuk transaction whether 
proceeding from a private entity or state must be exposed to these three checking points, 
namely Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV), Central Bank at structuring and packaging level, and 
finally Securities and Exchange Commission at marketing stage. This is crucial because 
ethical feature is the primary element of Sukuk that attract investors. Triple checks apply to 
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both sovereign and private issuances, particularly important in case of corporate issuance 
because as level of risk in the private is higher. Where a holder of mining lease is taking on 
partners through Sukuk investment such a deal would need to be registered with original 
grantor of the lease as well as investment promotion commission for transparency and greater 
security for investors. Certain incentives might be attached to this requirement in order to 
encourage compliance. 
 
To facilitate use of Sukuk in the Nigeria‟s extractive industries, recognition of Sukuk as a 
source for investment capital must be reflected in the principal legislations related to mining. 
Primary function of NIPC is to promote investment in the country. This objective is achieved 
by, inter alia, disseminating information about investment opportunities, which includes 
minerals potentials, and availability of various ways of raising investment capital in Nigeria. 
National investment database developed for this purpose and put out to investors world-wide 
through the NIPC Portal should reflect Sukuk categorically. Further, the investment 
promotion handout should contain a highlight on the viability of Sukuk market in the country 
as there are over one hundred million potential subscribers for such an ethical investment 
domestically.468 Similarly, the Mining Act shall recognise the right of the appropriate mining 
lease holder to create a sublease by dint of Sukuk certificates over the subject matter covered 
by the main grant. Inserting this provision into the Act is crucial because while the current 
position of law restricts reassignment of the mining lease, issuance of Islamic bonds legally 
operates to create beneficial co-ownership over the asset (i.e. the minefield). 
 
Sukuk should be specifically included in update of laws and policies. Given the difference 
between Sukuk and traditional bond is a fundamental one,469 the former must not be simply 
assumed to have always been subsumed automatically in the latter, except where the 
expression so admits. Clear example would the rights of mining companies, like any other 
corporate entity to raise capital for their projects through issuance of bonds or debentures, 
which do not need to be backed by physical assets of the company but backed solely by the 
full faith and credit of the issuer. This right does not extend to include Sukuk as they are 
                                                          
468 This point is proven by over-subscription of the debut road infrastructure Sukuk issued in Nigeria in the year 
2017 
469 Argument about material particulars distinguishing Sukuk from traditional bonds has been presented in 
chapter 2. Presence of debt element in the latter, which is completely absent in the former underscores the main 
parting point between the two. 
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meant for borrowing money through creation of floating charges on the asset of the company 
but not allocation of partnership over the beneficial ownership of the asset in question. 
 
To facilitate widespread upgrade of infrastructure through Sukuk investment, Nigeria needs 
to create a link between national infrastructure development plan and Sukuk, prioritizing 
areas essential to mineral sector. National Integrated Infrastructure Master Plan 2030 should 
be amended to redefine its priority. For the period, the focus should be on power and 
transport linking the hot mining spots in Nigeria to major international egresses, namely sea 
ports and cargo airports in the country to facilitate onward exportation of minerals. In 
addition to state efforts, the framework should be encouraging private investment through 
provision of monumental incentives for infrastructure Sukuk. Incentives in this regard can 
take a form of guarantee of indemnity by the state, which will create certainty and credibility 
for such corporate Sukuk similar to those of sovereign issuance, and thereby winning the 
confidence of both local and foreign investors. Given the examples of countries like 
Indonesia, if properly and carefully implemented in Nigeria, infrastructure Sukuk has the 
potentials to bring about speedy transformation of the country‟s creaky power and crumbling 
transport infrastructure, and, thus, would ultimately revive investment into the mining sector. 
 
7.4. Resolution of Sukuk Disputes 
 
Chapter four and six highlighted significance of dispute resolution mechanism, It constitutes 
one of the key factor‟s investors use to determine strength and weakness of a framework. 
Generally, investors would feel unsafe where they are not well-protected against defaults that 
could arise out of their transactions. In contrast, existence of effective system to address 
investment grievances creates greater certainty for Sukuk investors. And as such, the 
framework for Sukuk in Nigeria has to incorporate a structure for disputes resolution that 
would be suitable for Islamic bonds. Although, cases studied in chapter six of this thesis 
reveal several judicial approaches to Sukuk disputes, yet two models have appeared to 
provide informative guides to emerging jurisdictions like Nigeria. 
 
Nigeria might confer jurisdiction to entertain Sukuk disputes on the regular Courts. 
Nevertheless, such regular courts must be superior courts of record, and applying Islamic 
legal principles to determine issues of Islamic finance, as it is the case in Malaysia. However, 
this model would face two challenges in Nigeria. States‟ High Courts are not competent to 
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entertain Sukuk disputes, because currently, Nigeria‟s constitution has vested exclusive 
jurisdiction in the Federal High Court over all matters to do with companies and Allied 
Matters, including bonds related disputes. Secondly, lack of legal expertise in the field. While 
High Court judges in Malaysia might be learned in both Shari‟ah and common law, Federal 
High Courts are predominantly manned by those that are trained and only qualify in common 
law. 
Alternatively, Nigeria might establish a special court within economic free zone of the 
country. The court shall function as an umbrella housing a syndicate of various judicial 
options respectively suitable for varying investment disputes. Although, the main legal order 
of the court is based on British commercial legal principles, yet it draws on members with 
expertise in all other legal system including Shari‟ah. In addition, the court offers arbitration 
facility as the first option for all members. No other judicial step can be taken unless and until 
arbitration has failed.  However, the court will only have jurisdiction with respect to matters 
involving members registered with the zone. This is UAE model. To create more certainty for 
Sukuk investors, Corporate Affairs Commission shall require all intending corporate Sukuk 
issuers to register with the zone. Setting up a regime of this nature in Nigeria would also have 
its own challenges. Fundamentally, this arrangement presupposes existence of entrepreneurial 
capitalism. 
 
Entrepreneurial capitalism or economic freedom is another aspect of a persuasive investment 
framework. Generally, indicators of economic freedom are legal protection of private right 
and property, removal of unnecessary restrictions to business, creation of functional capital 
market and access to sound money. Co-existence of these factors makes a jurisdiction an 
economic free zone and boost its popularity among investors. This is the main approach 
adopted by UAE and has been discussed elaborately in chapter six.  
 
This thesis would prefer UAE model for Nigeria‟s framework. Given the international 
character of the judicial infrastructure of investment zone, it is likely that this will attract not 
only local but also foreign investor into the country. Chapter six has shown the fortunes of 
UAE following their setting up of free investment zones. In a span of just two years, DIFC 
attracted 750 companies who put together brought in investment capital of about USD 18 
billion into infrastructure alone. The amount of FDI flow into UAE equates that of entire sub-
Saharan countries of Africa put together. Additionally, the presence of multi-dimensional 
legal approach in the court would create confidence that the settlement process shall duly 
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consider the ethical perspective of Sukuk investment. Furthermore, the offer to resolve 
disputes through arbitration is a push towards amicable resolution which is a wholesome 
option for investors. Considering business relationship between parties to arbitration is more 
likely to remain cordial compare to aftermath of legal battles which is usually adversarial in 
nature, the former underscores investors‟ preference. 
 
7.5. Challenges and Limitations of this Research 
 
Like any other research work, reform proposal presented in this thesis are not without 
challenges and limitations. The thesis has put forward an argument of what are the key issues 
undermining investment in the Nigeria‟s mining sector and how they can be tackled through 
adapting to innovative investment tools by making policy and law reforms necessary for 
repositioning the industry. However, there are challenges and limitations that could hamper 
the smooth process of achieving those objectives. These challenges basically relate to issues 
of governance and implementation; security and bureaucracy; as well as the extent to which 
this will impact development. These issues are discussed under separate headings below: 
7.5.1. Political and Government (Legislative Agenda and Implementation) 
 
Core submissions of this thesis involve proposals for policy and law reform intended to serve 
as guide for government officials and policy makers. On socio-economic front, this study has 
argued that, unless chapter two of the constitution is restated to hold the government in 
Nigeria judicially accountable to its citizens as regards economic equity and judicious 
management of mining revenue to drive growth and development, then prosperity will 
continue to be a mirage in the country. Because, the current position of the constitution which 
is in favour of non-justiciability of socio-economic rights, creates incentives for executive 
impunity and therefore feeds corruption and poor governance. Hence, the proposal for the 
amendment of the constitution became relevant. Similarly, the main proposition of this study 
for creation of comprehensive Sukuk framework suggested several policy formulations and 
reform of various legislations, including but not limited to the Mining Act, Investment and 
Securities Act, and NIPC Act. Beyond this reform, periodic guidelines for Sukuk investment 
are to be issued by key regulating institutions using the expertise of their respective SACs to 
ensure implementation of government‟s policy and legislations. These tasks are usually faced 
with certain challenges. 
 204 
 
 
To begin with, the act of making laws itself is an uneasy task in developing countries 
including Nigeria. Getting a bill through legislative process has always been a challenging 
task for the political class to perform in Nigeria due to issues of poor governance, which 
often see executive and legislature at loggerhead with each other. As a result, the country is 
still operating upon laws that are conspicuously out-dated. Typical example in this regard, is 
petroleum industry whose governing laws dates back to almost six decades, the industry is 
begging for an update, but to no avail.  The bill (PIB) intended to reform the oil and gas 
sector has been lying in frustration on the floor of national assembly for over twenty years 
now. Persistent deadlock on who should get what, has been the main reason behind this 
unnecessary delay. Failure to pass the bill seeking to concretize and institutionalise CSR of 
multinationals in 2008, was yet another instance demonstrating the extent to which political 
hitches could defeat the essence of any reform involving legislative agenda in Nigeria.  
 
Further, even where recommendations are reflected through legislation, they oftentimes 
remain as reform on papers. Proposals and recommendations of many researches works, 
conferences and even governmental bodies (ad-hoc committees etc.) had resulted into state 
policies and regulations, yet practical implementation has become an issue. The problem is 
multidimensional: official impunity (rule of law); self-centred attitude; and compromising 
standard. It would appear that, all issues of poor governance in Africa are related to 
corruption. Thus, the fundamental issue for good governance in Nigeria is corruption. The 
menace of corruption has led to fall in standard and quality of service in every sector of both 
public and private arenas. This explains the reason as to why development, be it 
infrastructure, socio-economic, human or otherwise, have all been stagnated despite 
monumental economic fortunes driven mainly through oil and gas sector of the country.  
 
This element of poor governance has been so systemic in Nigeria that; it is championed by 
almost all institutions and thus, has the tendency to undermine any effort to promote 
development agenda. While legislative and judicial institutions are characterized by undue 
delay in making laws and disposition of matters respectively, the executive and its agencies 
have been notorious for compromising standard; failure to implement law and policy to the 
letter and spirit; and promotion of personal objectives at the expense of national interest. In 
consequence, it is plausible argue that, even if Nigeria succeeds in transforming its mining 
sector into functional one through implementing reform agenda advanced in this study, this 
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achievement would only increase the revenue base of the federal government but might not 
necessarily mean translation of economic growth into opportunities that could benefit the 
citizens due to corruption. Nonetheless, the proposed amends to chapter two of the 
constitution is targeted at strengthening rule of law and accountability to ensure even 
redistribution of resource revenue and quell corruption. 
 
Furthermore, to root out corruption in the system, this thesis would suggest establishment of 
ethics and standard board in Nigeria. Like in the UK, standard board shall set ethical standard 
for every prospective legislative, judicial and executive officer in the country. Failing to 
satisfy the standard before, during or after tenure in office must be consequential, sanctioned 
to carry high-handed punitive measures. By implication, this would mean that, the board shall 
have powers to suspend and dismiss summarily from office such officers that breach the law 
by engaging in conducts falling below the ethical standard. That would also mean placing the 
board ahead of all three arms of government even though it generates its legitimacy from the 
constitution. 
 
7.5.2 Security and Bureaucracy  
 
This research did not delve much into the areas of security and bureaucracy, yet they have 
significant impact on shaping business environment. Investors would consider security to 
lives and properties, as one of the key issues forming the basis for risk assessment. 
Accordingly, existence of any elements posing real or perceived danger to potential investors 
would have the tendency of discouraging them from undertaking business in that jurisdiction. 
Thus, prevalence of factors such as Boko Haram insurgency, herdsmen and farmer crisis as 
well as kidnapping in northern Nigeria where most of the mining sites are located, would 
have substantial impact on the flow of mineral investment into the country. Although this 
aspect has not been looked at in depth, significance of cordial relationship between resource 
extracting companies and host community, which provides social license for mining projects 
has been discussed under CDA in chapter four. 
 
Insurgency and prevalence of organised crime undermine investor confidence. In spite the 
fact that, serious mining activities involving foreign entities has not been present in Nigeria in 
large scale sufficient enough to assess the real impact of these elements on the prospects of 
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mining, assumptions could be drawn from the oil sector. Militants‟ reaction to resource 
extraction in the oil-rich Niger-Delta region of Nigeria has caused significant reduction in 
production capacity of the country for a number of years, forcing investors into divestment on 
one hand, and the government to adopt new policies on the other. Thus, given the 
significance of security to investment success and profitability, unless the prevailing state of 
insecurity is addressed, boko haram insurgency, kidnapping and communal crisis will 
continue to threaten the thrive of mineral investment in Nigeria regardless of sound 
investment framework. 
Another important perspective to security as far as mining is concerned is the security of 
tenure. Inasmuch as geological potentials are crucial to investors in the mineral sector so also 
the existence of a sound land policy in the jurisdiction. Unsettled titles to land constitute a 
recipe for conflict between investors and original title holders. Given the fact majority of 
what the government has designated as strategic sites for mining in Nigeria occur in rural 
areas on one hand, and the dependence of rural economy on agriculture, sound land policy is 
critical to successful mining. Taking over agrarian lands for mining could lead to rural people 
losing shelter, land for farming and grazing. Beyond economic attachment, significance of 
land to rural society has acquired social and political sentiment. This study has made 
reference to nature of rights available to mining leaseholders in Nigeria and their implications 
to titleholders. In contrast, rights of private landowner to minerals under their land as obtain 
in the United Kingdom have been discussed. However, this thesis did not elaborate on 
Nigeria‟s land policy in general, or various types of tenure system in the country.470 
 
Bureaucracy has also been a factor dissuading investors from conservative jurisdictions. 
Excessive administrative procedure constitutes obstacles to economic freedom and hinders 
flow of investment. States have been proactive in removing unnecessary requirements for 
lengthy documentations in order to ease business. By implication, where a country requires 
investors to go through various government officials to obtain several approvals before 
undertaking a business, that approach creates disincentives for potential investors. In contrast, 
investors are attracted to jurisdictions where the use of modern technology has been adopted 
and all documentation is done by click of a computer button. This approach is bound to gain 
more popularity because it saves time and cost for investors, and therefore more efficient. 
The more efficient the approach is, the lesser the cost of investment. Relaxing complexity 
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 Chapters 4 & 6 
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associated with documentation is an essential indicator of   the level of economic freedom 
available in a given state. Chapter six highlighted the concept of economic freedom including 
the impact of bureaucracy on investment. Yet, there was neither extensive analysis of its 
indicators nor specific assessment of past and present impact on Nigeria. 
 
Connected to the issue of bureaucracy is frequent change of law and regulations without 
proper notice or due consultations. Bureaucratic vicissitude is typical feature of African 
countries including Nigeria and owing mainly to political instability and self-aggrandisement 
of those happen to be in power at a particular period. Successive governments almost always 
come up with new policies to water down any achievement holding credit to the predecessor. 
At time policy change might be influenced by desire to pacify a group for their political 
loyalty to the head of government. Given the multi-ethnic and multi-faith feature of Nigeria, 
this kind of switch in policy might be fuelled by mere sentiment. All these shifts in policy 
which are likely to result in sudden and significant change of investment regulations with 
tendency to affect business interest of enterprises in the country are often introduced without 
enough or any notice. This practice exposes the entrepreneur to the risk of unpredictable 
circumstances, which undermines investor confidence in that jurisdiction. Although this 
thesis has pointed out the negative impact of unnecessary bureaucracy on investment,471 it did 
not into quantitative analysis of this impact in Nigeria. 
 
Productive mining does depend not only on sound framework for investment and Sukuk, but 
also stability of those policies and consistency in their application. Thus, unless a sort of 
protection against political and bureaucratic vicissitude is provided for policies made in the 
interest of the nation, important innovation such as framework for Sukuk could be potentially 
liable to suffer serious sabotage simply on the account of religious or political sentiment. To 
guard against such inconsistency, an inbuilt protection mechanism within the framework 
would be necessary. A provision shall be inserted into any such legislation stipulating 
conditions and procedure of introducing any amendment or reform to it. That should include 
public consultation and securing two third majority of both the state and national assemblies. 
This would ensure checks against arbitrary use of power by the political class to scrap 
progressive policies and important institutions against public interest. 
 
                                                          
471 Chapter four and six 
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7.4.3 Impact on Development 
 
Overall essence of mining is development. State harness resources in order to drive 
development and prosperity for its people, revenue generated from mineral investment meant 
primarily for raising the living condition of the citizens. Beyond the present time, resource 
management also means devising ways to sustaining the prosperity for future generation. 
This is the main objective underpinning all mining and investment policies. Accordingly, 
creating a framework for Sukuk and investment in the mining sector must have an impact on 
development.  
 
This thesis would have impact on Nigeria‟s economy. Reforming the investment framework 
means transforming the mining sector into functional one, attractive to investors world-wide. 
In crude terms, the increase of investment in solid minerals literally means an increase in the 
national revenue. Although, unlike oil minerals where state is actively involved in exploration 
activities through national oil company (NNPC), only private enterprises undertake extraction 
in the hard resources industry. Nevertheless, revenue from mineral investment accrues to 
state coffers in terms of royalty and a number of tax categories. And by implication, this 
would reduce the strain put on oil and gas industry by overdependence of Nigeria‟s economy 
on petroleum. Chapter one noted significant improvement recorded by some destinations in 
African on mining contribution to GDP. Currently, contribution of mining sector to GDP in 
Nigeria is comparatively insignificant; yet, the proposal of this study would ultimately have 
impact on the economy including the GDP. 
 
As well as impact on infrastructure development, Infrastructure is one of the two key nexuses 
between Sukuk investment and mining industry as identified in this study. While mining 
success depends heavily on stable power and good transport network, Sukuk serves as 
innovative means of creating those facilities. Thus, the argument of this thesis creating 
comprehensive framework for Sukuk investment provides incentives for developing 
electricity and road infrastructure, which are crucial for mining. For any approach to mining 
to be effective it must consider connecting rural parts of Nigeria, where mining activities take 
place, to the air and sea ports. These rural areas are currently disconnected. Further, to reduce 
the cost of technical and industrial expenses, stable electric power supply is critical. Hence, 
the proposal holistic reform of the Nigeria‟s mining sector incorporates a proposal for 
significant infrastructure upgrade. 
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Closely related to infrastructure development is industrial development. Since 1990s many 
industries have shut down operation in Nigeria due to high cost of production resulting from 
power shortage, which consequently resulted in monumental loss of jobs. The impact of this 
research on infrastructure development has the potential of reversing the negative effect 
emanated from shortage of power. Infrastructure Sukuk has been used widely and 
successfully to provide capital for investment in power generation across the world. In 
addition, revival of mining industry would provide raw material for many factories and 
industries in Nigeria; Aluminium zinc, ceramic, cement, among others. Availability of these 
raw materials couple with stable power supply would create incentives for setting up factories 
and industries across Nigeria. 
 
All the above would generate socio-economic impact on the society. Sukuk investment seeks 
to persuade investment in the mining sector. Mining generates revenue, which primarily 
inflates economic fortunes of the state, in other words economic growth. Economic growth is 
normally giving state financial capacity to create socio-economic prosperity. This include 
establishment of schools and learning centres, healthcare facilities and job opportunities. All 
these factors put together increases socio-economic fortunes of individual members in the 
society. Combined effect of this is that such a society would be both peaceful and productive. 
Because standard healthcare and quality education are likely to produce wholesome and 
skilful individuals capable of adding value to industries and organisations, that employ them. 
Thus, they are attractive to employers, and the employment provides decent compensation for 
their talent. In effect, this symbiotic relationship creates mutual benefits and thereby drives 
growth and eliminates poverty. In contrast, high rate illiteracy and widespread unemployment 
are catalyst for social unrest and conflict. Cases of Boko Haram and Niger Delta militants 
recruiting from the teaming unemployed Nigerian youth afford good example. 
 
In addition, both infrastructures Sukuk and mineral extraction provide incentives for factories 
and industries to come live; this would inevitably promote job creation. A host number of 
companies that forced by lack of necessary infrastructure to close down, are likely to start 
business again in the event power supply becomes stable. And by implication, this would 
further reduce unemployment rate. Furthermore, the potentials of the mining industry to 
provide raw materials needed for industrial development create incentives for both 
government and the private sector to take initiatives in creating industries in the country. In 
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addition to cheap raw material, availability of electricity makes it even more efficient to run 
industries in the country. Again, this would offer more recruitment opportunities. 
 
However, impact of this study on development is not without challenges. Revenue generation 
and economic fortunes do not translate into socio-economic prosperity automatically. Rather, 
good governance is a key to transforming financial fortunes into good living, social 
prosperity and earning opportunity for people. Thus, unless there is in place a system to 
check and ensure transparency and accountability in resource management, the impact of this 
study on development might be unlikely. This is the current situation with oil and gas 
industry: despite the monumental revenue the sector generates, socio-economic indicators of 
Nigeria have persistently been recording far below expectation. Therefore, amending chapter 
two of the constitution is expedient to enable the citizens hold state authorities accountable 
for their failure to drive development. This is, however, highly challenging as the procedure 
for amending the constitution is cumbersome one, demanding two third majority supports 
from all state houses of assemblies as well as the national assembly. Given that, the 
amendment is meant to check their excesses, the political class is unlikely to endorse this 
reform. Except there is pressure created through a push from electorate within respective 
constituencies of the legislatures and international bodies from outside. 
 
7.5 Further Research  
 
The scope of this thesis is limited to the use of Sukuk to revive investment in the Nigeria‟s 
mining sector. Although it touches on issues of governance, socio-economic development 
and sustainability being matters incidental to mining, the focus has been the use of policy and 
regulatory framework to create enabling environment for innovative investment practices 
within the mining industry of Nigeria, with overall objective geared towards diversifying the 
revenue base of the country. Thus, effective and even redistribution of revenue generated 
from that investment to create prosperity is not covered in this study. Also, given the fact that 
mining in sector in Nigeria is a private sector-driven industry, more attention has been given 
to corporate Sukuk as compare to sovereign Sukuk. Hence, further specific research might be 
carried out on these areas.  
 
7.6 Conclusion 
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This thesis has argued that, Sukuk investment has the potential to revive Nigeria‟s mining 
industry in two ways, namely project-financing and infrastructure financing. Infrastructure 
Sukuk has served as catalyst for upgrading power and transport infrastructure in countries 
like Indonesia, Malaysia, UK and some GCC countries. Power and road network are the key 
issues undermining efficiency of mining in Nigeria. While this element of inefficiency puts 
the cost of investment in the country high and thereby dissuading multinationals from 
injecting their capital on one hand, and on the other, lack of liquidity has rendered local 
miners less productive in the sector. The thesis demonstrated how Sukuk instruments could 
address both situations. However, smooth application of this instrument in Nigeria could be 
hindered by lack of comprehensive investment framework, which is both inclusive and 
suitable. 
 
Further, the thesis argued that, to stimulate this innovative investment tool, Nigeria needs to 
create enabling business environment for Islamic bonds within its overall investment 
framework. Creation of such a framework would require a paradigm shift in policy and law 
as obtains in the leading jurisdictions namely, Malaysia, Dubai and UK. These countries have 
pursued significant amendments to their investment regimes in order to reflect basic 
requirements of Sukuk, and consequently attained remarkable success. Accordingly, Nigeria 
has to incorporate similar reform as proposed in this thesis to allow productive operation of 
this instrument in the mining sector of the country. To reinvigorate the solid mineral industry 
in Nigeria, this thesis proposed an integrated reform, encompassing key essential components 
of a functional mining industry, namely, investment, infrastructure as well as law and policy. 
Adopting three-pronged approach (legal, economic and spatial), the study highlighted 
interlinkages between these areas and key statutory provisions that need to be addressed. 
 
This reform is necessary to create alternative source of revenue for Nigeria as the oil and gas 
industry has been in gradual but progressive decline. Solid minerals sector has been identified 
as one of the country‟s potential to replace oil and gas in the event of the latter winds up 
completely. Thus, there is need to transform the sector into a functional and productive one, 
and to achieve this objective it is crucial creation of efficient mining business environment. 
Efficient mining industry depends on not only sound regulatory framework but also reliable 
power and transport infrastructure. In addition, practical, inclusive and accessible capital 
market is critical to building local content as it creates avenue for empowering domestic 
enterprises and artisanal mining. Nigeria needs to factor these three elements-sound 
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regulations; infrastructure development; and access to investment capital-into the on-going 
reform of the mineral sector. The proposals put forward by this thesis contribute to this 
holistic reform. 
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